simplify sigchain http distribution

README.md

@@ -669,9 +669,10 @@ geth keychain bundle-extract --in ./chain.sscb --out ./chain.jsonl
 The verifier reports active authority devices/keys, disclosed and incomplete
 profiles, the head digest, and current attester/backend anchor thresholds. It
 auto-detects JSONL interchange or the canonical `.sscb` bundle. The bundle is
-the deterministic on-disk/full-snapshot distribution format and can be hosted
+the single deterministic on-disk and distribution file and can be hosted
-unchanged at `/.well-known/sshsigchain/v1/<chain-id>/chain.sscb` by a static
+unchanged at any explicitly configured HTTP(S) URL, including by a static file
-HTTP server. HTTP and every other distribution backend remain untrusted inputs.
+server. There is no well-known path or URL-based discovery. HTTP and every
+other distribution backend remain untrusted inputs.
 Local append workflows, accepted-head persistence, concrete fetchers, and
 concrete anchor adapters remain follow-up work. Until they exist, do not
 substitute an unpinned checkpoint, HTTP response, or local operation-log view

crates/geth-cli/src/lib.rs

@@ -4183,7 +4183,6 @@ fn print_response(response: ControlResponse, output: OutputMode) -> Result<()> {
             claims,
             receipts,
             bundle_hash,
-            static_http_path,
             note,
         } => {
             println!("input: {}", input.display());
@@ -4194,7 +4193,6 @@ fn print_response(response: ControlResponse, output: OutputMode) -> Result<()> {
             println!("claims: {claims}");
             println!("receipts: {receipts}");
             println!("bundle_hash: {bundle_hash}");
-            println!("static_http_path: {static_http_path}");
             eprintln!("note: {note}");
         }
         ControlResponse::KeychainExplained { subject, lines } => {

crates/geth-control/src/lib.rs

@@ -779,7 +779,6 @@ pub enum ControlResponse {
         claims: usize,
         receipts: usize,
         bundle_hash: String,
-        static_http_path: String,
         note: String,
     },
     KeychainExplained {

crates/geth-keychain/src/lib.rs

@@ -25,9 +25,9 @@ pub use sshsigchain::{
     SshSigchainVerification, SshSigchainVerifier, VerifiedAnchoredHistory, authority_key_id,
     canonical_bundle_hash, decode_canonical_bundle, decode_sshsigchain_jsonl,
     encode_canonical_bundle, encode_sshsigchain_jsonl, key_proof_signing_bytes,
-    profile_payload_commitment, select_anchored_head, static_http_bundle_path,
+    profile_payload_commitment, select_anchored_head, verify_anchor_receipts,
-    verify_anchor_receipts, verify_anchored_history, verify_canonical_bundle_records,
+    verify_anchored_history, verify_canonical_bundle_records, verify_head_claim,
-    verify_head_claim, verify_sshsigchain,
+    verify_sshsigchain,
 };
 
 use geth_types::{

crates/geth-keychain/src/sshsigchain.rs

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ pub use bundle::{
     CANONICAL_BUNDLE_EXTENSION, CANONICAL_BUNDLE_MEDIA_TYPE, CanonicalSshSigchainBundle,
     DistributionEndpoint, DistributionError, MAX_CANONICAL_BUNDLE_BYTES, SshSigchainBundleSource,
     canonical_bundle_hash, decode_canonical_bundle, encode_canonical_bundle,
-    static_http_bundle_path, verify_canonical_bundle_records,
+    verify_canonical_bundle_records,
 };
 
 pub const SSH_SIGCHAIN_VERSION: u8 = 1;

crates/geth-keychain/src/sshsigchain/bundle.rs

@@ -28,8 +28,9 @@ pub struct CanonicalSshSigchainBundle {
     pub receipts: Vec<AnchorReceipt>,
 }
 
-/// Locates an untrusted distribution source. It is routing configuration, not
+/// Locates an untrusted distribution source. It is exact routing
-/// a trust anchor; integrity and authority come from SSHSIGCHAIN verification.
+/// configuration, not a discovery mechanism or trust anchor; acceptance comes
+/// from SSHSIGCHAIN verification against the independently pinned trust tuple.
 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
 pub struct DistributionEndpoint {
@@ -111,14 +112,6 @@ pub enum DistributionError {
     Protocol(#[from] SshSigchainError),
 }
 
-#[must_use]
-pub fn static_http_bundle_path(chain_id: ChainId) -> String {
-    format!(
-        "/.well-known/sshsigchain/v1/{}/chain.{CANONICAL_BUNDLE_EXTENSION}",
-        chain_id.to_hex()
-    )
-}
-
 #[must_use]
 pub fn canonical_bundle_hash(bytes: &[u8]) -> Digest {
     let mut input = Vec::with_capacity(BUNDLE_HASH_DOMAIN.len() + bytes.len());
@@ -740,6 +733,15 @@ fn validate_object_size(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<(), DistributionError> {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    #[test]
+    fn distribution_locator_is_arbitrary_exact_routing_configuration() {
+        let locator = "https://cdn.example.test/custom/latest.bin?channel=stable";
+        let endpoint =
+            DistributionEndpoint::new("primary", "http", locator).expect("distribution endpoint");
+
+        assert_eq!(endpoint.locator, locator);
+    }
+
     const ROOT_KEY: &str = "ssh-ed25519 AQID";
 
     fn signed_genesis() -> SshSigchainRecord {
@@ -778,7 +780,7 @@ mod tests {
         .with_signature(vec![4, 5, 6])
         .expect("claim signature");
         let receipt = AnchorReceipt {
-            backend_id: "static-http".to_owned(),
+            backend_id: "http-primary".to_owned(),
             claim_hash: claim.claim_hash().expect("claim hash"),
             evidence: b"receipt".to_vec(),
         };
@@ -897,7 +899,7 @@ mod tests {
                     required_classes: vec!["http".to_owned()],
                     backend_threshold: 1,
                     backends: vec![AnchorBackendPolicy {
-                        backend_id: "static-http".to_owned(),
+                        backend_id: "http-primary".to_owned(),
                         class: "http".to_owned(),
                         locator: "https://example.test".to_owned(),
                         weight: 1,
@@ -932,18 +934,6 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(decode_canonical_bundle(&bytes).expect("decode"), bundle);
     }
 
-    #[test]
-    fn static_http_path_is_stable_and_contains_only_lowercase_chain_id() {
-        assert_eq!(
-            static_http_bundle_path(ChainId([0xab; 32])),
-            concat!(
-                "/.well-known/sshsigchain/v1/",
-                "abababababababababababababababababababababababababababababababab/",
-                "chain.sscb"
-            )
-        );
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn canonical_bundle_matches_published_base_vector() {
         let record = SshSigchainRecord::unsigned(

crates/geth-node/src/lib.rs

@@ -6575,7 +6575,6 @@ pub fn handle_request(
                 claims: 0,
                 receipts: 0,
                 bundle_hash: geth_keychain::canonical_bundle_hash(&bytes).to_hex(),
-                static_http_path: geth_keychain::static_http_bundle_path(chain_id),
                 note: "wrote the canonical SSHSIGCHAIN bundle; the root public key remains an out-of-band trust input and is intentionally not embedded".to_owned(),
             })
         }
@@ -6594,7 +6593,6 @@ pub fn handle_request(
                 claims: bundle.claims.len(),
                 receipts: bundle.receipts.len(),
                 bundle_hash: geth_keychain::canonical_bundle_hash(&bytes).to_hex(),
-                static_http_path: geth_keychain::static_http_bundle_path(bundle.chain_id),
                 note: "extracted record JSONL including available disclosures; head claims and anchor receipts remain in the canonical bundle because JSONL carries records only".to_owned(),
             })
         }

docs/adr/0018-sshsigchain.md

@@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ SSHSIGCHAIN v1 is redesigned before deployment:
   discloseable payloads, claims, and receipts without embedding root trust;
 - JSONL is noncanonical human-facing interchange; and
 - distribution backends return untrusted bundle bytes through one interface,
-  with a static HTTP profile that requires no server application.
+  with a single-file static HTTP profile at an exact operator-configured URL
+  that requires no server application, well-known discovery, or TOFU.
 
 The generic core defines backend interfaces and deterministic policy behavior,
 not Nostr, HTTP, blockchain, or transparency-log clients. Those adapters belong

docs/architecture.md

@@ -496,10 +496,11 @@ SSHSIGCHAIN's canonical `.sscb` bundle is the portable on-disk and full-snapshot
 distribution boundary. It deterministically stores signed record objects,
 separate disclosures, head claims, and anchor receipts without embedding the
 root key. JSONL remains inspection/interchange only. Bundle sources implement a
-backend-neutral untrusted fetch interface; the static HTTP profile publishes
+backend-neutral untrusted fetch interface; the static HTTP profile fetches the
-the same bytes below `/.well-known/sshsigchain/v1/<chain-id>/chain.sscb`.
+same single file from an exact operator-configured URL. It defines no
-Fetching never grants trust or selects a head. Geth may use Iroh rather than
+well-known path or discovery rule. Fetching never grants trust or selects a
-HTTP operationally without changing the format or verification path.
+head. Geth may use Iroh rather than HTTP operationally without changing the
+format or verification path.
 
