Test invalid replicated signatures are rejected

This commit is contained in:
Eric Wendland 2026-05-22 14:19:17 +02:00
commit 2a8a348b97
2 changed files with 212 additions and 4 deletions

View file

@ -23,8 +23,10 @@ Implementation order:
node state.
- `[x]` Add initial two-daemon tests proving unsigned replicated
keychain/auth operations are rejected and not imported.
- `[ ]` Add tests proving invalidly signed and conflicting replicated
keychain/auth records do not mutate trust/resource state.
- `[x]` Add initial two-daemon tests proving invalidly signed replicated
keychain/auth operations are rejected and not imported.
- `[ ]` Add tests proving conflicting replicated keychain/auth records do
not mutate trust/resource state.
- `[ ]` Improve `auth explain` diagnostics enough for operators to
distinguish discovered-only peers, missing endpoint bindings, missing
grants, matching grants, revocations, and bearer access.
@ -71,8 +73,10 @@ Implementation order:
enrolled node without using the old one-off `node enroll sync` shortcut.
- `[x]` Tests assert unsigned replicated keychain/auth records do not mutate
local trust or resource state.
- `[ ]` Tests assert invalidly signed/conflicting replicated keychain/auth
records do not mutate local trust or resource state.
- `[x]` Tests assert invalidly signed replicated keychain/auth records do not
mutate local trust or resource state.
- `[ ]` Tests assert conflicting replicated keychain/auth records do not
mutate local trust or resource state.
- `[~]` Remote authorization enforcement audit.
Acceptance criteria: