Extract reusable keychain sigchain model

Cargo.lock

@@ -1653,6 +1653,7 @@ dependencies = [
 name = "geth-keychain"
 version = "0.1.0"
 dependencies = [
+ "blake3",
  "geth-codec",
  "geth-types",
  "serde",

README.md

@@ -139,6 +139,10 @@ The bootstrap implementation provides:
 - `geth resource create <kind> <name>`
 - `geth keychain init [--admin-key <path>] [--signing-key <path>]`
 - `geth keychain status`
+- `geth keychain admin-add --admin-key <pub> --signing-key <private> [--principal <name>]`
+- `geth keychain admin-revoke <key-fingerprint> --signing-key <private>`
+- `geth keychain allowed-signers`
+- `geth keychain verify`
 - `geth keychain sync <node-id-or-name>`
 - `geth auth sync <node-id-or-name>`
 - `geth sync status`
@@ -436,6 +440,26 @@ geth node revoke-grant resource:ssh-proxy:local <grant-id> \
 geth node revoke work-laptop --signing-key ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
 ```
 
+Admin SSH keys are managed through the same signed keychain log:
+
+```sh
+geth keychain admin-add \
+  --admin-key ~/.ssh/new_admin.pub \
+  --signing-key ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk \
+  --principal admin
+geth keychain allowed-signers > /tmp/geth.allowed_signers
+geth keychain verify
+```
+
+The keychain follows a sigchain model documented in
+`docs/sigchain-keychain.md`: each keychain operation is accepted only if it is
+signed by an admin key from the previously accepted reduced view. This is the
+geth analogue of verifying `git-skm` allowed-signers changes from a prior
+trusted state. The reusable mechanics live in the `geth-keychain` crate,
+including allowed-signers projection, replay verification, and an appendable
+JSONL sigchain file format suitable for static hosting with HTTP caching/range
+requests.
+
 The enrollment flow for a new node is:
 
 ```sh

crates/geth-cli/src/lib.rs

@@ -635,6 +635,27 @@ pub enum KeychainCommand {
         signing_key: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     Status,
+    AdminAdd {
+        #[arg(long)]
+        admin_key: PathBuf,
+        #[arg(long)]
+        signing_key: PathBuf,
+        #[arg(long)]
+        principal: Option<String>,
+        #[arg(long)]
+        valid_after_ms: Option<i64>,
+        #[arg(long)]
+        valid_before_ms: Option<i64>,
+    },
+    AdminRevoke {
+        key: String,
+        #[arg(long)]
+        signing_key: PathBuf,
+        #[arg(long)]
+        admin_key: Option<PathBuf>,
+    },
+    AllowedSigners,
+    Verify,
     Sync {
         node: String,
     },
@@ -1432,6 +1453,40 @@ fn request_for_command(command: Command) -> Result<ControlRequest> {
         Command::Keychain {
             command: KeychainCommand::Status,
         } => ControlRequest::KeychainStatus,
+        Command::Keychain {
+            command:
+                KeychainCommand::AdminAdd {
+                    admin_key,
+                    signing_key,
+                    principal,
+                    valid_after_ms,
+                    valid_before_ms,
+                },
+        } => ControlRequest::KeychainAdminAdd {
+            admin_key_path: admin_key,
+            signing_key_path: signing_key,
+            principal,
+            valid_after_ms,
+            valid_before_ms,
+        },
+        Command::Keychain {
+            command:
+                KeychainCommand::AdminRevoke {
+                    key,
+                    signing_key,
+                    admin_key,
+                },
+        } => ControlRequest::KeychainAdminRevoke {
+            key,
+            signing_key_path: signing_key,
+            admin_key_path: admin_key,
+        },
+        Command::Keychain {
+            command: KeychainCommand::AllowedSigners,
+        } => ControlRequest::KeychainAllowedSigners,
+        Command::Keychain {
+            command: KeychainCommand::Verify,
+        } => ControlRequest::KeychainVerify,
         Command::Keychain {
             command: KeychainCommand::Sync { node },
         } => ControlRequest::KeychainSync { node },
@@ -2458,6 +2513,47 @@ fn print_response(response: ControlResponse, json: bool) -> Result<()> {
                 );
             }
         }
+        ControlResponse::KeychainAdminUpdated {
+            op,
+            signatures,
+            note,
+        } => {
+            println!("recorded keychain op: {}", op.id);
+            for signature in signatures {
+                println!(
+                    "signed keychain op: {} by {} ({})",
+                    signature.op_id, signature.signer, signature.namespace
+                );
+            }
+            println!("note: {note}");
+        }
+        ControlResponse::KeychainAllowedSigners {
+            allowed_signers,
+            note,
+            ..
+        } => {
+            print!("{allowed_signers}");
+            if allowed_signers.is_empty() {
+                println!("no active admin public keys available");
+            }
+            eprintln!("note: {note}");
+        }
+        ControlResponse::KeychainVerified { report } => {
+            println!("ops: {}", report.ops);
+            println!("signatures: {}", report.signatures);
+            println!("accepted_ops: {}", report.accepted_ops);
+            println!("rejected_ops: {}", report.rejected_ops);
+            println!("active_admin_keys: {}", report.active_admin_keys);
+            println!(
+                "accepted_head: {}",
+                report
+                    .accepted_head
+                    .as_ref()
+                    .map(|head| head.as_str())
+                    .unwrap_or("none")
+            );
+            println!("note: {}", report.note);
+        }
         ControlResponse::KeychainSynced {
             peer_node_id,
             peer_agent_id,

crates/geth-control/src/lib.rs

@@ -3,7 +3,10 @@ use geth_cas::{FileConflict, FileRoot, FileRootScan};
 use geth_db::{CrSqliteChangeBatch, DbResource};
 use geth_discovery::{DiscoveredPeer, PeerCard};
 use geth_document::{DocumentResource, DocumentState};
-use geth_keychain::{KeychainOp, KeychainOpSignature, NodeEnrollmentRequest, NodeRecord};
+use geth_keychain::{
+    KeychainAllowedSigner, KeychainOp, KeychainOpSignature, KeychainSigchainReport,
+    NodeEnrollmentRequest, NodeRecord,
+};
 use geth_kv::{KvEntry, KvResource, KvSyncEntry};
 use geth_overlay::{
     OverlayInterfacePlan, OverlayJoinPlan, OverlayNetworkStatus, OverlayPacket, OverlayPlan,
@@ -226,6 +229,20 @@ pub enum ControlRequest {
         signing_key_path: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     KeychainStatus,
+    KeychainAdminAdd {
+        admin_key_path: PathBuf,
+        signing_key_path: PathBuf,
+        principal: Option<String>,
+        valid_after_ms: Option<i64>,
+        valid_before_ms: Option<i64>,
+    },
+    KeychainAdminRevoke {
+        key: String,
+        signing_key_path: PathBuf,
+        admin_key_path: Option<PathBuf>,
+    },
+    KeychainAllowedSigners,
+    KeychainVerify,
     KeychainSync {
         node: String,
     },
@@ -662,6 +679,19 @@ pub enum ControlResponse {
         ops: Vec<KeychainOp>,
         signatures: Vec<KeychainOpSignature>,
     },
+    KeychainAdminUpdated {
+        op: KeychainOp,
+        signatures: Vec<KeychainOpSignature>,
+        note: String,
+    },
+    KeychainAllowedSigners {
+        entries: Vec<KeychainAllowedSigner>,
+        allowed_signers: String,
+        note: String,
+    },
+    KeychainVerified {
+        report: KeychainSigchainReport,
+    },
     KeychainSynced {
         peer_node_id: String,
         peer_agent_id: String,

crates/geth-keychain/Cargo.toml

@@ -6,10 +6,9 @@ rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
 
 [dependencies]
+blake3.workspace = true
 serde.workspace = true
+serde_json.workspace = true
 thiserror.workspace = true
 geth-codec = { path = "../geth-codec" }
 geth-types = { path = "../geth-types" }
-
-[dev-dependencies]
-serde_json.workspace = true

crates/geth-keychain/src/lib.rs

@@ -41,6 +41,34 @@ pub struct KeychainOpSignature {
     pub created_at: UnixMillis,
 }
 
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct KeychainAllowedSigner {
+    pub key: KeyId,
+    pub principal: String,
+    pub public_key: String,
+    pub valid_after_ms: Option<i64>,
+    pub valid_before_ms: Option<i64>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct KeychainSigchainReport {
+    pub ops: usize,
+    pub signatures: usize,
+    pub accepted_ops: usize,
+    pub rejected_ops: usize,
+    pub active_admin_keys: usize,
+    pub accepted_head: Option<AuthOpId>,
+    pub note: String,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct KeychainSigchainEntry {
+    pub op: KeychainOp,
+    pub signatures: Vec<KeychainOpSignature>,
+}
+
+pub type KeychainSignatureVerifier<'a> = dyn Fn(&KeychainOp, &KeychainOpSignature) -> bool + 'a;
+
 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct NodeEnrollmentRequest {
     pub id: AuthOpId,
@@ -127,6 +155,11 @@ pub struct NodeEnrollmentRequestSigningPayload {
 pub enum KeychainError {
     #[error("invalid node enrollment status: {0}")]
     InvalidEnrollmentStatus(String),
+    #[error("sigchain JSONL line {line}: {source}")]
+    SigchainJsonl {
+        line: usize,
+        source: serde_json::Error,
+    },
 }
 
 #[must_use]
@@ -152,6 +185,10 @@ pub enum KeychainOpKind {
     KeychainInit,
     AdminKeyAdd {
         key: KeyId,
+        public_key: Option<String>,
+        principal: Option<String>,
+        valid_after_ms: Option<i64>,
+        valid_before_ms: Option<i64>,
     },
     AdminKeyRevoke {
         key: KeyId,
@@ -254,7 +291,7 @@ pub fn reduce_keychain_ops(ops: &[KeychainOp]) -> KeychainView {
     for op in ops {
         match &op.kind {
             KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit => initialized = true,
-            KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd { key } => {
+            KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd { key, .. } => {
                 admin_keys.insert(key.clone());
             }
             KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyRevoke { key } => {
@@ -364,6 +401,204 @@ pub fn reduce_keychain_ops(ops: &[KeychainOp]) -> KeychainView {
     }
 }
 
