Test invalid replicated signatures are rejected

This commit is contained in:
Eric Wendland 2026-05-22 14:19:17 +02:00
commit 2a8a348b97
2 changed files with 212 additions and 4 deletions

View file

@ -789,6 +789,210 @@ fn unsigned_keychain_and_auth_ops_are_rejected_during_peer_sync() {
);
}
#[test]
fn invalidly_signed_keychain_and_auth_ops_are_rejected_during_peer_sync() {
let left_home = tempfile::tempdir().expect("left tempdir");
let right_home = tempfile::tempdir().expect("right tempdir");
if !unix_sockets_available(left_home.path()) || !unix_sockets_available(right_home.path()) {
return;
}
assert!(run_geth(left_home.path(), &["init"]).status.success());
assert!(run_geth(right_home.path(), &["init"]).status.success());
for home in [left_home.path(), right_home.path()] {
std::fs::write(
home.join("config.toml"),
"[iroh]\nrelay_mode = \"disabled\"\nlocal_discovery = false\n",
)
.expect("write config");
}
let fake_admin_public_key =
"ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIFakeAdminKeyMaterialForNegativeTests test@geth\n";
let fake_admin_public_key_path = left_home.path().join("fake-admin.pub");
std::fs::write(&fake_admin_public_key_path, fake_admin_public_key)
.expect("write fake admin public key");
let mut left_daemon = spawn_daemon(left_home.path());
let mut right_daemon = spawn_daemon(right_home.path());
wait_for_socket(&left_home.path().join("run/geth.sock"));
wait_for_socket(&right_home.path().join("run/geth.sock"));
let trust_admin = run_geth(
left_home.path(),
&[
"keychain",
"init",
"--admin-key",
fake_admin_public_key_path
.to_str()
.expect("fake admin public key path"),
],
);
assert!(
trust_admin.status.success(),
"trust admin stderr: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&trust_admin.stderr)
);
let left_card_path = left_home.path().join("left-peer-card.json");
let right_card_path = right_home.path().join("right-peer-card.json");
assert!(
run_geth(
left_home.path(),
&[
"peer",
"export",
"--out",
left_card_path.to_str().expect("left card path"),
],
)
.status
.success()
);
assert!(
run_geth(
right_home.path(),
&[
"peer",
"export",
"--out",
right_card_path.to_str().expect("right card path"),
],
)
.status
.success()
);
let right_card_json = std::fs::read_to_string(&right_card_path).expect("read right card");
let right_card: geth_discovery::PeerCard =
serde_json::from_str(&right_card_json).expect("decode right card");
assert!(
run_geth(
left_home.path(),
&[
"peer",
"import",
right_card_path.to_str().expect("right card path"),
],
)
.status
.success()
);
assert!(
run_geth(
right_home.path(),
&[
"peer",
"import",
left_card_path.to_str().expect("left card path"),
],
)
.status
.success()
);
let signer = geth_types::KeyId::new(geth_ssh_identity::ssh_public_key_fingerprint(
fake_admin_public_key,
));
let keychain_op = geth_keychain::KeychainOp {
id: geth_types::AuthOpId::new("keychain-op:invalid-signature-user-add"),
created_at: geth_types::UnixMillis(20),
kind: geth_keychain::KeychainOpKind::UserAdd {
user: geth_types::UserId::new("user:invalid-signature"),
name: "Invalid Signature".to_owned(),
},
};
let auth_op = geth_auth::AuthOp {
id: geth_types::AuthOpId::new("auth-op:invalid-signature-grant"),
resource: geth_types::ResourceId::new("resource:ssh-proxy:local"),
created_at: geth_types::UnixMillis(21),
kind: geth_auth::AuthOpKind::GrantCreate {
grant_id: "grant:invalid-signature".to_owned(),
principal: geth_types::PrincipalId::new("node:invalid-signature"),
capabilities: vec![geth_types::Capability::new("ssh_proxy.connect")],
},
};
let right_paths = geth_config::GethPaths::from_home(right_home.path());
let right_store =
geth_store::Store::open(&right_paths.metadata_db()).expect("open right store");
right_store
.insert_keychain_op(&geth_store::StoredKeychainOp {
op_id: keychain_op.id.to_string(),
op_json: serde_json::to_string(&keychain_op).expect("encode keychain op"),
created_at_ms: keychain_op.created_at.0,
})
.expect("insert invalidly signed keychain op");
right_store
.insert_keychain_signature(&geth_store::StoredKeychainSignature {
op_id: keychain_op.id.to_string(),
signer: signer.to_string(),
signer_public_key: fake_admin_public_key.to_owned(),
namespace: geth_keychain::KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE.to_owned(),
signature: b"not a valid openssh signature".to_vec(),
created_at_ms: 22,
})
.expect("insert invalid keychain signature");
right_store
.insert_auth_op(&geth_store::StoredAuthOp {
op_id: auth_op.id.to_string(),
resource_id: auth_op.resource.to_string(),
op_json: serde_json::to_string(&auth_op).expect("encode auth op"),
created_at_ms: auth_op.created_at.0,
})
.expect("insert invalidly signed auth op");
right_store
.insert_auth_signature(&geth_store::StoredAuthSignature {
op_id: auth_op.id.to_string(),
signer: signer.to_string(),
signer_public_key: fake_admin_public_key.to_owned(),
namespace: geth_auth::AUTH_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE.to_owned(),
signature: b"not a valid openssh signature".to_vec(),
created_at_ms: 23,
})
.expect("insert invalid auth signature");
let keychain_sync = run_geth(
left_home.path(),
&["keychain", "sync", right_card.node_id.as_str()],
);
let auth_sync = run_geth(
left_home.path(),
&["auth", "sync", right_card.node_id.as_str()],
);
let _ = left_daemon.kill();
let _ = right_daemon.kill();
let _ = left_daemon.wait();
let _ = right_daemon.wait();
assert!(
keychain_sync.status.success(),
"keychain sync stderr: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&keychain_sync.stderr)
);
assert!(
auth_sync.status.success(),
"auth sync stderr: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&auth_sync.stderr)
);
assert!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&keychain_sync.stdout).contains("invalid_ops_rejected: 1"));
assert!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&auth_sync.stdout).contains("invalid_ops_rejected: 1"));
let left_paths = geth_config::GethPaths::from_home(left_home.path());
let left_store = geth_store::Store::open(&left_paths.metadata_db()).expect("open left store");
assert!(
!left_store
.list_keychain_ops()
.expect("list left keychain ops")
.iter()
.any(|op| op.op_id == keychain_op.id.as_str())
);
assert!(
!left_store
.list_auth_ops()
.expect("list left auth ops")
.iter()
.any(|op| op.op_id == auth_op.id.as_str())
);
}
#[test]
fn peer_card_export_import_and_list_are_candidate_only() {
let source_home = tempfile::tempdir().expect("source tempdir");

View file

@ -23,8 +23,10 @@ Implementation order:
node state.
- `[x]` Add initial two-daemon tests proving unsigned replicated
keychain/auth operations are rejected and not imported.
- `[ ]` Add tests proving invalidly signed and conflicting replicated
keychain/auth records do not mutate trust/resource state.
- `[x]` Add initial two-daemon tests proving invalidly signed replicated
keychain/auth operations are rejected and not imported.
- `[ ]` Add tests proving conflicting replicated keychain/auth records do
not mutate trust/resource state.
- `[ ]` Improve `auth explain` diagnostics enough for operators to
distinguish discovered-only peers, missing endpoint bindings, missing
grants, matching grants, revocations, and bearer access.
@ -71,8 +73,10 @@ Implementation order:
enrolled node without using the old one-off `node enroll sync` shortcut.
- `[x]` Tests assert unsigned replicated keychain/auth records do not mutate
local trust or resource state.
- `[ ]` Tests assert invalidly signed/conflicting replicated keychain/auth
records do not mutate local trust or resource state.
- `[x]` Tests assert invalidly signed replicated keychain/auth records do not
mutate local trust or resource state.
- `[ ]` Tests assert conflicting replicated keychain/auth records do not
mutate local trust or resource state.
- `[~]` Remote authorization enforcement audit.
Acceptance criteria: