# ADR 0018: Sequence-free SSHSIGCHAIN authority protocol

## Status

Accepted for the generic core. The protocol is still pre-deployment and has no
legacy compatibility requirement.

## Context

The first linked draft improved on a timestamp-sorted static bundle, but still
made application profiles responsible for all key lifecycle semantics. It also
included both a sequence counter and a parent hash, fixed one application
profile for the whole chain, exposed every payload, and left rollback anchors
outside the protocol model.

That design would let applications fragment device/key behavior, made
multi-profile least privilege awkward, and offered no standard way to disclose
only selected profile data or compare independently anchored heads.

## Decision

SSHSIGCHAIN v1 is redesigned before deployment:

- the trust tuple is `(chain ID, SSHSIG namespace, root public key)`;
- parent hashes alone define order; there is no sequence number;
- link identity hashes the signed outer bytes, not the signature encoding;
- every link carries a mandatory public Authority v1 transition;
- authority owns devices, keys, proof-of-possession, causal revocation,
  permission ceilings, delegation, and anchor policy;
- applications use profile-ID-scoped, salted payload commitments and cannot
  mutate authority;
- disclosures are transport additions which do not change a link or its hash;
- authorized keys can sign head claims;
- distinct head attesters and backend-neutral receipts are evaluated by
  separate weighted/required thresholds and required backend classes;
- cached ancestors are never replaced by older heads and incomparable verified
  histories fail as forks; and
- a policy-change head is witnessed under the preceding policy before the new
  policy governs descendants.

The generic core defines backend interfaces and deterministic policy behavior,
not Nostr, HTTP, blockchain, or transparency-log clients. Those adapters belong
outside `geth-keychain`. Backends provide evidence and discovery, not consensus.

The generic protocol remains independent of geth transports. All geth
node-to-node communication remains Iroh-only; SSH remains a trust and signature
integration.

## Consequences

Device and key behavior is interoperable rather than reinvented in each
profile. A verifier can validate current authority while withholding application
data, but must report affected profile state as incomplete. Proofs of possession
prevent an administrator from silently enrolling a key it does not control.
Device ceilings and delegable permission sets constrain later amplification.

The wire format is intentionally incompatible with every pre-deployment test
draft. No migration parser or version alias is retained.

Rollback protection still depends on persistent local accepted heads and the
operator's anchor policy. A Nostr relay, mutable HTTP URL, blockchain, or
transparency service has only the guarantees its receipt verifier and deployment
actually establish. Concrete publication, durable accepted-head storage, and
cross-implementation vectors remain follow-up work.