//! Reusable signed keychain and sigchain model.
//!
//! This crate owns geth's identity-plane data model: admin keys, users,
//! devices, nodes, agents, endpoint bindings, and the signed operation log used
//! to update them. It intentionally has no dependency on the daemon, SQLite,
//! Iroh, local sockets, or any particular publication mechanism.
//!
//! The current local operation-log verifier remains local to geth's daemon
//! state. Portable SSHSIGCHAIN records are implemented separately in
//! [`sshsigchain`]: they use an explicit trust tuple, fixed signing bytes, and
//! a causal hash chain rather than a timestamp-sorted JSONL bundle.

mod sshsigchain;

pub use sshsigchain::{
    AnchorAttesterPolicy, AnchorBackendPolicy, AnchorPolicy, AnchorReceipt, AnchorReceiptVerifier,
    AnchoredHistory, AuthorityDeviceState, AuthorityKey, AuthorityKeyId, AuthorityKeyState,
    AuthorityState, AuthorityTransition, ChainId as SshSigchainChainId,
    Digest as SshSigchainDigest, HeadClaim, MAX_JSONL_BYTES, MAX_JSONL_LINE_BYTES,
    MAX_NAMESPACE_BYTES, Permission, ProfileDisclosure, ProfileExtension,
    SSH_SIGCHAIN_ANCHOR_NAMESPACE, SSH_SIGCHAIN_KEY_PROOF_NAMESPACE, SSH_SIGCHAIN_NAMESPACE,
    SSH_SIGCHAIN_VERIFIER_PRINCIPAL, SSH_SIGCHAIN_VERSION, SshSigchainError, SshSigchainRecord,
    SshSigchainTrust, SshSigchainVerification, SshSigchainVerifier, VerifiedAnchoredHistory,
    authority_key_id, decode_sshsigchain_jsonl, encode_sshsigchain_jsonl, key_proof_signing_bytes,
    profile_payload_commitment, select_anchored_head, verify_anchor_receipts,
    verify_anchored_history, verify_head_claim, verify_sshsigchain,
};

use geth_types::{
    AgentId, AuthOpId, Capability, DeviceId, KeyId, NodeId, ResourceId, UnixMillis, UserId,
};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet};

pub const KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE: &str = "geth.keychain.v1@geth.local";
pub const NODE_ENROLLMENT_REQUEST_NAMESPACE: &str = "geth.node-enrollment-request.v1@geth.local";
pub const AUTHORIZED_KEYS_NAMESPACE: &str = "geth.authorized-keys.v1@eric.wendland.dev";
pub const DEFAULT_ADMIN_PRINCIPAL: &str = "admin";

pub type SignedKeychainOp = geth_codec::SignedEnvelope<KeychainOp, KeyId>;

#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct KeychainProfile {
    keychain_signature_namespace: String,
    node_enrollment_request_namespace: String,
    default_admin_principal: String,
}

impl KeychainProfile {
    /// Create a profile from explicit signature namespaces.
    ///
    /// Use this when an application wants stable, audited namespaces rather
    /// than the generated `<application>.<purpose>.v1@<domain>` form.
    pub fn new(
        keychain_signature_namespace: impl Into<String>,
        node_enrollment_request_namespace: impl Into<String>,
        default_admin_principal: impl Into<String>,
    ) -> Result<Self, KeychainError> {
        let keychain_signature_namespace = keychain_signature_namespace.into();
        let node_enrollment_request_namespace = node_enrollment_request_namespace.into();
        let default_admin_principal = default_admin_principal.into();
        validate_namespace(&keychain_signature_namespace)?;
        validate_namespace(&node_enrollment_request_namespace)?;
        validate_principal(&default_admin_principal)?;
        Ok(Self {
            keychain_signature_namespace,
            node_enrollment_request_namespace,
            default_admin_principal,
        })
    }

    /// Build application-specific namespaces under a DNS-style domain.
    ///
    /// For example, `for_application("acme", "example.com")` creates:
    ///
    /// - `acme.keychain.v1@example.com`
    /// - `acme.node-enrollment-request.v1@example.com`
    pub fn for_application(
        application: impl AsRef<str>,
        domain: impl AsRef<str>,
    ) -> Result<Self, KeychainError> {
        let application = validate_namespace_component(application.as_ref(), "application")?;
        let domain = validate_namespace_component(domain.as_ref(), "domain")?;
        Self::new(
            format!("{application}.keychain.v1@{domain}"),
            format!("{application}.node-enrollment-request.v1@{domain}"),
            DEFAULT_ADMIN_PRINCIPAL,
        )
    }

