Improve auth explain diagnostics

README.md

@@ -314,6 +314,13 @@ use `ssh_cert.request`, `ssh_cert.read`, `ssh_cert.approve`, and
 use `ssh_revocation.publish`, `ssh_revocation.read`, and
 `ssh_revocation.import` on `resource:ssh:revocations`.
 
+`geth auth explain <subject> <resource> <capability>` is the operator-facing
+debug path for those decisions. Human output includes the allow/deny result,
+the reason, evaluated auth-op count, and compact diagnostics. JSON output
+includes the same diagnostics so scripts can distinguish discovered-only peers,
+unknown subjects, missing or matched endpoint bindings, missing grants, revoked
+grants, and bearer-secret access without scraping prose.
+
 ## Local State
 
 If `GETH_HOME` is set, geth uses it. Otherwise it uses an OS-specific data

crates/geth-auth/src/lib.rs

@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ pub fn explain_auth_ops(
     capability: Capability,
 ) -> AuthExplanation {
     let view = reduce_auth_ops(ops);
-    explain_from_view(&view, ops.len(), subject, resource, capability)
+    explain_from_ops_and_view(ops, &view, subject, resource, capability)
 }
 
 pub fn explain_from_view(
@@ -244,6 +244,99 @@ pub fn explain_from_view(
     resource: ResourceId,
     capability: Capability,
 ) -> AuthExplanation {
+    explain_from_ops_and_view(&[], view, subject, resource, capability)
+        .with_evaluated_ops(evaluated_ops)
+}
+
+fn explain_from_ops_and_view(
+    ops: &[AuthOp],
+    view: &AuthView,
+    subject: PrincipalId,
+    resource: ResourceId,
+    capability: Capability,
+) -> AuthExplanation {
+    let evaluated_ops = ops.len();
+    if let Some(secret) = subject.as_str().strip_prefix("bearer:") {
+        let secret = SecretId::new(secret.to_owned());
+        if let Some(access) = view.bearer_access.get(&secret) {
+            if access.resource == resource {
+                if let Some(granted_capability) = access
+                    .capabilities
+                    .iter()
+                    .find(|granted| capability_allows(granted, &capability))
+                {
+                    return AuthExplanation {
+                        subject: subject.to_string(),
+                        resource: resource.to_string(),
+                        capability: capability.to_string(),
+                        allowed: true,
+                        reason: format!(
+                            "active bearer access {} allows resource-scoped capability via {} without granting node identity",
+                            access.secret, granted_capability
+                        ),
+                        evaluated_ops,
+                        diagnostics: vec![
+                            "subject:bearer-secret".to_owned(),
+                            format!("bearer:active:{}", access.secret),
+                            format!("capability:matched:{granted_capability}"),
+                        ],
+                    };
+                }
+                return AuthExplanation {
+                    subject: subject.to_string(),
+                    resource: resource.to_string(),
+                    capability: capability.to_string(),
+                    allowed: false,
+                    reason:
+                        "active bearer access exists for this resource but lacks the requested capability"
+                            .to_owned(),
+                    evaluated_ops,
+                    diagnostics: vec![
+                        "subject:bearer-secret".to_owned(),
+                        format!("bearer:active:{secret}"),
+                        "capability:missing".to_owned(),
+                    ],
+                };
+            }
+        }
+
+        if ops.iter().any(|op| {
+            op.resource == resource
+                && matches!(
+                    &op.kind,
+                    AuthOpKind::BearerAccessRevoke { secret: revoked } if revoked == &secret
+                )
+        }) {
+            return AuthExplanation {
+                subject: subject.to_string(),
+                resource: resource.to_string(),
+                capability: capability.to_string(),
+                allowed: false,
+                reason:
+                    "bearer access for this resource was revoked; bearer secrets do not grant node identity"
+                        .to_owned(),
+                evaluated_ops,
+                diagnostics: vec![
+                    "subject:bearer-secret".to_owned(),
+                    format!("bearer:revoked:{secret}"),
+                ],
+            };
+        }
+
+        return AuthExplanation {
+            subject: subject.to_string(),
+            resource: resource.to_string(),
+            capability: capability.to_string(),
+            allowed: false,
+            reason: "no active bearer access exists for this resource and capability".to_owned(),
+            evaluated_ops,
+            diagnostics: vec![
+                "subject:bearer-secret".to_owned(),
+                "bearer:missing".to_owned(),
+            ],
+        };
+    }
+
     let group_principals = groups_for_subject(view, &resource, &subject);
     for grant in view.grants.values() {
         let Some(granted_capability) = grant
@@ -267,6 +360,11 @@ pub fn explain_from_view(
                     grant.id, granted_capability
                 ),
                 evaluated_ops,
+                diagnostics: vec![
+                    "subject:direct-principal".to_owned(),
+                    format!("grant:matched:{}", grant.id),
+                    format!("capability:matched:{granted_capability}"),
+                ],
             };
         }
         if group_principals.contains(&grant.principal) {
@@ -280,10 +378,29 @@ pub fn explain_from_view(
                     grant.id, granted_capability
                 ),
                 evaluated_ops,
+                diagnostics: vec![
+                    "subject:group-member".to_owned(),
+                    format!("grant:matched:{}", grant.id),
+                    format!("capability:matched:{granted_capability}"),
+                ],
             };
         }
     }
 
+    if let Some(grant_id) = revoked_matching_grant_id(ops, &subject, &resource, &capability) {
+        return AuthExplanation {
+            subject: subject.to_string(),
+            resource: resource.to_string(),
+            capability: capability.to_string(),
+            allowed: false,
+            reason: format!(
+                "matching grant {grant_id} was revoked; no active direct or group grant currently allows the requested capability"
+            ),
+            evaluated_ops,
+            diagnostics: vec![format!("grant:revoked:{grant_id}")],
+        };
+    }
+
     AuthExplanation {
         subject: subject.to_string(),
         resource: resource.to_string(),
@@ -291,9 +408,65 @@ pub fn explain_from_view(
         allowed: false,
         reason: "no active direct or group grant contains the requested capability".to_owned(),
         evaluated_ops,
+        diagnostics: vec!["grant:missing".to_owned()],
     }
 }
 
+fn revoked_matching_grant_id(
+    ops: &[AuthOp],
+    subject: &PrincipalId,
+    resource: &ResourceId,
+    capability: &Capability,
+) -> Option<String> {
+    let mut matching_grants = BTreeSet::new();
+    let mut group_members = BTreeMap::<GroupId, BTreeSet<PrincipalId>>::new();
+    for op in ops {
+        if &op.resource != resource {
+            continue;
+        }
+        match &op.kind {
+            AuthOpKind::GrantCreate {
+                grant_id,
+                principal,
+                capabilities,
+            } => {
+                let direct = principal == subject;
+                let group = group_members
+                    .get(&GroupId::new(principal.as_str()))
+                    .is_some_and(|members| members.contains(subject));
+                let capability_matches = capabilities
+                    .iter()
+                    .any(|granted| capability_allows(granted, capability));
+                if (direct || group) && capability_matches {
+                    matching_grants.insert(grant_id.clone());
+                }
+            }
+            AuthOpKind::GrantRevoke { grant_id } => {
+                if matching_grants.remove(grant_id) {
+                    return Some(grant_id.clone());
+                }
+            }
+            AuthOpKind::GroupAddMember { group, principal } => {
+                group_members
+                    .entry(group.clone())
+                    .or_default()
+                    .insert(principal.clone());
+            }
+            AuthOpKind::GroupRemoveMember { group, principal } => {
+                if let Some(members) = group_members.get_mut(group) {
+                    members.remove(principal);
+                }
+            }
+            AuthOpKind::ResourceCreate
+            | AuthOpKind::ResourceAuthoritySet { .. }
+            | AuthOpKind::BearerAccessCreate { .. }
+            | AuthOpKind::BearerAccessRevoke { .. }
+            | AuthOpKind::GroupCreate { .. } => {}
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
 pub fn capability_allows(granted: &Capability, requested: &Capability) -> bool {
     if granted == requested {
         return true;
@@ -345,9 +518,24 @@ pub struct AuthExplanation {
     pub allowed: bool,
     pub reason: String,
     pub evaluated_ops: usize,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub diagnostics: Vec<String>,
 }
 
 impl AuthExplanation {
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn with_evaluated_ops(mut self, evaluated_ops: usize) -> Self {
+        self.evaluated_ops = evaluated_ops;
+        self
+    }
+
+    pub fn add_diagnostic(&mut self, diagnostic: impl Into<String>) {
+        let diagnostic = diagnostic.into();
+        if !self.diagnostics.contains(&diagnostic) {
+            self.diagnostics.push(diagnostic);
+        }
+    }
+
     #[must_use]
     pub fn stub(subject: String, resource: String, capability: String) -> Self {
         Self {
@@ -357,6 +545,7 @@ impl AuthExplanation {
             allowed: false,
             reason: "authorization logs are scaffolded; no grant reducer is active yet".to_owned(),
             evaluated_ops: 0,
+            diagnostics: vec!["auth-log:empty".to_owned()],
         }
     }
 
@@ -369,6 +558,10 @@ impl AuthExplanation {
             allowed: false,
             reason: "subject is a discovered peer candidate only; discovery does not grant trust or authorization".to_owned(),
             evaluated_ops: 0,
+            diagnostics: vec![
+                "subject:discovered-only".to_owned(),
+                "trust:missing".to_owned(),
+            ],
         }
     }
 }
@@ -527,6 +720,12 @@ mod tests {
             "kv.admin".into(),
         );
         assert!(!revoked.allowed);
+        assert!(revoked.reason.contains("grant:revoked"));
+        assert!(
+            revoked
+                .diagnostics
+                .contains(&"grant:revoked:grant:revoked".to_owned())
+        );
     }
 
     #[test]
@@ -578,6 +777,47 @@ mod tests {
             Some(Vec::new())
         );
         assert!(view.bearer_access.is_empty());
+
+        let revoked = explain_auth_ops(
+            &ops,
+            "bearer:secret:invite".into(),
+            "resource:notes".into(),
+            "pipe.connect".into(),
+        );
+        assert!(!revoked.allowed);
+        assert!(revoked.reason.contains("revoked"));
+        assert!(
+            revoked
+                .diagnostics
+                .contains(&"bearer:revoked:secret:invite".to_owned())
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn auth_explain_reports_active_bearer_access() {
+        let ops = vec![op(
+            1,
+            AuthOpKind::BearerAccessCreate {
+                secret: "secret:invite".into(),
+                token_hash: Some("token-hash".to_owned()),
+                capabilities: vec!["pipe.connect".into()],
+                expires_at: None,
+            },
+        )];
+
+        let allowed = explain_auth_ops(
+            &ops,
+            "bearer:secret:invite".into(),
+            "resource:notes".into(),
+            "pipe.connect".into(),
+        );
+        assert!(allowed.allowed);
+        assert!(allowed.reason.contains("bearer access"));
+        assert!(
+            allowed
+                .diagnostics
+                .contains(&"bearer:active:secret:invite".to_owned())
+        );
     }
 
     #[test]

crates/geth-cli/src/lib.rs

@@ -2065,6 +2065,9 @@ fn print_response(response: ControlResponse, json: bool) -> Result<()> {
             println!("capability: {}", explain.capability);
             println!("reason: {}", explain.reason);
             println!("evaluated_ops: {}", explain.evaluated_ops);
+            if !explain.diagnostics.is_empty() {
+                println!("diagnostics: {}", explain.diagnostics.join(","));
+            }
         }
         ControlResponse::AuthOpRecorded { op, signatures } => {
             println!("recorded auth op: {}", op.id);

