Add protected peer auth check

AGENTS.md

@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ Roadmap items should be actionable and checkable:
   certificate metadata, revocation metadata, user service definitions, and a
   pinned `geth-iroh` endpoint wrapper with protocol-router scaffold, peer-card
   types, manual signed peer-card export/import/list commands, `geth peer ping`
-  over Iroh, untrusted discovery-backend trait, custom relay-map config, and
-  Iroh local-network discovery toggle exist.
+  and `geth peer auth-check` over Iroh, untrusted discovery-backend trait,
+  custom relay-map config, and Iroh local-network discovery toggle exist.
 - Canonical signed-operation envelopes exist for keychain/auth signature
   payloads. The keychain reducer builds an active identity view for admin keys,
   users, devices, nodes, agents, and endpoint bindings.

README.md

@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ The bootstrap implementation provides:
 - `geth peer import <path>`
 - `geth peer list`
 - `geth peer ping <node-id>`
+- `geth peer auth-check <node-id> <resource> <capability>`
 - `geth resource list`
 - `geth resource create <kind> <name>`
 - `geth keychain init [--admin-key <path>]`
@@ -121,6 +122,9 @@ The bootstrap implementation provides:
 include the Iroh EndpointID plus currently known relay/direct addresses.
 `geth peer ping <node-id>` uses the local daemon's Iroh endpoint to dial an
 imported peer card and exchange a signed candidate-only peer-card ping.
+`geth peer auth-check <node-id> <resource> <capability>` sends a protected
+Iroh control request: the remote daemon verifies that the caller's signed peer
+card binds the actual Iroh EndpointID before reducing resource-local auth ops.
 Importing or pinging a peer card never grants capabilities by itself.
 
 Other command groups exist as explicit stubs: `ssh proxy`.

crates/geth-cli/src/lib.rs

@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ pub enum PeerCommand {
     Ping {
         node: String,
     },
+    AuthCheck {
+        node: String,
+        resource: String,
+        capability: String,
+    },
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Subcommand)]
@@ -464,6 +469,15 @@ fn request_for_command(command: Command) -> Result<ControlRequest> {
             PeerCommand::Import { path } => ControlRequest::PeerCardImport { path },
             PeerCommand::List => ControlRequest::PeerCardList,
             PeerCommand::Ping { node } => ControlRequest::PeerPing { node },
+            PeerCommand::AuthCheck {
+                node,
+                resource,
+                capability,
+            } => ControlRequest::PeerAuthCheck {
+                node,
+                resource,
+                capability,
+            },
         },
         Command::Resource {
             command: ResourceCommand::List,
@@ -819,6 +833,27 @@ fn print_response(response: ControlResponse, json: bool) -> Result<()> {
             println!("alpn: {alpn}");
             println!("note: {note}");
         }
+        ControlResponse::PeerAuthChecked {
+            peer_node_id,
+            peer_agent_id,
+            endpoint_id,
+            resource,
+            capability,
+            allowed,
+            reason,
+            evaluated_ops,
+            note,
+        } => {
+            println!("peer auth: {peer_node_id}");
+            println!("agent: {peer_agent_id}");
+            println!("endpoint: {endpoint_id}");
+            println!("resource: {resource}");
+            println!("capability: {capability}");
+            println!("allowed: {allowed}");
+            println!("reason: {reason}");
+            println!("evaluated_ops: {evaluated_ops}");
+            println!("note: {note}");
+        }
         ControlResponse::ResourceList { resources } => {
             if resources.is_empty() {
                 println!("no resources");