    #[must_use]
    pub fn geth() -> Self {
        Self {
            keychain_signature_namespace: KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE.to_owned(),
            node_enrollment_request_namespace: NODE_ENROLLMENT_REQUEST_NAMESPACE.to_owned(),
            default_admin_principal: DEFAULT_ADMIN_PRINCIPAL.to_owned(),
        }
    }

    #[must_use]
    pub fn keychain_signature_namespace(&self) -> &str {
        &self.keychain_signature_namespace
    }

    #[must_use]
    pub fn node_enrollment_request_namespace(&self) -> &str {
        &self.node_enrollment_request_namespace
    }

    #[must_use]
    pub fn default_admin_principal(&self) -> &str {
        &self.default_admin_principal
    }
}

impl Default for KeychainProfile {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self::geth()
    }
}

pub fn keychain_signing_payload(op: &KeychainOp) -> Result<Vec<u8>, geth_codec::CodecError> {
    keychain_signing_payload_with_profile(op, &KeychainProfile::geth())
}

pub fn keychain_signing_payload_with_profile(
    op: &KeychainOp,
    profile: &KeychainProfile,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, geth_codec::CodecError> {
    geth_codec::signing_payload(profile.keychain_signature_namespace(), op)
}

pub fn keychain_signing_payload_hash(
    op: &KeychainOp,
) -> Result<geth_types::BlobHash, geth_codec::CodecError> {
    keychain_signing_payload_hash_with_profile(op, &KeychainProfile::geth())
}

pub fn keychain_signing_payload_hash_with_profile(
    op: &KeychainOp,
    profile: &KeychainProfile,
) -> Result<geth_types::BlobHash, geth_codec::CodecError> {
    geth_codec::signing_payload_hash(profile.keychain_signature_namespace(), op)
}

#[must_use]
pub fn signed_keychain_op(op: KeychainOp, signer: KeyId, signature: Vec<u8>) -> SignedKeychainOp {
    signed_keychain_op_with_profile(op, signer, signature, &KeychainProfile::geth())
}

#[must_use]
pub fn signed_keychain_op_with_profile(
    op: KeychainOp,
    signer: KeyId,
    signature: Vec<u8>,
    profile: &KeychainProfile,
) -> SignedKeychainOp {
    geth_codec::SignedEnvelope::new(
        profile.keychain_signature_namespace(),
        op,
        signer,
        signature,
    )
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct KeychainOp {
    pub id: geth_types::AuthOpId,
    pub created_at: UnixMillis,
    pub kind: KeychainOpKind,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct KeychainOpSignature {
    pub op_id: AuthOpId,
    pub signer: KeyId,
    pub signer_public_key: String,
    pub namespace: String,
    pub signature: Vec<u8>,
    pub created_at: UnixMillis,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct KeychainAllowedSigner {
    pub key: KeyId,
    pub principal: String,
    pub public_key: String,
    pub valid_after_ms: Option<i64>,
    pub valid_before_ms: Option<i64>,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct KeychainSigchainReport {
    pub ops: usize,
    pub signatures: usize,
    pub accepted_ops: usize,
    pub rejected_ops: usize,
    pub active_admin_keys: usize,
    pub accepted_head: Option<AuthOpId>,
    pub note: String,
}

pub trait KeychainSignatureVerifier {
    fn verify_keychain_signature(&self, op: &KeychainOp, signature: &KeychainOpSignature) -> bool;
}

impl<F> KeychainSignatureVerifier for F
where
    F: for<'op, 'signature> Fn(&'op KeychainOp, &'signature KeychainOpSignature) -> bool,
{
    fn verify_keychain_signature(&self, op: &KeychainOp, signature: &KeychainOpSignature) -> bool {
        self(op, signature)
    }
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NodeEnrollmentRequest {
    pub id: AuthOpId,
    pub requester_node: NodeId,
    pub requester_agent: AgentId,
    pub requester_agent_public_key: String,
    pub requested_node_name: String,
    pub requested_capabilities: Vec<NodeEnrollmentCapability>,
    pub endpoint_id: Option<String>,
    pub reason: Option<String>,
    pub status: NodeEnrollmentStatus,
    pub created_at: UnixMillis,
    pub provenance: Option<NodeEnrollmentProvenance>,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NodeEnrollmentCapability {
    pub resource: ResourceId,
    pub capability: Capability,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NodeEnrollmentProvenance {
    pub namespace: String,
    pub signer_node: NodeId,
    pub signer_agent: AgentId,
    pub signer_public_key: String,
    pub signature_hex: String,
    pub signed_at: UnixMillis,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum NodeEnrollmentStatus {
    Pending,
    Approved,
    Rejected,
}