+pub fn sorted_keychain_ops(mut ops: Vec<KeychainOp>) -> Vec<KeychainOp> {
+    ops.sort_by(|left, right| {
+        (
+            left.created_at.0,
+            keychain_op_order(&left.kind),
+            left.id.to_string(),
+        )
+            .cmp(&(
+                right.created_at.0,
+                keychain_op_order(&right.kind),
+                right.id.to_string(),
+            ))
+    });
+    ops
+}
+
+#[must_use]
+pub fn keychain_op_order(kind: &KeychainOpKind) -> u8 {
+    match kind {
+        KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit => 0,
+        KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd { .. } => 1,
+        KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyRevoke { .. } => 2,
+        _ => 10,
+    }
+}
+
+#[must_use]
+pub fn allowed_signers(
+    ops: &[KeychainOp],
+    signatures: &[KeychainOpSignature],
+) -> Vec<KeychainAllowedSigner> {
+    let mut entries = BTreeMap::<KeyId, KeychainAllowedSigner>::new();
+    for op in sorted_keychain_ops(ops.to_vec()) {
+        match op.kind {
+            KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
+                key,
+                public_key,
+                principal,
+                valid_after_ms,
+                valid_before_ms,
+            } => {
+                let public_key = public_key
+                    .or_else(|| {
+                        signatures
+                            .iter()
+                            .find(|signature| signature.signer == key)
+                            .map(|signature| signature.signer_public_key.trim().to_owned())
+                    })
+                    .unwrap_or_default();
+                if !public_key.is_empty() {
+                    entries.insert(
+                        key.clone(),
+                        KeychainAllowedSigner {
+                            key,
+                            principal: principal.unwrap_or_else(|| "admin".to_owned()),
+                            public_key,
+                            valid_after_ms,
+                            valid_before_ms,
+                        },
+                    );
+                }
+            }
+            KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyRevoke { key } => {
+                entries.remove(&key);
+            }
+            _ => {}
+        }
+    }
+    entries.into_values().collect()
+}
+
+#[must_use]
+pub fn render_allowed_signers(entries: &[KeychainAllowedSigner]) -> String {
+    let mut text = String::new();
+    for entry in entries {
+        text.push_str(&format!(
+            "{} {}\n",
+            entry.principal,
+            entry.public_key.trim()
+        ));
+    }
+    text
+}
+
+pub fn verify_sigchain(
+    ops: &[KeychainOp],
+    signatures: &[KeychainOpSignature],
+    verifier: &KeychainSignatureVerifier<'_>,
+) -> KeychainSigchainReport {
+    let ops = sorted_keychain_ops(ops.to_vec());
+    let mut accepted = Vec::<KeychainOp>::new();
+    let mut trusted_admins = BTreeSet::<KeyId>::new();
+    let mut rejected_ops = 0;
+    for op in &ops {
+        let op_signatures = signatures
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|signature| signature.op_id == op.id)
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+        let bootstrap_init = accepted.is_empty() && matches!(op.kind, KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit);
+        let bootstrap_admin = accepted.len() == 1
+            && matches!(accepted[0].kind, KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit)
+            && matches!(&op.kind, KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd { .. });
+        let valid = bootstrap_init
+            || bootstrap_admin
+            || op_signatures.iter().any(|signature| {
+                let signer_is_authorized = trusted_admins.contains(&signature.signer);
+                signer_is_authorized
+                    && signature_uses_claimed_key(signature)
+                    && verifier(op, signature)
+            });
+        if valid {
+            accepted.push(op.clone());
+            trusted_admins = reduce_keychain_ops(&accepted)
+                .admin_keys
+                .into_iter()
+                .collect();
+        } else {
+            rejected_ops += 1;
+        }
+    }
+    let view = reduce_keychain_ops(&accepted);
+    KeychainSigchainReport {
+        ops: ops.len(),
+        signatures: signatures.len(),
+        accepted_ops: accepted.len(),
+        rejected_ops,
+        active_admin_keys: view.admin_keys.len(),
+        accepted_head: accepted.last().map(|op| op.id.clone()),
+        note: "verified by replaying keychain operations against the previously accepted admin-key view, similar to git-skm's parent allowed_signers verification".to_owned(),
+    }
+}
+
+#[must_use]
+pub fn signature_uses_claimed_key(signature: &KeychainOpSignature) -> bool {
+    KeyId::new(admin_key_fingerprint(&signature.signer_public_key)) == signature.signer
+}
+
+#[must_use]
+pub fn admin_key_fingerprint(public_key: &str) -> String {
+    format!("ssh:blake3:{}", blake3::hash(public_key.trim().as_bytes()))
+}
+
+#[must_use]
+pub fn sigchain_entries(
+    ops: &[KeychainOp],
+    signatures: &[KeychainOpSignature],
+) -> Vec<KeychainSigchainEntry> {
+    sorted_keychain_ops(ops.to_vec())
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|op| KeychainSigchainEntry {
+            signatures: signatures
+                .iter()
+                .filter(|signature| signature.op_id == op.id)
+                .cloned()
+                .collect(),
+            op,
+        })
+        .collect()
+}
+
+pub fn encode_sigchain_jsonl(
+    entries: &[KeychainSigchainEntry],
+) -> Result<String, serde_json::Error> {
+    let mut text = String::new();
+    for entry in entries {
+        text.push_str(&serde_json::to_string(entry)?);
+        text.push('\n');
+    }
+    Ok(text)
+}
+
+pub fn decode_sigchain_jsonl(text: &str) -> Result<Vec<KeychainSigchainEntry>, KeychainError> {
+    text.lines()
+        .enumerate()
+        .filter(|(_, line)| !line.trim().is_empty())
+        .map(|(index, line)| {
+            serde_json::from_str::<KeychainSigchainEntry>(line).map_err(|source| {
+                KeychainError::SigchainJsonl {
+                    line: index + 1,
+                    source,
+                }
+            })
+        })
+        .collect()
+}
+
+#[must_use]
+pub fn flatten_sigchain_entries(
+    entries: &[KeychainSigchainEntry],
+) -> (Vec<KeychainOp>, Vec<KeychainOpSignature>) {
+    let ops = entries.iter().map(|entry| entry.op.clone()).collect();
+    let signatures = entries
+        .iter()
+        .flat_map(|entry| entry.signatures.clone())
+        .collect();
+    (ops, signatures)
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
@@ -390,6 +625,10 @@ mod tests {
             created_at: UnixMillis(1),
             kind: KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
                 key: "key:admin".into(),
+                public_key: Some("ssh-ed25519 AAAA test@example".to_owned()),
+                principal: Some("admin".to_owned()),
+                valid_after_ms: None,
+                valid_before_ms: None,
             },
         };
         assert_eq!(
@@ -422,12 +661,20 @@ mod tests {
                 2,
                 KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
                     key: "key:admin-a".into(),
+                    public_key: Some("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a".to_owned()),
+                    principal: Some("admin-a".to_owned()),
+                    valid_after_ms: None,
+                    valid_before_ms: None,
                 },
             ),
             op(
                 3,
                 KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
                     key: "key:admin-b".into(),
+                    public_key: Some("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-b".to_owned()),
+                    principal: Some("admin-b".to_owned()),
+                    valid_after_ms: None,
+                    valid_before_ms: None,
                 },
             ),
             op(
@@ -562,6 +809,110 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(!view.endpoints.contains_key("endpoint:old"));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn allowed_signers_and_sigchain_jsonl_are_portable() {
+        let ops = vec![
+            op(1, KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit),
+            op(
+                2,
+                KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
+                    key: admin_key_fingerprint("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a").into(),
+                    public_key: Some("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a".to_owned()),
+                    principal: Some("admin-a".to_owned()),
+                    valid_after_ms: None,
+                    valid_before_ms: None,
+                },
+            ),
+        ];
+        let signatures = vec![KeychainOpSignature {
+            op_id: ops[1].id.clone(),
+            signer: admin_key_fingerprint("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a").into(),
+            signer_public_key: "ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a".to_owned(),
+            namespace: KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE.to_owned(),
+            signature: vec![1],
+            created_at: UnixMillis(2),
+        }];
+        let allowed = allowed_signers(&ops, &signatures);
+        assert_eq!(allowed.len(), 1);
+        assert!(render_allowed_signers(&allowed).contains("admin-a ssh-ed25519"));
+
+        let entries = sigchain_entries(&ops, &signatures);
+        let jsonl = encode_sigchain_jsonl(&entries).expect("encode jsonl");
+        assert_eq!(jsonl.lines().count(), 2);
+        let decoded = decode_sigchain_jsonl(&jsonl).expect("decode jsonl");
+        assert_eq!(decoded, entries);
+        let (decoded_ops, decoded_signatures) = flatten_sigchain_entries(&decoded);
+        assert_eq!(decoded_ops, sorted_keychain_ops(ops));
+        assert_eq!(decoded_signatures, signatures);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sigchain_verification_replays_against_prior_admin_view() {
+        let admin_a: KeyId = admin_key_fingerprint("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a").into();
+        let admin_b: KeyId = admin_key_fingerprint("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-b").into();
+        let ops = vec![
+            op(1, KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit),
+            op(
+                2,
+                KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
+                    key: admin_a.clone(),
+                    public_key: Some("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a".to_owned()),
+                    principal: Some("admin-a".to_owned()),
+                    valid_after_ms: None,
+                    valid_before_ms: None,
+                },
+            ),
+            op(
+                3,
+                KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
+                    key: admin_b.clone(),
+                    public_key: Some("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-b".to_owned()),
+                    principal: Some("admin-b".to_owned()),
+                    valid_after_ms: None,
+                    valid_before_ms: None,
+                },
+            ),
+            op(
+                4,
+                KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyRevoke {
+                    key: admin_a.clone(),
+                },
+            ),
+        ];
+        let signatures = vec![
+            KeychainOpSignature {
+                op_id: ops[1].id.clone(),
+                signer: admin_a.clone(),
+                signer_public_key: "ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a".to_owned(),
+                namespace: KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE.to_owned(),
+                signature: vec![1],
+                created_at: UnixMillis(2),
+            },
+            KeychainOpSignature {
+                op_id: ops[2].id.clone(),
+                signer: admin_a.clone(),
+                signer_public_key: "ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a".to_owned(),
+                namespace: KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE.to_owned(),
+                signature: vec![1],
+                created_at: UnixMillis(3),
+            },
+            KeychainOpSignature {
+                op_id: ops[3].id.clone(),
+                signer: admin_b,
+                signer_public_key: "ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-b".to_owned(),
+                namespace: KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE.to_owned(),
+                signature: vec![1],
+                created_at: UnixMillis(4),
+            },
+        ];
+        let report = verify_sigchain(&ops, &signatures, &|_, signature| {
+            signature.signature == vec![1]
+        });
+        assert_eq!(report.accepted_ops, 4);
+        assert_eq!(report.rejected_ops, 0);
+        assert_eq!(report.active_admin_keys, 1);
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn reducer_excludes_revoked_identity_subtrees() {
         let ops = vec![