crates/geth-node/src/lib.rs

@@ -3306,6 +3306,103 @@ fn can_sync_resource(
     .allowed)
 }
 
+fn explain_auth_for_operator(
+    store: &Store,
+    subject: &str,
+    resource: &str,
+    capability: &str,
+) -> Result<AuthExplanation, NodeError> {
+    let ops = load_auth_ops_for_resource(store, resource)?;
+    let mut explanation = geth_auth::explain_auth_ops(
+        &ops,
+        PrincipalId::new(subject.to_owned()),
+        ResourceId::new(resource.to_owned()),
+        Capability::new(capability.to_owned()),
+    );
+
+    if subject.starts_with("bearer:") {
+        return Ok(explanation);
+    }
+
+    let peer_card = store.get_peer_card(subject)?;
+    let keychain_view = geth_keychain::reduce_keychain_ops(&load_keychain_ops(store)?);
+    let subject_node = NodeId::new(subject.to_owned());
+    let trusted_node = keychain_view.nodes.get(&subject_node);
+
+    match (trusted_node, peer_card) {
+        (None, Some(_)) => {
+            explanation.add_diagnostic("subject:discovered-only");
+            explanation.add_diagnostic("trust:missing");
+            if !explanation
+                .reason
+                .contains("discovery does not grant trust or authorization")
+            {
+                explanation.reason = format!(
+                    "subject is a discovered peer candidate only; discovery does not grant trust or authorization; {}",
+                    explanation.reason
+                );
+            }
+        }
+        (None, None) => {
+            explanation.add_diagnostic("subject:unknown");
+            explanation.add_diagnostic("trust:missing");
+            if !explanation.allowed {
+                explanation.reason = format!(
+                    "subject is not present in the keychain and has no discovered peer card; {}",
+                    explanation.reason
+                );
+            }
+        }
+        (Some(node), None) => {
+            explanation.add_diagnostic("subject:trusted-node");
+            if node.endpoints.is_empty() {
+                explanation.add_diagnostic("endpoint-binding:missing");
+            } else {
+                explanation.add_diagnostic("endpoint-binding:present");
+                explanation.add_diagnostic("discovery:missing-peer-card");
+            }
+        }
+        (Some(node), Some(stored_card)) => {
+            explanation.add_diagnostic("subject:trusted-node");
+            let card = serde_json::from_str::<PeerCard>(&stored_card.card_json).ok();
+            let matching_endpoint = card.as_ref().and_then(|card| {
+                card.endpoints
+                    .iter()
+                    .map(|endpoint| endpoint.endpoint_id.as_str())
+                    .find(|endpoint| {
+                        keychain_view
+                            .endpoints
+                            .get(*endpoint)
+                            .is_some_and(|bound_node| bound_node == &node.id)
+                    })
+                    .map(ToOwned::to_owned)
+            });
+
+            if let Some(endpoint) = matching_endpoint {
+                explanation.add_diagnostic(format!("endpoint-binding:matched:{endpoint}"));
+            } else if node.endpoints.is_empty() {
+                explanation.add_diagnostic("endpoint-binding:missing");
+                if !explanation.allowed {
+                    explanation.reason = format!(
+                        "trusted node has no active endpoint binding; {}",
+                        explanation.reason
+                    );
+                }
+            } else {
+                explanation.add_diagnostic("endpoint-binding:missing-for-peer-card");
+                if !explanation.allowed {
+                    explanation.reason = format!(
+                        "discovered peer card has no endpoint candidate bound to the trusted node; {}",
+                        explanation.reason
+                    );
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    Ok(explanation)
+}
+
 fn bearer_proof(
     bearer_secret: Option<String>,
     resource: &str,
@@ -3360,6 +3457,7 @@ fn explain_peer_or_bearer(
         allowed: false,
         reason,
         evaluated_ops: peer_explanation.evaluated_ops,
+        diagnostics: vec!["subject:bearer-secret".to_owned()],
     };
 
     if proof.resource != resource_id {
@@ -3425,6 +3523,11 @@ fn explain_peer_or_bearer(
             "bearer proof allows this resource-scoped capability without granting node identity"
                 .to_owned(),
         evaluated_ops: peer_explanation.evaluated_ops,
+        diagnostics: vec![
+            "subject:bearer-secret".to_owned(),
+            format!("bearer:active:{}", access.secret),
+            "capability:matched".to_owned(),
+        ],
     })
 }
 
