Add peer card discovery scaffold

This commit is contained in:
Eric Wendland 2026-05-16 14:24:21 +02:00
commit 81149605bc
11 changed files with 271 additions and 15 deletions

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@ -104,8 +104,9 @@ Roadmap items should be actionable and checkable:
- Local daemon, local control socket, local identity, local store, local CAS,
daemon-owned Iroh endpoint startup, built-in relay-mode config, SSH
certificate metadata, revocation metadata, user service definitions, and a
pinned `geth-iroh` endpoint wrapper with protocol-router scaffold exist.
- Custom relay maps, mDNS discovery, peer auth over Iroh, cr-sqlite, iroh-docs,
iroh-gossip, iroh-blobs, Automerge sync, real auth enforcement, OpenSSH KRL
generation, and Keyhive/BeeKEM-style authorization are future roadmap items
unless implemented later.
pinned `geth-iroh` endpoint wrapper with protocol-router scaffold, peer-card
types, and untrusted discovery-backend trait exist.
- Custom relay maps, mDNS discovery transport, peer auth over Iroh, cr-sqlite,
iroh-docs, iroh-gossip, iroh-blobs, Automerge sync, real auth enforcement,
OpenSSH KRL generation, and Keyhive/BeeKEM-style authorization are future
roadmap items unless implemented later.

2
Cargo.lock generated
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@ -1032,6 +1032,7 @@ dependencies = [
"geth-config",
"geth-control",
"geth-node",
"geth-store",
"tempfile",
"tokio",
"tracing-subscriber",
@ -1134,6 +1135,7 @@ version = "0.1.0"
dependencies = [
"geth-types",
"serde",
"thiserror 2.0.18",
]
[[package]]

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@ -71,6 +71,18 @@ impl AuthExplanation {
evaluated_ops: 0,
}
}
#[must_use]
pub fn discovered_candidate(subject: String, resource: String, capability: String) -> Self {
Self {
subject,
resource,
capability,
allowed: false,
reason: "subject is a discovered peer candidate only; discovery does not grant trust or authorization".to_owned(),
evaluated_ops: 0,
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]

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@ -7,4 +7,5 @@ license.workspace = true
[dependencies]
serde.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
geth-types = { path = "../geth-types" }