crates/geth-node/src/lib.rs

@@ -403,7 +403,13 @@ fn initialize_owner_keychain(
         ops.push(KeychainOp {
             id: generated_keychain_op_id("admin-key-add", admin_key.as_str(), now),
             created_at: now,
-            kind: KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd { key: admin_key },
+            kind: KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
+                key: admin_key,
+                public_key: Some(public_key.trim().to_owned()),
+                principal: Some("admin".to_owned()),
+                valid_after_ms: None,
+                valid_before_ms: None,
+            },
         });
     }
 
@@ -3389,7 +3395,7 @@ async fn keychain_sync_from_peer_since(
                     .iter()
                     .filter(|signature| {
                         if !trusted_admins.contains(&signature.signer)
-                            || !keychain_signature_uses_claimed_key(signature)
+                            || !geth_keychain::signature_uses_claimed_key(signature)
                         {
                             return false;
                         }
@@ -7578,7 +7584,13 @@ pub fn handle_request(
                 let op = KeychainOp {
                     id: generated_keychain_op_id("admin-key-add", admin_key.as_str(), created_at),
                     created_at,
-                    kind: KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd { key: admin_key },
+                    kind: KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
+                        key: admin_key,
+                        public_key: Some(public_key.trim().to_owned()),
+                        principal: Some("admin".to_owned()),
+                        valid_after_ms: None,
+                        valid_before_ms: None,
+                    },
                 };
                 store_keychain_op(&store, &op)?;
                 ops.push(op);
@@ -7608,6 +7620,81 @@ pub fn handle_request(
                 nodes: view.nodes.len(),
             }))
         }
+        ControlRequest::KeychainAdminAdd {
+            admin_key_path,
+            signing_key_path,
+            principal,
+            valid_after_ms,
+            valid_before_ms,
+        } => {
+            let public_key = std::fs::read_to_string(&admin_key_path)?;
+            let admin_key = KeyId::new(ssh_public_key_fingerprint(&public_key));
+            let created_at = UnixMillis(geth_store::now_ms());
+            let op = KeychainOp {
+                id: generated_keychain_op_id("admin-key-add", admin_key.as_str(), created_at),
+                created_at,
+                kind: KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
+                    key: admin_key,
+                    public_key: Some(public_key.trim().to_owned()),
+                    principal: principal.or_else(|| Some("admin".to_owned())),
+                    valid_after_ms,
+                    valid_before_ms,
+                },
+            };
+            let signatures = store_and_sign_keychain_ops(
+                &store,
+                node,
+                std::slice::from_ref(&op),
+                Some(&signing_key_path),
+                None,
+            )?;
+            Ok(ControlResponse::KeychainAdminUpdated {
+                op,
+                signatures,
+                note: "recorded signed admin key addition in the keychain sigchain".to_owned(),
+            })
+        }
+        ControlRequest::KeychainAdminRevoke {
+            key,
+            signing_key_path,
+            admin_key_path,
+        } => {
+            let created_at = UnixMillis(geth_store::now_ms());
+            let op = KeychainOp {
+                id: generated_keychain_op_id("admin-key-revoke", &key, created_at),
+                created_at,
+                kind: KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyRevoke {
+                    key: KeyId::new(key),
+                },
+            };
+            let signatures = store_and_sign_keychain_ops(
+                &store,
+                node,
+                std::slice::from_ref(&op),
+                Some(&signing_key_path),
+                admin_key_path.as_deref(),
+            )?;
+            Ok(ControlResponse::KeychainAdminUpdated {
+                op,
+                signatures,
+                note: "recorded signed admin key revocation in the keychain sigchain".to_owned(),
+            })
+        }
+        ControlRequest::KeychainAllowedSigners => {
+            let entries = geth_keychain::allowed_signers(
+                &load_keychain_ops(&store)?,
+                &load_keychain_signatures(&store)?,
+            );
+            let allowed_signers = geth_keychain::render_allowed_signers(&entries);
+            Ok(ControlResponse::KeychainAllowedSigners {
+                entries,
+                allowed_signers,
+                note: "derived from active AdminKeyAdd/AdminKeyRevoke operations; compatible with ssh-keygen -Y allowed_signers format".to_owned(),
+            })
+        }
+        ControlRequest::KeychainVerify => Ok(ControlResponse::KeychainVerified {
+            report: verify_keychain_sigchain_with_ssh(&store, node)?,
+        }),
         ControlRequest::NodeList => {
             let view = geth_keychain::reduce_keychain_ops(&load_keychain_ops(&store)?);
             Ok(ControlResponse::NodeList {
@@ -10414,6 +10501,26 @@ fn store_keychain_op(store: &Store, op: &KeychainOp) -> Result<(), NodeError> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+fn verify_keychain_sigchain_with_ssh(
+    store: &Store,
+    node: &LocalNode,
+) -> Result<geth_keychain::KeychainSigchainReport, NodeError> {
+    let ops = load_keychain_ops(store)?;
+    let signatures = load_keychain_signatures(store)?;
+    Ok(geth_keychain::verify_sigchain(
+        &ops,
+        &signatures,
+        &|op, signature| {
+            verify_keychain_signature_with_ssh(
+                node,
+                op,
+                &stored_keychain_signature_from_signature(signature),
+            )
+            .unwrap_or(false)
+        },
+    ))
+}
+
 fn store_and_sign_keychain_ops(
     store: &Store,
     node: &LocalNode,
@@ -10519,10 +10626,6 @@ fn stored_keychain_signature_from_signature(
     }
 }
 