@@ -6756,35 +6859,12 @@ pub fn handle_request(
             subject,
             resource,
             capability,
-        } => {
+        } => Ok(ControlResponse::AuthExplain(explain_auth_for_operator(
-            let ops = load_auth_ops_for_resource(&store, &resource)?;
+            &store,
-            let discovered = store.get_peer_card(&subject)?.is_some();
+            &subject,
-            if ops.is_empty() {
+            &resource,
-                if discovered {
+            &capability,
-                    Ok(ControlResponse::AuthExplain(
+        )?)),
-                        AuthExplanation::discovered_candidate(subject, resource, capability),
-                    ))
-                } else {
-                    Ok(ControlResponse::AuthExplain(AuthExplanation::stub(
-                        subject, resource, capability,
-                    )))
-                }
-            } else {
-                let mut explanation = geth_auth::explain_auth_ops(
-                    &ops,
-                    PrincipalId::new(subject.clone()),
-                    ResourceId::new(resource.clone()),
-                    Capability::new(capability.clone()),
-                );
-                if discovered && !explanation.allowed {
-                    explanation.reason = format!(
-                        "subject is a discovered peer candidate only; discovery does not grant trust or authorization; {}",
-                        explanation.reason
-                    );
-                }
-                Ok(ControlResponse::AuthExplain(explanation))
-            }
-        }
         ControlRequest::AuthGrant {
             subject,
             resource,

