Add protected peer auth check
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7 changed files with 347 additions and 9 deletions
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@ -46,8 +46,11 @@ discovers Iroh node addressing. `geth peer export/import/list` supports manual
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exchange of signed peer cards as untrusted candidates. Peer cards include the
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Iroh EndpointID plus relay/direct address candidates when the daemon can observe
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them. `geth peer ping <node-id>` dials an imported peer card over Iroh and
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exchanges signed peer-card metadata. Automatic signed peer-card advertisement
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over LAN discovery remains separate future work.
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exchanges signed peer-card metadata. `geth peer auth-check <node-id>
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<resource> <capability>` sends a protected Iroh control request that validates
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the caller's signed peer card against the actual Iroh EndpointID before
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evaluating resource-local capabilities. Automatic signed peer-card
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advertisement over LAN discovery remains separate future work.
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Peer cards are the discovery payload. A peer card carries node ID, agent ID,
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endpoint candidates, timestamp, signing public key, and an Ed25519 signature
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@ -55,7 +58,10 @@ over a canonical payload. Imported and ping-discovered peer cards are stored as
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untrusted metadata in `peer_cards`; trust reduction is future work. `auth
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explain` reports when a subject is only a discovered peer candidate and denies
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access. The peer ping path authenticates the Iroh endpoint and peer-card
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signature, but it does not authorize any resource module.
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signature, but it does not authorize any resource module. Protected peer
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control requests must also prove that the signed peer card binds the observed
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Iroh EndpointID, then reduce resource auth ops; an EndpointID alone is not
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accepted as a resource principal.
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The daemon starts this endpoint during `geth daemon run` and keeps it alive for
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the daemon lifetime. When endpoint startup succeeds, the Iroh EndpointID is
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@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ geth-to-geth connections without granting trust from discovery alone.
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- No discovery result grants capabilities or trust.
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- `auth explain` can distinguish "discovered" from "trusted".
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- `[~]` Basic authenticated peer connection.
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- `[x]` Basic authenticated peer connection.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- `[x]` `geth peer ping <node-id>` dials another node over Iroh using an
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imported signed peer card.
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@ -135,9 +135,9 @@ geth-to-geth connections without granting trust from discovery alone.
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as a candidate only.
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- `[x]` The ping response records negotiated ALPN and remote endpoint
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identity.
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- `[ ]` The remote side proves an agent/node binding before protected module
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- `[x]` The remote side proves an agent/node binding before protected module
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access.
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- `[ ]` Protected module handlers reject requests that only know an
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- `[x]` Protected module handlers reject requests that only know an
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EndpointID and lack resource capabilities.
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## Phase 2: Trust And Authorization
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