-fn keychain_signature_uses_claimed_key(signature: &KeychainOpSignature) -> bool {
-    KeyId::new(ssh_public_key_fingerprint(&signature.signer_public_key)) == signature.signer
-}
-
 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
 struct KeychainSignatureStatus {
     total: usize,
@@ -10614,11 +10717,12 @@ fn verify_keychain_signature_with_ssh(
 }
 
 fn load_keychain_ops(store: &Store) -> Result<Vec<KeychainOp>, NodeError> {
-    store
+    let ops = store
         .list_keychain_ops()?
         .into_iter()
-        .map(|stored| serde_json::from_str(&stored.op_json).map_err(NodeError::from))
-        .collect()
+        .map(|stored| serde_json::from_str::<KeychainOp>(&stored.op_json).map_err(NodeError::from))
+        .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, NodeError>>()?;
+    Ok(geth_keychain::sorted_keychain_ops(ops))
 }
 
 fn load_keychain_signatures(store: &Store) -> Result<Vec<KeychainOpSignature>, NodeError> {

crates/geth/tests/bootstrap.rs

@@ -2575,6 +2575,85 @@ fn keychain_init_can_record_openssh_signatures() {
     }
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn keychain_admin_sigchain_exports_allowed_signers_and_verifies() {
+    if Command::new("ssh-keygen").arg("-?").output().is_err() {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    let home = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
+    let paths = geth_config::GethPaths::from_home(home.path());
+    let node = geth_node::init_node(&paths).expect("init node");
+    let admin_key_path = home.path().join("admin_ed25519");
+    generate_ssh_key(&admin_key_path);
+
+    geth_node::handle_request(
+        &node,
+        geth_control::ControlRequest::KeychainInit {
+            admin_key_path: Some(admin_key_path.with_extension("pub")),
+            signing_key_path: Some(admin_key_path.clone()),
+        },
+    )
+    .expect("init signed keychain");
+
+    let second_admin_key_path = home.path().join("second_admin_ed25519");
+    generate_ssh_key(&second_admin_key_path);
+    let response = geth_node::handle_request(
+        &node,
+        geth_control::ControlRequest::KeychainAdminAdd {
+            admin_key_path: second_admin_key_path.with_extension("pub"),
+            signing_key_path: admin_key_path.clone(),
+            principal: Some("second-admin".to_owned()),
+            valid_after_ms: None,
+            valid_before_ms: None,
+        },
+    )
+    .expect("admin add");
+    match response {
+        geth_control::ControlResponse::KeychainAdminUpdated { op, signatures, .. } => {
+            assert_eq!(signatures.len(), 1);
+            match op.kind {
+                geth_keychain::KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
+                    public_key,
+                    principal,
+                    ..
+                } => {
+                    assert!(public_key.expect("public key").starts_with("ssh-ed25519 "));
+                    assert_eq!(principal.as_deref(), Some("second-admin"));
+                }
+                other => panic!("unexpected op kind: {other:?}"),
+            }
+        }
+        other => panic!("unexpected response: {other:?}"),
+    }
+
+    let response =
+        geth_node::handle_request(&node, geth_control::ControlRequest::KeychainAllowedSigners)
+            .expect("allowed signers");
+    match response {
+        geth_control::ControlResponse::KeychainAllowedSigners {
+            entries,
+            allowed_signers,
+            ..
+        } => {
+            assert_eq!(entries.len(), 2);
+            assert!(allowed_signers.contains("second-admin ssh-ed25519 "));
+        }
+        other => panic!("unexpected response: {other:?}"),
+    }
+
+    let response = geth_node::handle_request(&node, geth_control::ControlRequest::KeychainVerify)
+        .expect("verify sigchain");
+    match response {
+        geth_control::ControlResponse::KeychainVerified { report } => {
+            assert_eq!(report.rejected_ops, 0);
+            assert_eq!(report.active_admin_keys, 2);
+            assert!(report.note.contains("git-skm"));
+        }
+        other => panic!("unexpected response: {other:?}"),
+    }
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn init_owned_node_records_signed_owner_device_and_node() {
     if Command::new("ssh-keygen").arg("-?").output().is_err() {