impl NodeEnrollmentStatus {
    #[must_use]
    pub fn as_str(&self) -> &'static str {
        match self {
            Self::Pending => "pending",
            Self::Approved => "approved",
            Self::Rejected => "rejected",
        }
    }
}

impl std::fmt::Display for NodeEnrollmentStatus {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        f.write_str(self.as_str())
    }
}

impl std::str::FromStr for NodeEnrollmentStatus {
    type Err = KeychainError;

    fn from_str(value: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
        match value {
            "pending" => Ok(Self::Pending),
            "approved" => Ok(Self::Approved),
            "rejected" => Ok(Self::Rejected),
            _ => Err(KeychainError::InvalidEnrollmentStatus(value.to_owned())),
        }
    }
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NodeEnrollmentRequestSigningPayload {
    pub id: AuthOpId,
    pub requester_node: NodeId,
    pub requester_agent: AgentId,
    pub requester_agent_public_key: String,
    pub requested_node_name: String,
    pub requested_capabilities: Vec<NodeEnrollmentCapability>,
    pub endpoint_id: Option<String>,
    pub reason: Option<String>,
    pub created_at: UnixMillis,
}

#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum KeychainError {
    #[error("invalid node enrollment status: {0}")]
    InvalidEnrollmentStatus(String),
    #[error("invalid keychain namespace: {0}")]
    InvalidNamespace(String),
    #[error("invalid keychain namespace {field}: {value}")]
    InvalidNamespaceComponent { field: String, value: String },
    #[error("invalid keychain principal: {0}")]
    InvalidPrincipal(String),
    #[error("codec error: {0}")]
    Codec(#[from] geth_codec::CodecError),
}

#[must_use]
pub fn node_enrollment_request_signing_payload(
    request: &NodeEnrollmentRequest,
) -> NodeEnrollmentRequestSigningPayload {
    NodeEnrollmentRequestSigningPayload {
        id: request.id.clone(),
        requester_node: request.requester_node.clone(),
        requester_agent: request.requester_agent.clone(),
        requester_agent_public_key: request.requester_agent_public_key.clone(),
        requested_node_name: request.requested_node_name.clone(),
        requested_capabilities: request.requested_capabilities.clone(),
        endpoint_id: request.endpoint_id.clone(),
        reason: request.reason.clone(),
        created_at: request.created_at,
    }
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(tag = "kind", rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum KeychainOpKind {
    KeychainInit,
    AdminKeyAdd {
        key: KeyId,
        public_key: Option<String>,
        principal: Option<String>,
        valid_after_ms: Option<i64>,
        valid_before_ms: Option<i64>,
    },
    AdminKeyRevoke {
        key: KeyId,
    },
    UserAdd {
        user: UserId,
        name: String,
    },
    UserRename {
        user: UserId,
        name: String,
    },
    UserRevoke {
        user: UserId,
    },
    DeviceAdd {
        device: DeviceId,
        user: UserId,
    },
    DeviceRevoke {
        device: DeviceId,
    },
    DeviceKeyAdd {
        device: DeviceId,
        key: KeyId,
    },
    DeviceKeyRevoke {
        device: DeviceId,
        key: KeyId,
    },
    NodeAdd {
        node: NodeId,
        device: DeviceId,
        name: String,
    },
    NodeRename {
        node: NodeId,
        name: String,
    },
    NodeRevoke {
        node: NodeId,
    },
    NodeEndpointAdd {
        node: NodeId,
        endpoint: String,
    },
    NodeEndpointRevoke {
        node: NodeId,
        endpoint: String,
    },
    AgentBind {
        agent: AgentId,
        node: NodeId,
    },
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct KeychainView {
    pub initialized: bool,
    pub admin_keys: Vec<KeyId>,
    pub users: BTreeMap<UserId, UserRecord>,
    pub devices: BTreeMap<DeviceId, DeviceRecord>,
    pub nodes: BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeRecord>,
    pub agents: BTreeMap<AgentId, NodeId>,
    pub endpoints: BTreeMap<String, NodeId>,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct UserRecord {
    pub id: UserId,
    pub name: String,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct DeviceRecord {
    pub id: DeviceId,
    pub user: UserId,
    pub keys: Vec<KeyId>,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NodeRecord {
    pub id: NodeId,
    pub device: DeviceId,
    pub name: String,
    pub endpoints: Vec<String>,
}