crates/geth-control/src/lib.rs

@@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ pub enum ControlRequest {
     PeerPing {
         node: String,
     },
+    PeerAuthCheck {
+        node: String,
+        resource: String,
+        capability: String,
+    },
     ResourceList,
     ResourceCreate {
         kind: String,
@@ -238,6 +243,17 @@ pub enum ControlResponse {
         alpn: String,
         note: String,
     },
+    PeerAuthChecked {
+        peer_node_id: String,
+        peer_agent_id: String,
+        endpoint_id: String,
+        resource: String,
+        capability: String,
+        allowed: bool,
+        reason: String,
+        evaluated_ops: usize,
+        note: String,
+    },
     ResourceList {
         resources: Vec<ResourceDescriptor>,
     },
@@ -441,7 +457,16 @@ pub struct CasBlob {
 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "kebab-case")]
 pub enum PeerControlRequest {
-    Ping { peer_card: PeerCard, nonce: String },
+    Ping {
+        peer_card: PeerCard,
+        nonce: String,
+    },
+    AuthCheck {
+        peer_card: PeerCard,
+        resource: String,
+        capability: String,
+        nonce: String,
+    },
 }
 
 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -456,6 +481,19 @@ pub enum PeerControlResponse {
         nonce: String,
         note: String,
     },
+    AuthChecked {
+        node_id: String,
+        agent_id: String,
+        endpoint_id: String,
+        remote_endpoint_id: String,
+        resource: String,
+        capability: String,
+        allowed: bool,
+        reason: String,
+        evaluated_ops: usize,
+        nonce: String,
+        note: String,
+    },
     Error {
         message: String,
     },
@@ -619,6 +657,16 @@ mod tests {
             request
         );
 
+        let request = ControlRequest::PeerAuthCheck {
+            node: "node:peer".to_owned(),
+            resource: "resource:cas:local".to_owned(),
+            capability: "cas.fetch".to_owned(),
+        };
+        assert_eq!(
+            decode_request(&encode_request(&request).expect("encode")).expect("decode"),
+            request
+        );
+
         let response = PeerControlResponse::Pong {
             node_id: "node:peer".to_owned(),
             agent_id: "agent:peer".to_owned(),
@@ -633,5 +681,24 @@ mod tests {
                 .expect("decode"),
             response
         );
+
+        let response = PeerControlResponse::AuthChecked {
+            node_id: "node:peer".to_owned(),
+            agent_id: "agent:peer".to_owned(),
+            endpoint_id: "endpoint:peer".to_owned(),
+            remote_endpoint_id: "endpoint:caller".to_owned(),
+            resource: "resource:cas:local".to_owned(),
+            capability: "cas.fetch".to_owned(),
+            allowed: false,
+            reason: "no grant".to_owned(),
+            evaluated_ops: 0,
+            nonce: "nonce".to_owned(),
+            note: "protected".to_owned(),
+        };
+        assert_eq!(
+            decode_peer_response(&encode_peer_response(&response).expect("encode"))
+                .expect("decode"),
+            response
+        );
     }
 }

crates/geth-node/src/lib.rs

@@ -232,6 +232,11 @@ pub async fn handle_request_async(
     match request {
         ControlRequest::PeerCardExport { out } => export_peer_card(node, out, true).await,
         ControlRequest::PeerPing { node: peer_node } => peer_ping(node, &peer_node).await,
+        ControlRequest::PeerAuthCheck {
+            node: peer_node,
+            resource,
+            capability,
+        } => peer_auth_check(node, &peer_node, resource, capability).await,
         other => handle_request(node, other),
     }
 }
@@ -322,6 +327,7 @@ async fn peer_ping(node: &LocalNode, peer_node: &str) -> Result<ControlResponse,
         .endpoints
         .first()
         .ok_or(geth_discovery::DiscoveryError::MissingEndpoint)?;
+    ensure_peer_card_matches_endpoint(&peer_card, &candidate.endpoint_id)?;
     let node_addr = iroh_node_addr_from_candidate(candidate)?;
     let endpoint = node
         .iroh_endpoint
@@ -386,6 +392,111 @@ async fn peer_ping(node: &LocalNode, peer_node: &str) -> Result<ControlResponse,
             "peer ping response nonce did not match request".to_owned(),
         )),
         PeerControlResponse::Error { message } => Err(NodeError::IrohPeer(message)),
+        PeerControlResponse::AuthChecked { .. } => Err(NodeError::IrohPeer(
+            "peer returned auth-check response to ping request".to_owned(),
+        )),
+    }
+}
+
+async fn peer_auth_check(
+    node: &LocalNode,
+    peer_node: &str,
+    resource: String,
+    capability: String,
+) -> Result<ControlResponse, NodeError> {
+    let store = Store::open(&node.paths.metadata_db())?;
+    let stored = store
+        .get_peer_card(peer_node)?
+        .ok_or_else(|| NodeError::PeerNotFound(peer_node.to_owned()))?;
+    let peer_card: PeerCard = serde_json::from_str(&stored.card_json)?;
+    peer_card.validate_candidate()?;
+    let candidate = peer_card
+        .endpoints
+        .first()
+        .ok_or(geth_discovery::DiscoveryError::MissingEndpoint)?;
+    ensure_peer_card_matches_endpoint(&peer_card, &candidate.endpoint_id)?;
+    let node_addr = iroh_node_addr_from_candidate(candidate)?;
+    let endpoint = node
+        .iroh_endpoint
+        .lock()
+        .map_err(|_| NodeError::RuntimeLockPoisoned)?
+        .clone()
+        .ok_or(NodeError::IrohEndpointUnavailable)?;
+    let self_card = local_peer_card(node, DiscoverySource::PeerExchange, true).await?;
+    let nonce = geth_crypto::blake3_hex(
+        format!(
+            "{}\0{}\0{}\0{}\0{}",
+            node.node_id,
+            peer_node,
+            resource,
+            capability,
+            geth_store::now_ms()
+        )
+        .as_bytes(),
+    );
+    let request = PeerControlRequest::AuthCheck {
+        peer_card: self_card,
+        resource: resource.clone(),
+        capability: capability.clone(),
+        nonce: nonce.clone(),
+    };
+
+    let conn = endpoint
+        .endpoint()
+        .connect(node_addr, geth_iroh::ALPN_CONTROL)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|error| NodeError::IrohPeer(error.to_string()))?;
+    let (mut send, mut recv) = conn
+        .open_bi()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|error| NodeError::IrohPeer(error.to_string()))?;
+    send.write_all(geth_control::encode_peer_request(&request)?.as_bytes())
+        .await
+        .map_err(|error| NodeError::IrohPeer(error.to_string()))?;
+    send.finish()
+        .map_err(|error| NodeError::IrohPeer(error.to_string()))?;
+    let bytes = recv
+        .read_to_end(64 * 1024)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|error| NodeError::IrohPeer(error.to_string()))?;
+    let text =
+        std::str::from_utf8(&bytes).map_err(|error| NodeError::IrohPeer(error.to_string()))?;
+    match geth_control::decode_peer_response(text)? {
+        PeerControlResponse::AuthChecked {
+            node_id,
+            agent_id,
+            endpoint_id,
+            resource: response_resource,
+            capability: response_capability,
+            allowed,
+            reason,
+            evaluated_ops,
+            nonce: response_nonce,
+            note,
+            ..
+        } if response_nonce == nonce
+            && response_resource == resource
+            && response_capability == capability =>
+        {
+            Ok(ControlResponse::PeerAuthChecked {
+                peer_node_id: node_id,
+                peer_agent_id: agent_id,
+                endpoint_id,
+                resource: response_resource,
+                capability: response_capability,
+                allowed,
+                reason,
+                evaluated_ops,
+                note,
+            })
+        }
+        PeerControlResponse::AuthChecked { .. } => Err(NodeError::IrohPeer(
+            "peer auth-check response did not match request".to_owned(),
+        )),
+        PeerControlResponse::Error { message } => Err(NodeError::IrohPeer(message)),
+        PeerControlResponse::Pong { .. } => Err(NodeError::IrohPeer(
+            "peer returned pong to auth-check request".to_owned(),
+        )),
     }
 }
 
@@ -431,6 +542,7 @@ async fn handle_iroh_control_connection(
     let response = match geth_control::decode_peer_request(text)? {
         PeerControlRequest::Ping { peer_card, nonce } => {
             peer_card.validate_candidate()?;
+            ensure_peer_card_matches_endpoint(&peer_card, &remote_endpoint_id)?;
             let discovered = DiscoveredPeer::candidate(
                 peer_card.clone(),
                 UnixMillis(geth_store::now_ms()),
@@ -452,6 +564,45 @@ async fn handle_iroh_control_connection(
                 note: "peer endpoint authenticated by Iroh and peer-card signature; candidate status does not grant resource capabilities".to_owned(),
             }
         }
+        PeerControlRequest::AuthCheck {
+            peer_card,
+            resource,
+            capability,
+            nonce,
+        } => {
+            peer_card.validate_candidate()?;
+            ensure_peer_card_matches_endpoint(&peer_card, &remote_endpoint_id)?;
+            let discovered = DiscoveredPeer::candidate(
+                peer_card.clone(),
+                UnixMillis(geth_store::now_ms()),
+                DiscoverySource::PeerExchange,
+            )?;
+            let store = Store::open(&node.paths.metadata_db())?;
+            store.upsert_peer_card(&StoredPeerCard {
+                peer_id: peer_card.node_id.to_string(),
+                card_json: serde_json::to_string(&peer_card)?,
+                updated_at_ms: discovered.discovered_at.0,
+            })?;
+            let explanation = geth_auth::explain_auth_ops(
+                &load_auth_ops_for_resource(&store, &resource)?,
+                PrincipalId::new(peer_card.node_id.to_string()),
+                ResourceId::new(resource.clone()),
+                Capability::new(capability.clone()),
+            );
+            PeerControlResponse::AuthChecked {
+                node_id: node.node_id.clone(),
+                agent_id: node.agent_id.clone(),
+                endpoint_id: node.iroh_status.endpoint_id.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
+                remote_endpoint_id,
+                resource,
+                capability,
+                allowed: explanation.allowed,
+                reason: explanation.reason,
+                evaluated_ops: explanation.evaluated_ops,
+                nonce,
+                note: "protected peer request authenticated endpoint/card binding before resource capability evaluation".to_owned(),
+            }
+        }
     };
     send.write_all(geth_control::encode_peer_response(&response)?.as_bytes())
         .await
@@ -487,6 +638,21 @@ fn iroh_node_addr_from_candidate(
     Ok(node_addr)
 }
 
+fn ensure_peer_card_matches_endpoint(card: &PeerCard, endpoint_id: &str) -> Result<(), NodeError> {
+    if card
+        .endpoints
+        .iter()
+        .any(|candidate| candidate.endpoint_id == endpoint_id)
+    {
+        Ok(())
+    } else {
+        Err(NodeError::IrohPeer(format!(
+            "signed peer card for {} does not bind Iroh endpoint {}",
+            card.node_id, endpoint_id
+        )))
+    }
+}
+
 fn display_alpn(alpn: Vec<u8>) -> String {
     String::from_utf8_lossy(&alpn).into_owned()
 }
@@ -571,6 +737,7 @@ pub fn handle_request(
             })
         }
         ControlRequest::PeerPing { .. } => Err(NodeError::IrohEndpointUnavailable),
+        ControlRequest::PeerAuthCheck { .. } => Err(NodeError::IrohEndpointUnavailable),
         ControlRequest::ResourceList => Ok(ControlResponse::ResourceList {
             resources: store
                 .list_resources()?
@@ -2046,6 +2213,65 @@ mod tests {
             other => panic!("unexpected ping response: {other:?}"),
         }
 
+        let denied = handle_request_async(
+            &left,
+            ControlRequest::PeerAuthCheck {
+                node: right_card.node_id.to_string(),
+                resource: "resource:cas:local".to_owned(),
+                capability: "cas.fetch".to_owned(),
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect("denied peer auth check");
+        match denied {
+            ControlResponse::PeerAuthChecked {
+                allowed,
+                reason,
+                note,
+                ..
+            } => {
+                assert!(!allowed);
+                assert!(reason.contains("no active direct or group grant"));
+                assert!(note.contains("authenticated endpoint/card binding"));
+            }
+            other => panic!("unexpected denied auth response: {other:?}"),
+        }
+
+        handle_request(
+            &right,
+            ControlRequest::AuthGrant {
+                subject: left.node_id.clone(),
+                resource: "resource:cas:local".to_owned(),
+                capability: "cas.fetch".to_owned(),
+                grant_id: Some("grant:left-cas-fetch".to_owned()),
+            },
+        )
+        .expect("grant left peer");
+
+        let allowed = handle_request_async(
+            &left,
+            ControlRequest::PeerAuthCheck {
+                node: right_card.node_id.to_string(),
+                resource: "resource:cas:local".to_owned(),
+                capability: "cas.fetch".to_owned(),
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect("allowed peer auth check");
+        match allowed {
+            ControlResponse::PeerAuthChecked {
+                allowed,
+                reason,
+                evaluated_ops,
+                ..
+            } => {
+                assert!(allowed);
+                assert!(reason.contains("direct grant"));
+                assert_eq!(evaluated_ops, 1);
+            }
+            other => panic!("unexpected allowed auth response: {other:?}"),
+        }
+
         left_endpoint.shutdown().await;
         right_endpoint.shutdown().await;
     }

docs/architecture.md

@@ -46,8 +46,11 @@ discovers Iroh node addressing. `geth peer export/import/list` supports manual
 exchange of signed peer cards as untrusted candidates. Peer cards include the
 Iroh EndpointID plus relay/direct address candidates when the daemon can observe
 them. `geth peer ping <node-id>` dials an imported peer card over Iroh and
-exchanges signed peer-card metadata. Automatic signed peer-card advertisement
-over LAN discovery remains separate future work.
+exchanges signed peer-card metadata. `geth peer auth-check <node-id>
+<resource> <capability>` sends a protected Iroh control request that validates
+the caller's signed peer card against the actual Iroh EndpointID before
+evaluating resource-local capabilities. Automatic signed peer-card
+advertisement over LAN discovery remains separate future work.
 
 Peer cards are the discovery payload. A peer card carries node ID, agent ID,
 endpoint candidates, timestamp, signing public key, and an Ed25519 signature
@@ -55,7 +58,10 @@ over a canonical payload. Imported and ping-discovered peer cards are stored as
 untrusted metadata in `peer_cards`; trust reduction is future work. `auth
 explain` reports when a subject is only a discovered peer candidate and denies
 access. The peer ping path authenticates the Iroh endpoint and peer-card
-signature, but it does not authorize any resource module.
+signature, but it does not authorize any resource module. Protected peer
+control requests must also prove that the signed peer card binds the observed
+Iroh EndpointID, then reduce resource auth ops; an EndpointID alone is not
+accepted as a resource principal.
 
 The daemon starts this endpoint during `geth daemon run` and keeps it alive for
 the daemon lifetime. When endpoint startup succeeds, the Iroh EndpointID is

docs/roadmap.md

@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ geth-to-geth connections without granting trust from discovery alone.
   - No discovery result grants capabilities or trust.
   - `auth explain` can distinguish "discovered" from "trusted".
 
-- `[~]` Basic authenticated peer connection.
+- `[x]` Basic authenticated peer connection.
   Acceptance criteria:
   - `[x]` `geth peer ping <node-id>` dials another node over Iroh using an
     imported signed peer card.
@@ -135,9 +135,9 @@ geth-to-geth connections without granting trust from discovery alone.
     as a candidate only.
   - `[x]` The ping response records negotiated ALPN and remote endpoint
     identity.
-  - `[ ]` The remote side proves an agent/node binding before protected module
+  - `[x]` The remote side proves an agent/node binding before protected module
     access.
-  - `[ ]` Protected module handlers reject requests that only know an
+  - `[x]` Protected module handlers reject requests that only know an
     EndpointID and lack resource capabilities.
 
 ## Phase 2: Trust And Authorization