docs/architecture.md

@@ -347,11 +347,18 @@ owner statements by accident. `geth node list` shows the active reduced node
 view. `geth node rename` and `geth node revoke` record signed keychain
 operations and require `--signing-key`. Endpoint rotation is explicit:
 `geth node endpoint-add` and `geth node endpoint-revoke` record signed
-`NodeEndpointAdd` and `NodeEndpointRevoke` keychain operations. `geth keychain
-sync <node>` pulls keychain operations and signatures from an imported peer over
-Iroh and imports only operations with a valid OpenSSH signature from a currently
-trusted admin key over the canonical payload. This is currently a pull-based
-signed operation log, not a CRDT or Keyhive-style convergent authority.
+`NodeEndpointAdd` and `NodeEndpointRevoke` keychain operations. Admin SSH keys
+are updated with signed `geth keychain admin-add` and `geth keychain
+admin-revoke` operations; `AdminKeyAdd` carries the public key material needed
+to reconstruct an OpenSSH `allowed_signers` view. `geth keychain verify` replays
+the log against the previously accepted admin-key view, mirroring the `git-skm`
+pattern of verifying key-registry changes from a prior trusted state. `geth
+keychain sync <node>` pulls keychain operations and signatures from an imported
+peer over Iroh and imports only operations with a valid OpenSSH signature from a
+currently trusted admin key over the canonical payload. See
+`docs/sigchain-keychain.md` for the detailed sigchain design. This is currently
+a pull-based signed operation log, not a CRDT or Keyhive-style convergent
+authority.
 
 New devices can use the node enrollment flow instead of hand-editing keychain
 state. `geth node enroll request` creates a canonical, agent-key-signed request

docs/roadmap.md

@@ -318,6 +318,22 @@ resource-scoped capability decisions.
   - `[x]` `geth keychain status` reports the stored keychain signature count.
   - `[x]` `geth keychain status` verifies stored keychain signatures against
     canonical payloads with OpenSSH when public key material is available.
+  - `[x]` `AdminKeyAdd` carries OpenSSH public key material, principal, and
+    optional validity metadata so the admin key registry is reconstructable
+    from the signed log itself.
+  - `[x]` `geth keychain admin-add` and `geth keychain admin-revoke` append
+    signed admin-key registry operations.
+  - `[x]` `geth keychain allowed-signers` exports the active admin key view in
+    OpenSSH `allowed_signers` format.
+  - `[x]` `geth keychain verify` replays the keychain sigchain against the
+    previously accepted admin-key view.
+  - `[x]` Reusable sigchain mechanics live in `geth-keychain`, not in daemon
+    orchestration code.
+  - `[x]` `geth-keychain` exposes transport-neutral allowed-signers projection,
+    replay verification with an injected verifier, and appendable JSONL
+    sigchain encode/decode helpers for static hosting or alternate transports.
+  - `[x]` `docs/sigchain-keychain.md` documents the sigchain data model,
+    verification algorithm, commands, and current security limits.
   - `[x]` Missing `ssh-keygen` or unavailable hardware keys produce clear
     errors during signing.
   - `[x]` Tests cover signed keychain init with a generated local OpenSSH key

docs/sigchain-keychain.md

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+# Geth Keychain Sigchain Design
+
+## Purpose
+
+The geth keychain is a signed operation log for mesh identity state. It is the
+source of truth for admin SSH keys, users, devices, nodes, agents, and endpoint
+bindings. Peers do not trust a mutable keychain snapshot. They replay signed
+operations and reduce the accepted log into the current keychain view.
+
+This is intentionally similar to the `git-skm` pattern:
+
+- `git-skm` treats a committed `allowed_signers` file as trusted only if every
+  commit that changed it can be verified from a prior trusted state.
+- geth treats a keychain operation as trusted only if it is signed by an admin
+  key that was trusted in the previously accepted keychain view.
+
+## Data Model
+
+The reusable model lives in the `geth-keychain` crate. The daemon stores it in
+SQLite and syncs it over Iroh, but the crate does not depend on SQLite, Iroh, or
+the geth daemon. Other projects can publish the same keychain as a static
+sigchain file, append it to object storage, embed it in a document, or transport
+it by any other mechanism.
+
+The durable log is `KeychainOp[]` plus `KeychainOpSignature[]`. Each operation
+has a deterministic canonical signing payload under the
+`geth.keychain.v1@geth.local` namespace.
+
+Important operation kinds:
+
+- `KeychainInit`
+- `AdminKeyAdd`
+- `AdminKeyRevoke`
+- `UserAdd`, `UserRename`, `UserRevoke`
+- `DeviceAdd`, `DeviceRevoke`
+- `DeviceKeyAdd`, `DeviceKeyRevoke`
+- `NodeAdd`, `NodeRename`, `NodeRevoke`
+- `NodeEndpointAdd`, `NodeEndpointRevoke`
+- `AgentBind`
+
+`AdminKeyAdd` records the admin key fingerprint and, for new operations, the
+OpenSSH public key material, optional principal, and optional validity metadata.
+The public key is part of the signed operation so the key registry can be
+reconstructed from the sigchain itself. Older local data may only have the
+fingerprint; geth can use stored signature public-key material as a fallback
+when exporting the current allowed signers view.
+
+## Signature Rules
+
+Each signed operation has a `KeychainOpSignature`:
+
+- `op_id`
+- signer key fingerprint
+- signer OpenSSH public key
+- namespace
+- OpenSSH signature bytes
+- creation time
+
+Signatures are produced with:
+
+```sh
+ssh-keygen -Y sign -n geth.keychain.v1@geth.local -f <signing-key> <payload>
+```
+
+Verification uses:
+
+```sh
+ssh-keygen -Y verify \
+  -f <allowed-signers> \
+  -I <signer-principal> \
+  -n geth.keychain.v1@geth.local \
+  -s <signature>
+```
+
+The signed payload is canonical binary encoding, not JSON.
+
+## Verification Algorithm
+
+For a candidate log ordered by `(created_at_ms, op_id)`:
+
+1. Start from a local trust anchor. In the bootstrap implementation this is a
+   locally initialized `KeychainInit` plus an admin key added through
+   `geth init --admin-key ... --signing-key ...` or `geth keychain init
+   --admin-key ...`.
+2. Maintain an accepted operation prefix and reduce it into the current
+   keychain view.
+3. For each next operation, collect its signatures.
+4. Accept the operation only if at least one signature:
+   - is from a key fingerprint present in the previous accepted view,
+   - carries public key material that hashes to that fingerprint,
+   - verifies over the canonical operation payload with OpenSSH, and
+   - uses the keychain namespace.
+5. After accepting the operation, append it to the accepted prefix and reduce
+   again. This lets a valid `AdminKeyAdd` authorize later operations, and a
+   valid `AdminKeyRevoke` stop later authorization by that key.
+6. Reject unsigned, invalidly signed, conflicting, or out-of-authority
+   operations.
+
+This mirrors `git-skm`'s "verify from the previously trusted
+allowed_signers" model, but the transport and storage are geth/Iroh/SQLite
+instead of Git commits.
+
+The `geth-keychain` crate exposes this as a transport-neutral verifier. Callers
+provide:
+
+- ordered or unordered `KeychainOp[]`
+- `KeychainOpSignature[]`
+- a signature verification callback
+
+The callback is responsible for the cryptographic backend, such as
+`ssh-keygen -Y verify`, WebCrypto, an HSM, or a test verifier. The crate owns
+the replay order, bootstrap rule, previous-view authorization rule,
+`allowed_signers` projection, and reduced keychain view.
+
+## Static Sigchain File
+
+For static hosting and range-friendly distribution, `geth-keychain` defines a
+JSONL sigchain representation:
+
+```json
+{"op":{...},"signatures":[...]}
+{"op":{...},"signatures":[...]}
+```
+
+Each line is a complete `KeychainSigchainEntry`. This keeps the file appendable
+and cacheable:
+
+- A publisher can append new entries to the end of the file.
+- HTTP clients can use `ETag`, `Last-Modified`, and byte range requests to fetch
+  only new bytes.
+- A client can decode complete trailing lines, ignore a partial final line until
+  the next fetch, and replay verification from its last accepted checkpoint.
+- The canonical signed payload remains the `KeychainOp`; JSONL is only the
+  publication container.
+
+The crate provides helpers to encode/decode JSONL and flatten entries back into
+`KeychainOp[]` plus `KeychainOpSignature[]`.
+
+Future work should add explicit checkpoint records containing the accepted head
+ID, byte offset, reduced view hash, and log hash. That would let static clients
+resume verification without replaying the entire file while still detecting
+rollback or truncation.
+
+## Commands
+
+Owner bootstrap:
+
+```sh
+geth init \
+  --admin-key ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub \
+  --signing-key ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk \
+  --node-name laptop
+```
+
+Add a new admin key:
+
+```sh
+geth keychain admin-add \
+  --admin-key ~/.ssh/new_admin.pub \
+  --signing-key ~/.ssh/current_admin_sk \
+  --principal admin
+```
+
+Revoke an admin key:
+
+```sh
+geth keychain admin-revoke <key-fingerprint> \
+  --signing-key ~/.ssh/current_admin_sk
+```
+
+Export the reduced active admin key registry in OpenSSH `allowed_signers`
+format:
+
+```sh
+geth keychain allowed-signers > allowed_signers
+```
+
+Replay and verify the local sigchain:
+
+```sh
+geth keychain verify
+```
+
+## Differences From Git-SKM
+
+`git-skm` uses Git commit history as the append-only log and a trusted commit
+hash as the checkpoint. geth uses `KeychainOp[]` as the append-only log and the
+locally initialized owner/admin key as the bootstrap trust anchor.
+
+The current geth prototype does not yet provide:
+
+- signed checkpoint objects equivalent to `skm.last-verified-commit`
+- transparency-log style append proofs
+- anti-rollback protection beyond local state, HTTP cache validators, and sync
+  conflict checks
+- delegated admin scopes or threshold admin signatures
+- strong compromise-recovery semantics
+
+Those are future hardening items. The current prototype is intended to make the
+key registry self-describing, replayable, and testable.
+
+## Security Invariants
+
+- The admin SSH private key is never copied into geth state.
+- Admin key changes are keychain operations, not mutable ACL edits.
+- Public key material needed to reconstruct active admin signers is stored in
+  the signed operation log.
+- Import from peers accepts only operations signed by currently trusted admin
+  keys.
+- A discovered peer card or Iroh EndpointID never grants keychain authority.
+- Bearer secrets do not grant keychain mutation rights.