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@ -1,18 +1,149 @@
use geth_types::NodeId;
use geth_types::{AgentId, NodeId, UnixMillis};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
pub const PEER_CARD_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE: &str = "geth.peer-card.v1@geth.local";
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct PeerCard {
pub node: NodeId,
pub endpoints: Vec<String>,
pub signed_by: String,
pub node_id: NodeId,
pub agent_id: AgentId,
pub endpoints: Vec<EndpointCandidate>,
pub issued_at: UnixMillis,
pub signature: SignatureMetadata,
}
impl PeerCard {
pub fn validate_candidate(&self) -> Result<(), DiscoveryError> {
if self.endpoints.is_empty() {
return Err(DiscoveryError::MissingEndpoint);
}
if self.signature.namespace != PEER_CARD_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE {
return Err(DiscoveryError::InvalidSignatureNamespace(
self.signature.namespace.clone(),
));
}
if self.signature.signer.is_empty() || self.signature.signature.is_empty() {
return Err(DiscoveryError::UnsignedPeerCard);
}
Ok(())
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct EndpointCandidate {
pub endpoint_id: String,
pub relay_url: Option<String>,
pub source: DiscoverySource,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SignatureMetadata {
pub namespace: String,
pub signer: String,
pub signature: String,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum DiscoverySource {
Manual,
Mdns,
PeerExchange,
Imported,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct DiscoveredPeer {
pub card: PeerCard,
pub discovered_at: UnixMillis,
pub source: DiscoverySource,
pub trust_state: CandidateTrustState,
}
impl DiscoveredPeer {
pub fn candidate(
card: PeerCard,
discovered_at: UnixMillis,
source: DiscoverySource,
) -> Result<Self, DiscoveryError> {
card.validate_candidate()?;
Ok(Self {
card,
discovered_at,
source,
trust_state: CandidateTrustState::CandidateOnly,
})
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum CandidateTrustState {
CandidateOnly,
}
pub trait DiscoveryBackend {
fn candidates(&self) -> Vec<PeerCard>;
fn candidates(&self) -> Result<Vec<DiscoveredPeer>, DiscoveryError>;
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum DiscoveryError {
#[error("peer card has no endpoint candidates")]
MissingEndpoint,
#[error("peer card is missing signature metadata")]
UnsignedPeerCard,
#[error("invalid peer card signature namespace: {0}")]
InvalidSignatureNamespace(String),
}
#[must_use]
pub fn discovery_is_untrusted_note() -> &'static str {
"discovery returns candidate peers only and never grants trust or authorization"
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn signed_card() -> PeerCard {
PeerCard {
node_id: "node:laptop".into(),
agent_id: "agent:abc".into(),
endpoints: vec![EndpointCandidate {
endpoint_id: "endpoint:iroh".to_owned(),
relay_url: None,
source: DiscoverySource::Manual,
}],
issued_at: UnixMillis(1),
signature: SignatureMetadata {
namespace: PEER_CARD_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE.to_owned(),
signer: "agent:abc".to_owned(),
signature: "sig:test".to_owned(),
},
}
}
#[test]
fn signed_peer_card_is_valid_candidate() {
signed_card()
.validate_candidate()
.expect("valid signed candidate");
}
#[test]
fn discovered_peer_is_candidate_only() {
let peer = DiscoveredPeer::candidate(signed_card(), UnixMillis(2), DiscoverySource::Mdns)
.expect("candidate");
assert_eq!(peer.trust_state, CandidateTrustState::CandidateOnly);
}
#[test]
fn unsigned_peer_card_is_not_valid_candidate() {
let mut card = signed_card();
card.signature.signature.clear();
assert!(matches!(
card.validate_candidate(),
Err(DiscoveryError::UnsignedPeerCard)
));
}
}

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@ -247,9 +247,17 @@ pub fn handle_request(
subject,
resource,
capability,
} => Ok(ControlResponse::AuthExplain(AuthExplanation::stub(
subject, resource, capability,
))),
} => {
if store.get_peer_card(&subject)?.is_some() {
Ok(ControlResponse::AuthExplain(
AuthExplanation::discovered_candidate(subject, resource, capability),
))
} else {
Ok(ControlResponse::AuthExplain(AuthExplanation::stub(
subject, resource, capability,
)))
}
}
ControlRequest::SshCertRequest {
public_key_path,
cert_kind,

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@ -250,6 +250,45 @@ impl Store {
.map_err(StoreError::from)
}
pub fn upsert_peer_card(&self, peer_card: &StoredPeerCard) -> Result<(), StoreError> {
self.conn.execute(
"INSERT OR REPLACE INTO peer_cards(peer_id, card_json, updated_at_ms) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3)",
params![peer_card.peer_id, peer_card.card_json, peer_card.updated_at_ms],
)?;
Ok(())
}
pub fn get_peer_card(&self, peer_id: &str) -> Result<Option<StoredPeerCard>, StoreError> {
let mut stmt = self.conn.prepare(
"SELECT peer_id, card_json, updated_at_ms FROM peer_cards WHERE peer_id = ?1",
)?;
let mut rows = stmt.query(params![peer_id])?;
if let Some(row) = rows.next()? {
Ok(Some(StoredPeerCard {
peer_id: row.get(0)?,
card_json: row.get(1)?,
updated_at_ms: row.get(2)?,
}))
} else {
Ok(None)
}
}
pub fn list_peer_cards(&self) -> Result<Vec<StoredPeerCard>, StoreError> {
let mut stmt = self
.conn
.prepare("SELECT peer_id, card_json, updated_at_ms FROM peer_cards ORDER BY peer_id")?;
let rows = stmt.query_map([], |row| {
Ok(StoredPeerCard {
peer_id: row.get(0)?,
card_json: row.get(1)?,
updated_at_ms: row.get(2)?,
})
})?;
rows.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()
.map_err(StoreError::from)
}
pub fn insert_ssh_cert_request(
&self,
request: &StoredSshCertRequest,
@ -430,6 +469,13 @@ pub struct CasObject {
pub path: String,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct StoredPeerCard {
pub peer_id: String,
pub card_json: String,
pub updated_at_ms: i64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct StoredSshCertRequest {
pub request_id: String,
@ -527,4 +573,20 @@ mod tests {
vec![revocation]
);
}
#[test]
fn peer_card_roundtrip() {
let store = Store::open_memory().expect("open");
let peer_card = StoredPeerCard {
peer_id: "node:laptop".to_owned(),
card_json: r#"{"node_id":"node:laptop"}"#.to_owned(),
updated_at_ms: 10,
};
store.upsert_peer_card(&peer_card).expect("insert");
assert_eq!(
store.get_peer_card("node:laptop").expect("get"),
Some(peer_card.clone())
);
assert_eq!(store.list_peer_cards().expect("list"), vec![peer_card]);
}
}

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@ -20,4 +20,5 @@ geth-cas = { path = "../geth-cas" }
geth-config = { path = "../geth-config" }
geth-control = { path = "../geth-control" }
geth-node = { path = "../geth-node" }
geth-store = { path = "../geth-store" }
tempfile.workspace = true

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@ -116,6 +116,38 @@ fn initialized_node_can_roundtrip_cas_blob() {
);
}
#[test]
fn auth_explain_distinguishes_discovered_peer_candidates() {
let home = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
let paths = geth_config::GethPaths::from_home(home.path());
let node = geth_node::init_node(&paths).expect("init node");
let store = geth_store::Store::open(&paths.metadata_db()).expect("open store");
store
.upsert_peer_card(&geth_store::StoredPeerCard {
peer_id: "node:discovered".to_owned(),
card_json: r#"{"node_id":"node:discovered"}"#.to_owned(),
updated_at_ms: 1,
})
.expect("insert peer card");
let response = geth_node::handle_request(
&node,
geth_control::ControlRequest::AuthExplain {
subject: "node:discovered".to_owned(),
resource: "resource:cas:local".to_owned(),
capability: "cas.fetch".to_owned(),
},
)
.expect("auth explain");
match response {
geth_control::ControlResponse::AuthExplain(explanation) => {
assert!(!explanation.allowed);
assert!(explanation.reason.contains("discovered peer candidate"));
}
other => panic!("unexpected response: {other:?}"),
}
}
#[test]
fn ssh_cert_request_approval_and_revocation_export_use_local_state() {
let home = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");

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@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ connectivity and mDNS/LAN discovery for local networks. These are connectivity
and candidate-discovery mechanisms only. They do not grant trust, mutate
authorization state, or make EndpointID knowledge sufficient for access.
Peer cards are the discovery payload. A peer card carries node ID, agent ID,
endpoint candidates, timestamp, and signature metadata. The current scaffold
stores peer cards as untrusted metadata in `peer_cards`; signature verification
and trust reduction are future work. `auth explain` reports when a subject is
only a discovered peer candidate and denies access.
The daemon starts this endpoint during `geth daemon run` and keeps it alive for
the daemon lifetime. When endpoint startup succeeds, the Iroh EndpointID is
recorded as a transport binding for the stable geth node identity. If local UDP

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@ -101,14 +101,14 @@ geth-to-geth connections without granting trust from discovery alone.
- Unknown ALPNs are rejected explicitly.
- Tests cover registration collisions and unknown protocol handling.
- `[ ]` Peer cards.
- `[x]` Peer cards.
Acceptance criteria:
- A peer card contains node ID, agent ID, endpoint candidates, timestamp, and
signature metadata.
- Peer cards are stored in `peer_cards`.
- Invalid or unsigned peer cards do not update trust state.
- `[ ]` Untrusted discovery backend trait.
- `[x]` Untrusted discovery backend trait.
Acceptance criteria:
- Discovery returns candidate peer cards only.
- No discovery result grants capabilities or trust.