pub fn reduce_keychain_ops(ops: &[KeychainOp]) -> KeychainView {
    let mut initialized = false;
    let mut admin_keys = BTreeSet::new();
    let mut users = BTreeMap::<UserId, UserRecord>::new();
    let mut revoked_users = BTreeSet::new();
    let mut devices = BTreeMap::<DeviceId, DeviceRecord>::new();
    let mut revoked_devices = BTreeSet::new();
    let mut nodes = BTreeMap::<NodeId, NodeRecord>::new();
    let mut revoked_nodes = BTreeSet::new();
    let mut agent_bindings = BTreeMap::<AgentId, NodeId>::new();

    for op in ops {
        match &op.kind {
            KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit => initialized = true,
            KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd { key, .. } => {
                admin_keys.insert(key.clone());
            }
            KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyRevoke { key } => {
                admin_keys.remove(key);
            }
            KeychainOpKind::UserAdd { user, name } => {
                revoked_users.remove(user);
                users.entry(user.clone()).or_insert_with(|| UserRecord {
                    id: user.clone(),
                    name: name.clone(),
                });
            }
            KeychainOpKind::UserRename { user, name } => {
                if let Some(record) = users.get_mut(user) {
                    record.name.clone_from(name);
                }
            }
            KeychainOpKind::UserRevoke { user } => {
                revoked_users.insert(user.clone());
            }
            KeychainOpKind::DeviceAdd { device, user } => {
                revoked_devices.remove(device);
                devices
                    .entry(device.clone())
                    .or_insert_with(|| DeviceRecord {
                        id: device.clone(),
                        user: user.clone(),
                        keys: Vec::new(),
                    });
            }
            KeychainOpKind::DeviceRevoke { device } => {
                revoked_devices.insert(device.clone());
            }
            KeychainOpKind::DeviceKeyAdd { device, key } => {
                if let Some(record) = devices.get_mut(device)
                    && !record.keys.contains(key)
                {
                    record.keys.push(key.clone());
                    record.keys.sort();
                }
            }
            KeychainOpKind::DeviceKeyRevoke { device, key } => {
                if let Some(record) = devices.get_mut(device) {
                    record.keys.retain(|item| item != key);
                }
            }
            KeychainOpKind::NodeAdd { node, device, name } => {
                revoked_nodes.remove(node);
                nodes.entry(node.clone()).or_insert_with(|| NodeRecord {
                    id: node.clone(),
                    device: device.clone(),
                    name: name.clone(),
                    endpoints: Vec::new(),
                });
            }
            KeychainOpKind::NodeRename { node, name } => {
                if let Some(record) = nodes.get_mut(node) {
                    record.name.clone_from(name);
                }
            }
            KeychainOpKind::NodeRevoke { node } => {
                revoked_nodes.insert(node.clone());
            }
            KeychainOpKind::NodeEndpointAdd { node, endpoint } => {
                if let Some(record) = nodes.get_mut(node)
                    && !record.endpoints.contains(endpoint)
                {
                    record.endpoints.push(endpoint.clone());
                    record.endpoints.sort();
                }
            }
            KeychainOpKind::NodeEndpointRevoke { node, endpoint } => {
                if let Some(record) = nodes.get_mut(node) {
                    record.endpoints.retain(|item| item != endpoint);
                }
            }
            KeychainOpKind::AgentBind { agent, node } => {
                agent_bindings.insert(agent.clone(), node.clone());
            }
        }
    }

    users.retain(|user, _| !revoked_users.contains(user));
    devices.retain(|device, record| {
        !revoked_devices.contains(device) && users.contains_key(&record.user)
    });
    nodes.retain(|node, record| {
        !revoked_nodes.contains(node) && devices.contains_key(&record.device)
    });
    agent_bindings.retain(|_, node| nodes.contains_key(node));

    let mut endpoints = BTreeMap::new();
    for (node, record) in &nodes {
        for endpoint in &record.endpoints {
            endpoints.insert(endpoint.clone(), node.clone());
        }
    }

    KeychainView {
        initialized,
        admin_keys: admin_keys.into_iter().collect(),
        users,
        devices,
        nodes,
        agents: agent_bindings,
        endpoints,
    }
}

pub fn sorted_keychain_ops(mut ops: Vec<KeychainOp>) -> Vec<KeychainOp> {
    ops.sort_by(|left, right| {
        (
            left.created_at.0,
            keychain_op_order(&left.kind),
            left.id.to_string(),
        )
            .cmp(&(
                right.created_at.0,
                keychain_op_order(&right.kind),
                right.id.to_string(),
            ))
    });
    ops
}

#[must_use]
pub fn keychain_op_order(kind: &KeychainOpKind) -> u8 {
    match kind {
        KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit => 0,
        KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd { .. } => 1,
        KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyRevoke { .. } => 2,
        _ => 10,
    }
}