crates/geth/tests/bootstrap.rs

@@ -1853,6 +1853,133 @@ fn auth_explain_distinguishes_discovered_peer_candidates() {
         geth_control::ControlResponse::AuthExplain(explanation) => {
             assert!(!explanation.allowed);
             assert!(explanation.reason.contains("discovered peer candidate"));
+            assert!(
+                explanation
+                    .diagnostics
+                    .contains(&"subject:discovered-only".to_owned())
+            );
+        }
+        other => panic!("unexpected response: {other:?}"),
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn auth_explain_distinguishes_endpoint_binding_state() {
+    let home = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
+    let paths = geth_config::GethPaths::from_home(home.path());
+    let node = geth_node::init_node(&paths).expect("init node");
+    let store = geth_store::Store::open(&paths.metadata_db()).expect("open store");
+    let created_at = geth_store::now_ms();
+
+    for op in [
+        geth_keychain::KeychainOp {
+            id: "op:keychain:init".into(),
+            created_at: geth_types::UnixMillis(created_at),
+            kind: geth_keychain::KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit,
+        },
+        geth_keychain::KeychainOp {
+            id: "op:user:add".into(),
+            created_at: geth_types::UnixMillis(created_at + 1),
+            kind: geth_keychain::KeychainOpKind::UserAdd {
+                user: "user:owner".into(),
+                name: "Owner".to_owned(),
+            },
+        },
+        geth_keychain::KeychainOp {
+            id: "op:device:add".into(),
+            created_at: geth_types::UnixMillis(created_at + 2),
+            kind: geth_keychain::KeychainOpKind::DeviceAdd {
+                device: "device:laptop".into(),
+                user: "user:owner".into(),
+            },
+        },
+        geth_keychain::KeychainOp {
+            id: "op:node:add".into(),
+            created_at: geth_types::UnixMillis(created_at + 3),
+            kind: geth_keychain::KeychainOpKind::NodeAdd {
+                node: "node:trusted".into(),
+                device: "device:laptop".into(),
+                name: "trusted".to_owned(),
+            },
+        },
+    ] {
+        store
+            .insert_keychain_op(&geth_store::StoredKeychainOp {
+                op_id: op.id.to_string(),
+                op_json: serde_json::to_string(&op).expect("keychain op json"),
+                created_at_ms: op.created_at.0,
+            })
+            .expect("insert keychain op");
+    }
+
+    store
+        .upsert_peer_card(&geth_store::StoredPeerCard {
+            peer_id: "node:trusted".to_owned(),
+            card_json: r#"{
+                "node_id":"node:trusted",
+                "agent_id":"agent:test",
+                "endpoints":[{"endpoint_id":"endpoint:card-only","relay_url":null,"direct_addresses":[],"source":"manual"}],
+                "issued_at":1,
+                "signature":{"namespace":"","signer":"","public_key":"","signature":""}
+            }"#
+            .to_owned(),
+            updated_at_ms: created_at + 4,
+        })
+        .expect("insert peer card");
+
+    let missing = geth_node::handle_request(
+        &node,
+        geth_control::ControlRequest::AuthExplain {
+            subject: "node:trusted".to_owned(),
+            resource: "resource:cas:local".to_owned(),
+            capability: "cas.fetch".to_owned(),
+        },
+    )
+    .expect("explain missing endpoint binding");
+    match missing {
+        geth_control::ControlResponse::AuthExplain(explanation) => {
+            assert!(!explanation.allowed);
+            assert!(
+                explanation
+                    .diagnostics
+                    .contains(&"endpoint-binding:missing".to_owned())
+            );
+        }
+        other => panic!("unexpected response: {other:?}"),
+    }
+
+    let endpoint_op = geth_keychain::KeychainOp {
+        id: "op:node:endpoint:add".into(),
+        created_at: geth_types::UnixMillis(created_at + 5),
+        kind: geth_keychain::KeychainOpKind::NodeEndpointAdd {
+            node: "node:trusted".into(),
+            endpoint: "endpoint:card-only".to_owned(),
+        },
+    };
+    store
+        .insert_keychain_op(&geth_store::StoredKeychainOp {
+            op_id: endpoint_op.id.to_string(),
+            op_json: serde_json::to_string(&endpoint_op).expect("endpoint op json"),
+            created_at_ms: endpoint_op.created_at.0,
+        })
+        .expect("insert endpoint op");
+
+    let matched = geth_node::handle_request(
+        &node,
+        geth_control::ControlRequest::AuthExplain {
+            subject: "node:trusted".to_owned(),
+            resource: "resource:cas:local".to_owned(),
+            capability: "cas.fetch".to_owned(),
+        },
+    )
+    .expect("explain matched endpoint binding");
+    match matched {
+        geth_control::ControlResponse::AuthExplain(explanation) => {
+            assert!(
+                explanation
+                    .diagnostics
+                    .contains(&"endpoint-binding:matched:endpoint:card-only".to_owned())
+            );
         }
         other => panic!("unexpected response: {other:?}"),
     }
@@ -1926,7 +2053,12 @@ fn auth_grant_revoke_and_explain_use_local_auth_log() {
         geth_control::ControlResponse::AuthExplain(explanation) => {
             assert!(!explanation.allowed);
             assert_eq!(explanation.evaluated_ops, 2);
-            assert!(explanation.reason.contains("no active"));
+            assert!(explanation.reason.contains("revoked"));
+            assert!(
+                explanation
+                    .diagnostics
+                    .contains(&"grant:revoked:grant:test-fetch".to_owned())
+            );
         }
         other => panic!("unexpected response: {other:?}"),
     }

docs/architecture.md

@@ -59,11 +59,13 @@ endpoint candidates, timestamp, signing public key, and an Ed25519 signature
 over a canonical payload. Imported and ping-discovered peer cards are stored as
 untrusted metadata in `peer_cards`; trust reduction is future work. `auth
 explain` reports when a subject is only a discovered peer candidate and denies
-access. The peer ping path authenticates the Iroh endpoint and peer-card
+access. It also reports whether a trusted node has no endpoint binding, whether
-signature, but it does not authorize any resource module. Protected peer
+the discovered peer card has no endpoint bound to that node, or whether a peer
-control requests must also prove that the signed peer card binds the observed
+card endpoint matches the reduced keychain view. The peer ping path
-Iroh EndpointID, then reduce resource auth ops; an EndpointID alone is not
+authenticates the Iroh endpoint and peer-card signature, but it does not
-accepted as a resource principal.
+authorize any resource module. Protected peer control requests must also prove
+that the signed peer card binds the observed Iroh EndpointID, then reduce
+resource auth ops; an EndpointID alone is not accepted as a resource principal.
 