 New devices can use the node enrollment flow instead of hand-editing keychain
 state. `geth node enroll join` explicitly imports an owner admin public key as

docs/roadmap.md

@@ -584,9 +584,9 @@ resource-scoped capability decisions.
       clearly preserving claims/receipts only in the canonical bundle.
     - `[x]` `verify-sigchain` auto-detects JSONL or canonical bundles and binds
       a bundle's namespace and chain ID to local trust.
-  - `[x]` Specify the backend-neutral distribution-source contract and a static
+  - `[x]` Specify the backend-neutral distribution-source contract and a
-    HTTP full-snapshot profile at
+    single-file static HTTP full-snapshot profile at an arbitrary, explicitly
-    `/.well-known/sshsigchain/v1/<chain-id>/chain.sscb`.
+    configured URL, without well-known discovery or URL-based trust.
   - `[ ]` Implement automatic distribution fetchers.
     - Acceptance criteria: an HTTP fetcher enforces streaming limits,
       conditional caching, redirect policy, trust-tuple matching, accepted-head

docs/sigchain-keychain.md

@@ -114,11 +114,11 @@ geth keychain bundle-extract --in chain.sscb --out chain.jsonl
 
 The canonical bundle keeps disclosures separate from signed record objects and
 sorts every object class deterministically. Adding a disclosure changes the
-bundle hash but not the chain head. The same file is the simple static HTTP
+bundle hash but not the chain head. The same single file is the static HTTP
-distribution artifact at
+distribution artifact at any explicitly configured URL; there is no well-known
-`/.well-known/sshsigchain/v1/<chain-id>/chain.sscb`. Distribution is untrusted:
+path, URL derivation, or trust-on-first-use. Distribution is untrusted: the
-the configured root, authority replay, anchor policy, locally accepted head,
+configured root, authority replay, anchor policy, locally accepted head, and
-and fork checks still decide acceptance.
+fork checks still decide acceptance.
 
 ## Local commands
 

docs/sshsigchain.md

@@ -446,12 +446,12 @@ anchoring, cached-head, and fork checks.
 
 ### 10.1 Static HTTP profile
 
-The static HTTP profile needs no server application or directory listing. For
+The static HTTP profile needs no server application, directory listing,
-chain ID `<lowercase-chain-id>`, publish the bundle at:
+well-known path, or discovery protocol. Its `locator` is the exact arbitrary
-
+HTTP(S) URL of one canonical `.sscb` file. Implementations MUST NOT derive the
-```text
+URL from the chain ID, treat a URL as root-key discovery, or use a successful
-/.well-known/sshsigchain/v1/<lowercase-chain-id>/chain.sscb
+fetch as trust-on-first-use. The chain ID, namespace, and root public key are
-```
+already pinned independently of the URL.
 
 The response media type SHOULD be:
 
@@ -459,23 +459,29 @@ The response media type SHOULD be:
 application/vnd.sshsigchain.bundle.v1
 ```
 
-A client performs an ordinary `GET`, accepts a successful full response, caps
+A client performs an ordinary `GET` of the exact configured URL, accepts a
-bytes while streaming, decodes the canonical bundle, requires its chain ID and
+successful full response, caps bytes while streaming, decodes the canonical
-namespace to match local trust, verifies the chain, verifies applicable head
+bundle, requires its chain ID and namespace to match local trust, verifies the
-claims and receipts, then applies cached-head/fork rules. `404` means the source
+chain, verifies applicable head claims and receipts, then applies
-currently has no bundle. Servers SHOULD replace `chain.sscb` atomically.
+cached-head/fork rules. `404` means the source currently has no bundle. Servers
+SHOULD replace the file atomically.
 
-Servers MAY expose the lowercase bundle hash as a strong `ETag`; clients MAY use
+Servers SHOULD expose the lowercase bundle hash as a strong `ETag`; clients
-`If-None-Match`. HTTP cache validators are performance hints, not trust. HTTPS
+SHOULD use `If-None-Match`. A mutable latest-version URL SHOULD use
-protects privacy, locators, and availability against network interference, but
+`Cache-Control: no-cache` or a suitably short freshness lifetime so ordinary
-SSHSIGCHAIN verification remains mandatory even over authenticated HTTPS.
+HTTP caches and CDNs can store the file and revalidate it. HTTP cache validators
-Plain HTTP remains integrity-safe only in the narrow sense that tampering is
+are performance hints, not trust. HTTPS protects privacy, locators, and
-detected; it offers no confidentiality or reliable availability.
+availability against network interference, but SSHSIGCHAIN verification
+remains mandatory even over authenticated HTTPS. Plain HTTP remains
+integrity-safe only in the narrow sense that tampering is detected; it offers
+no confidentiality or reliable availability.
 
-This full-snapshot profile intentionally favors deployment with a static file
+Servers MAY support byte ranges, and clients MAY use them to resume or
-server. A later chunked profile may add immutable hash-addressed objects and a
+parallelize transfer of the single file. The v1 bundle has no authenticated
-small mutable manifest, but it must preserve the object encodings and all
+random-access index: a client MUST assemble, decode, hash, and verify the
-verification rules above.
+complete canonical bundle before accepting any state. A `206 Partial Content`
+response is therefore a download optimization, not a partial-chain or
+per-object protocol. This profile deliberately remains one file.
 
 ## 11. JSONL interchange