#[must_use]
pub fn allowed_signers(
    ops: &[KeychainOp],
    signatures: &[KeychainOpSignature],
) -> Vec<KeychainAllowedSigner> {
    allowed_signers_with_profile(ops, signatures, &KeychainProfile::geth())
}

#[must_use]
pub fn allowed_signers_with_profile(
    ops: &[KeychainOp],
    signatures: &[KeychainOpSignature],
    profile: &KeychainProfile,
) -> Vec<KeychainAllowedSigner> {
    let mut entries = BTreeMap::<KeyId, KeychainAllowedSigner>::new();
    for op in sorted_keychain_ops(ops.to_vec()) {
        match op.kind {
            KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
                key,
                public_key,
                principal,
                valid_after_ms,
                valid_before_ms,
            } => {
                let public_key = public_key
                    .or_else(|| {
                        signatures
                            .iter()
                            .find(|signature| signature.signer == key)
                            .map(|signature| signature.signer_public_key.trim().to_owned())
                    })
                    .unwrap_or_default();
                if !public_key.is_empty() {
                    entries.insert(
                        key.clone(),
                        KeychainAllowedSigner {
                            key,
                            principal: principal
                                .unwrap_or_else(|| profile.default_admin_principal().to_owned()),
                            public_key,
                            valid_after_ms,
                            valid_before_ms,
                        },
                    );
                }
            }
            KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyRevoke { key } => {
                entries.remove(&key);
            }
            _ => {}
        }
    }
    entries.into_values().collect()
}

#[must_use]
pub fn render_allowed_signers(entries: &[KeychainAllowedSigner]) -> String {
    let mut text = String::new();
    for entry in entries {
        text.push_str(&format!(
            "{} {}\n",
            entry.principal,
            entry.public_key.trim()
        ));
    }
    text
}

pub fn verify_sigchain(
    ops: &[KeychainOp],
    signatures: &[KeychainOpSignature],
    verifier: &(impl KeychainSignatureVerifier + ?Sized),
) -> KeychainSigchainReport {
    verify_sigchain_with_profile(ops, signatures, &KeychainProfile::geth(), verifier)
}

pub fn verify_sigchain_with_profile(
    ops: &[KeychainOp],
    signatures: &[KeychainOpSignature],
    profile: &KeychainProfile,
    verifier: &(impl KeychainSignatureVerifier + ?Sized),
) -> KeychainSigchainReport {
    let ops = sorted_keychain_ops(ops.to_vec());
    let mut accepted = Vec::<KeychainOp>::new();
    let mut trusted_admins = BTreeSet::<KeyId>::new();
    let mut rejected_ops = 0;
    for op in &ops {
        let op_signatures = signatures
            .iter()
            .filter(|signature| signature.op_id == op.id)
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let bootstrap_init = accepted.is_empty() && matches!(op.kind, KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit);
        let bootstrap_admin = accepted.len() == 1
            && matches!(accepted[0].kind, KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit)
            && matches!(&op.kind, KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd { .. });
        let valid = bootstrap_init
            || bootstrap_admin
            || op_signatures.iter().any(|signature| {
                let signer_is_authorized = trusted_admins.contains(&signature.signer);
                signer_is_authorized
                    && signature.namespace == profile.keychain_signature_namespace()
                    && signature_uses_claimed_key(signature)
                    && verifier.verify_keychain_signature(op, signature)
            });
        if valid {
            accepted.push(op.clone());
            trusted_admins = reduce_keychain_ops(&accepted)
                .admin_keys
                .into_iter()
                .collect();
        } else {
            rejected_ops += 1;
        }
    }
    let view = reduce_keychain_ops(&accepted);
    KeychainSigchainReport {
        ops: ops.len(),
        signatures: signatures.len(),
        accepted_ops: accepted.len(),
        rejected_ops,
        active_admin_keys: view.admin_keys.len(),
        accepted_head: accepted.last().map(|op| op.id.clone()),
        note: "verified by replaying keychain operations against the previously accepted admin-key view, similar to git-skm's parent allowed_signers verification".to_owned(),
    }
}

#[must_use]
pub fn signature_uses_claimed_key(signature: &KeychainOpSignature) -> bool {
    KeyId::new(admin_key_fingerprint(&signature.signer_public_key)) == signature.signer
}

#[must_use]
pub fn admin_key_fingerprint(public_key: &str) -> String {
    format!("ssh:blake3:{}", blake3::hash(public_key.trim().as_bytes()))
}

fn validate_namespace(value: &str) -> Result<(), KeychainError> {
    let has_single_domain_separator = value.matches('@').count() == 1;
    let valid = has_single_domain_separator
        && !value.trim().is_empty()
        && value == value.trim()
        && value.bytes().all(|byte| {
            byte.is_ascii_alphanumeric()
                || matches!(byte, b'.' | b'-' | b'_' | b'@' | b':' | b'/' | b'+')
        });
    if valid {
        Ok(())
    } else {
        Err(KeychainError::InvalidNamespace(value.to_owned()))
    }
}

fn validate_namespace_component<'a>(value: &'a str, field: &str) -> Result<&'a str, KeychainError> {
    let valid = !value.trim().is_empty()
        && value == value.trim()
        && !value.contains('@')
        && value
            .bytes()
            .all(|byte| byte.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(byte, b'.' | b'-' | b'_'));
    if valid {
        Ok(value)
    } else {
        Err(KeychainError::InvalidNamespaceComponent {
            field: field.to_owned(),
            value: value.to_owned(),
        })
    }
}

fn validate_principal(value: &str) -> Result<(), KeychainError> {
    let valid = !value.trim().is_empty()
        && value == value.trim()
        && !value.bytes().any(|byte| byte.is_ascii_whitespace());
    if valid {
        Ok(())
    } else {
        Err(KeychainError::InvalidPrincipal(value.to_owned()))
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn keychain_structs_roundtrip() {
        let op = KeychainOp {
            id: "op:1".into(),
            created_at: UnixMillis(1),
            kind: KeychainOpKind::UserAdd {
                user: "user:eric".into(),
                name: "Eric".to_owned(),
            },
        };
        let json = serde_json::to_string(&op).expect("json");
        let decoded: KeychainOp = serde_json::from_str(&json).expect("decode");
        assert_eq!(decoded, op);
    }

    #[test]
    fn keychain_signing_payload_is_canonical_and_namespaced() {
        let op = KeychainOp {
            id: "op:1".into(),
            created_at: UnixMillis(1),
            kind: KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
                key: "key:admin".into(),
                public_key: Some("ssh-ed25519 AAAA test@example".to_owned()),
                principal: Some("admin".to_owned()),
                valid_after_ms: None,
                valid_before_ms: None,
            },
        };
        assert_eq!(
            keychain_signing_payload(&op).expect("payload"),
            keychain_signing_payload(&op).expect("payload again")
        );
        assert_ne!(
            keychain_signing_payload_hash(&op).expect("hash"),
            geth_codec::hash_canonical(&op).expect("raw op hash")
        );

        let signed = signed_keychain_op(op.clone(), "key:admin".into(), vec![1, 2, 3]);
        assert_eq!(signed.namespace(), KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE);
        assert_eq!(signed.payload(), &op);
    }

    #[test]
    fn profile_namespaces_support_other_applications() {
        let profile = KeychainProfile::for_application("acme-notes", "example.com")
            .expect("application profile");
        assert_eq!(
            profile.keychain_signature_namespace(),
            "acme-notes.keychain.v1@example.com"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            profile.node_enrollment_request_namespace(),
            "acme-notes.node-enrollment-request.v1@example.com"
        );

        let op = KeychainOp {
            id: "op:1".into(),
            created_at: UnixMillis(1),
            kind: KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit,
        };
        assert_ne!(
            keychain_signing_payload(&op).expect("geth payload"),
            keychain_signing_payload_with_profile(&op, &profile).expect("app payload")
        );

        let signed =
            signed_keychain_op_with_profile(op.clone(), "key:admin".into(), vec![1], &profile);
        assert_eq!(signed.namespace(), "acme-notes.keychain.v1@example.com");

        assert!(KeychainProfile::for_application("bad app", "example.com").is_err());
        assert!(KeychainProfile::new("missing-domain", "also-missing-domain", "admin").is_err());
    }

    fn op(sequence: i64, kind: KeychainOpKind) -> KeychainOp {
        KeychainOp {
            id: format!("op:{sequence}").into(),
            created_at: UnixMillis(sequence),
            kind,
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn reducer_tracks_active_keychain_view() {
        let ops = vec![
            op(1, KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit),
            op(
                2,
                KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
                    key: "key:admin-a".into(),
                    public_key: Some("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a".to_owned()),
                    principal: Some("admin-a".to_owned()),
                    valid_after_ms: None,
                    valid_before_ms: None,
                },
            ),
            op(
                3,
                KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
                    key: "key:admin-b".into(),
                    public_key: Some("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-b".to_owned()),
                    principal: Some("admin-b".to_owned()),
                    valid_after_ms: None,
                    valid_before_ms: None,
                },
            ),
            op(
                4,
                KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyRevoke {
                    key: "key:admin-b".into(),
                },
            ),
            op(
                5,
                KeychainOpKind::UserAdd {
                    user: "user:eric".into(),
                    name: "Eric".to_owned(),
                },
            ),
            op(
                6,
                KeychainOpKind::UserRename {
                    user: "user:eric".into(),
                    name: "Eric Updated".to_owned(),
                },
            ),
            op(
                7,
                KeychainOpKind::DeviceAdd {
                    device: "device:laptop".into(),
                    user: "user:eric".into(),
                },
            ),
            op(
                8,
                KeychainOpKind::DeviceKeyAdd {
                    device: "device:laptop".into(),
                    key: "key:device-a".into(),
                },
            ),
            op(
                9,
                KeychainOpKind::DeviceKeyAdd {
                    device: "device:laptop".into(),
                    key: "key:device-b".into(),
                },
            ),
            op(
                10,
                KeychainOpKind::DeviceKeyRevoke {
                    device: "device:laptop".into(),
                    key: "key:device-b".into(),
                },
            ),
            op(
                11,
                KeychainOpKind::NodeAdd {
                    node: "node:laptop".into(),
                    device: "device:laptop".into(),
                    name: "laptop".to_owned(),
                },
            ),
            op(
                12,
                KeychainOpKind::NodeRename {
                    node: "node:laptop".into(),
                    name: "work-laptop".to_owned(),
                },
            ),
            op(
                13,
                KeychainOpKind::NodeEndpointAdd {
                    node: "node:laptop".into(),
                    endpoint: "endpoint:old".to_owned(),
                },
            ),
            op(
                14,
                KeychainOpKind::NodeEndpointAdd {
                    node: "node:laptop".into(),
                    endpoint: "endpoint:new".to_owned(),
                },
            ),
            op(
                15,
                KeychainOpKind::NodeEndpointRevoke {
                    node: "node:laptop".into(),
                    endpoint: "endpoint:old".to_owned(),
                },
            ),
            op(
                16,
                KeychainOpKind::AgentBind {
                    agent: "agent:daemon".into(),
                    node: "node:laptop".into(),
                },
            ),
        ];

        let view = reduce_keychain_ops(&ops);

        assert!(view.initialized);
        assert_eq!(view.admin_keys, vec![KeyId::from("key:admin-a")]);
        assert_eq!(
            view.users.get(&UserId::from("user:eric")),
            Some(&UserRecord {
                id: "user:eric".into(),
                name: "Eric Updated".to_owned(),
            })
        );
        assert_eq!(
            view.devices.get(&DeviceId::from("device:laptop")),
            Some(&DeviceRecord {
                id: "device:laptop".into(),
                user: "user:eric".into(),
                keys: vec!["key:device-a".into()],
            })
        );
        assert_eq!(
            view.nodes.get(&NodeId::from("node:laptop")),
            Some(&NodeRecord {
                id: "node:laptop".into(),
                device: "device:laptop".into(),
                name: "work-laptop".to_owned(),
                endpoints: vec!["endpoint:new".to_owned()],
            })
        );
        assert_eq!(
            view.agents.get(&AgentId::from("agent:daemon")),
            Some(&NodeId::from("node:laptop"))
        );
        assert_eq!(
            view.endpoints.get("endpoint:new"),
            Some(&NodeId::from("node:laptop"))
        );
        assert!(!view.endpoints.contains_key("endpoint:old"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn sigchain_verification_replays_against_prior_admin_view() {
        let admin_a: KeyId = admin_key_fingerprint("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a").into();
        let admin_b: KeyId = admin_key_fingerprint("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-b").into();
        let ops = vec![
            op(1, KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit),
            op(
                2,
                KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
                    key: admin_a.clone(),
                    public_key: Some("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a".to_owned()),
                    principal: Some("admin-a".to_owned()),
                    valid_after_ms: None,
                    valid_before_ms: None,
                },
            ),
            op(
                3,
                KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
                    key: admin_b.clone(),
                    public_key: Some("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-b".to_owned()),
                    principal: Some("admin-b".to_owned()),
                    valid_after_ms: None,
                    valid_before_ms: None,
                },
            ),
            op(
                4,
                KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyRevoke {
                    key: admin_a.clone(),
                },
            ),
        ];
        let signatures = vec![
            KeychainOpSignature {
                op_id: ops[1].id.clone(),
                signer: admin_a.clone(),
                signer_public_key: "ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a".to_owned(),
                namespace: KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE.to_owned(),
                signature: vec![1],
                created_at: UnixMillis(2),
            },
            KeychainOpSignature {
                op_id: ops[2].id.clone(),
                signer: admin_a.clone(),
                signer_public_key: "ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a".to_owned(),
                namespace: KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE.to_owned(),
                signature: vec![1],
                created_at: UnixMillis(3),
            },
            KeychainOpSignature {
                op_id: ops[3].id.clone(),
                signer: admin_b,
                signer_public_key: "ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-b".to_owned(),
                namespace: KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE.to_owned(),
                signature: vec![1],
                created_at: UnixMillis(4),
            },
        ];
        let report = verify_sigchain(
            &ops,
            &signatures,
            &|_: &KeychainOp, signature: &KeychainOpSignature| signature.signature == vec![1],
        );
        assert_eq!(report.accepted_ops, 4);
        assert_eq!(report.rejected_ops, 0);
        assert_eq!(report.active_admin_keys, 1);
    }

    #[test]
    fn sigchain_verification_uses_profile_namespace_and_verifier_trait() {
        struct AcceptNonEmptySignatures;

        impl KeychainSignatureVerifier for AcceptNonEmptySignatures {
            fn verify_keychain_signature(
                &self,
                _: &KeychainOp,
                signature: &KeychainOpSignature,
            ) -> bool {
                !signature.signature.is_empty()
            }
        }

        let profile = KeychainProfile::for_application("acme", "example.com").expect("profile");
        let admin_a: KeyId = admin_key_fingerprint("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a").into();
        let ops = vec![
            op(1, KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit),
            op(
                2,
                KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
                    key: admin_a.clone(),
                    public_key: Some("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a".to_owned()),
                    principal: None,
                    valid_after_ms: None,
                    valid_before_ms: None,
                },
            ),
            op(
                3,
                KeychainOpKind::UserAdd {
                    user: "user:external".into(),
                    name: "External App User".to_owned(),
                },
            ),
        ];
        let mut signature = KeychainOpSignature {
            op_id: ops[2].id.clone(),
            signer: admin_a,
            signer_public_key: "ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a".to_owned(),
            namespace: KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE.to_owned(),
            signature: vec![1],
            created_at: UnixMillis(3),
        };

        let rejected = verify_sigchain_with_profile(
            &ops,
            &[signature.clone()],
            &profile,
            &AcceptNonEmptySignatures,
        );
        assert_eq!(rejected.accepted_ops, 2);
        assert_eq!(rejected.rejected_ops, 1);

        signature.namespace = profile.keychain_signature_namespace().to_owned();
        let accepted =
            verify_sigchain_with_profile(&ops, &[signature], &profile, &AcceptNonEmptySignatures);
        assert_eq!(accepted.accepted_ops, 3);
        assert_eq!(accepted.rejected_ops, 0);
    }

    #[test]
    fn allowed_signers_uses_profile_default_principal() {
        let profile = KeychainProfile::new(
            "acme.keychain.v1@example.com",
            "acme.node-enrollment-request.v1@example.com",
            "owner",
        )
        .expect("profile");
        let ops = vec![
            op(1, KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit),
            op(
                2,
                KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
                    key: admin_key_fingerprint("ssh-ed25519 AAAA owner").into(),
                    public_key: Some("ssh-ed25519 AAAA owner".to_owned()),
                    principal: None,
                    valid_after_ms: None,
                    valid_before_ms: None,
                },
            ),
        ];
        let allowed = allowed_signers_with_profile(&ops, &[], &profile);
        assert_eq!(allowed[0].principal, "owner");
    }

    #[test]
    fn reducer_excludes_revoked_identity_subtrees() {
        let ops = vec![
            op(
                1,
                KeychainOpKind::UserAdd {
                    user: "user:eric".into(),
                    name: "Eric".to_owned(),
                },
            ),
            op(
                2,
                KeychainOpKind::DeviceAdd {
                    device: "device:laptop".into(),
                    user: "user:eric".into(),
                },
            ),
            op(
                3,
                KeychainOpKind::NodeAdd {
                    node: "node:laptop".into(),
                    device: "device:laptop".into(),
                    name: "laptop".to_owned(),
                },
            ),
            op(
                4,
                KeychainOpKind::NodeEndpointAdd {
                    node: "node:laptop".into(),
                    endpoint: "endpoint:live".to_owned(),
                },
            ),
            op(
                5,
                KeychainOpKind::AgentBind {
                    agent: "agent:daemon".into(),
                    node: "node:laptop".into(),
                },
            ),
            op(
                6,
                KeychainOpKind::UserRevoke {
                    user: "user:eric".into(),
                },
            ),
        ];

        let view = reduce_keychain_ops(&ops);

        assert!(view.users.is_empty());
        assert!(view.devices.is_empty());
        assert!(view.nodes.is_empty());
        assert!(view.agents.is_empty());
        assert!(view.endpoints.is_empty());
    }
}