 The daemon starts this endpoint during `geth daemon run` and keeps it alive for
 the daemon lifetime. When endpoint startup succeeds, the Iroh EndpointID is
@@ -309,13 +311,16 @@ both signed logs so the new node can see its approved identity and permissions.
 The authorization plane is `geth-auth`: resource-local signed operation logs,
 grants, revocations, groups, and `auth explain`. Auth operations reduce into a
 current permission view for resources, grants, groups, and bearer access. The
-library can explain direct and group grants. The daemon persists local auth
+library can explain direct grants, group grants, missing grants, revoked grants,
-grant/revoke operations and `geth auth explain` evaluates that local operation
+and bearer-secret access. The daemon persists local auth grant/revoke operations
-log. `geth node grant`, `geth node revoke-grant`, `geth auth grant`, and `geth
+and `geth auth explain` enriches the reducer result with keychain and discovery
-auth revoke` require `--signing-key` in the CLI and store OpenSSH-signed auth
+diagnostics, including discovered-only peers and endpoint-binding state. Human
-operations. Enrollment approval uses the same signed auth operation path. Auth
+output prints those diagnostics and JSON output exposes them as structured
-sync imports only auth operations signed by currently trusted admin keys.
+strings for scripts. `geth node grant`, `geth node revoke-grant`, `geth auth
-Broader delegated authority and module enforcement are still future work.
+grant`, and `geth auth revoke` require `--signing-key` in the CLI and store
+OpenSSH-signed auth operations. Enrollment approval uses the same signed auth
+operation path. Auth sync imports only auth operations signed by currently
+trusted admin keys. Broader delegated authority is still future work.
 
 Capability evaluation supports exact matches plus explicit scoped forms. For KV,
 `kv.write_prefix:<prefix>` grants writes requested as `kv.write_key:<key>` only

docs/roadmap.md

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ end-to-end test target for the intended personal mesh use cases.
 
 Implementation order:
 
-1. `[~]` Close remote authorization and replicated-state safety gaps.
+1. `[x]` Close remote authorization and replicated-state safety gaps.
    Acceptance criteria:
    - `[x]` Add initial two-daemon tests proving denied remote pubsub publish,
      remote pipe listen, and SSH admin shell requests do not mutate serving
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Implementation order:
      keychain/auth operations are rejected and not imported.
    - `[x]` Add tests proving conflicting replicated keychain/auth records do
      not mutate trust/resource state.
-   - `[ ]` Improve `auth explain` diagnostics enough for operators to
+   - `[x]` Improve `auth explain` diagnostics enough for operators to
      distinguish discovered-only peers, missing endpoint bindings, missing
      grants, matching grants, revocations, and bearer access.
 
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Implementation order:
     pubsub, pipe, SSH proxy/admin shell, SSH cert metadata, and revocations.
   - `[x]` Initial two-daemon denied-mutation coverage exists for remote pubsub
     publish, remote pipe listen, and SSH admin shell.
-  - `[ ]` `auth explain` output can explain discovered-only peers, missing
+  - `[x]` `auth explain` output can explain discovered-only peers, missing
     endpoint bindings, missing grants, matching grants, revocations, and bearer
     access.
 
@@ -364,6 +364,9 @@ resource-scoped capability decisions.
   - `[x]` Output includes the grant ID or missing grant that caused the result.
   - `[x]` JSON output is stable enough for tests and scripts.
   - `[x]` Replicated auth sync requires trusted-admin signatures before import.
+  - `[x]` Human and JSON output include diagnostics for discovered-only peers,
+    missing and matched endpoint bindings, matching grants, revoked grants, and
+    bearer access.
 
 - `[~]` Resource secrets and bearer invites.
   Acceptance criteria: