geth/crates/geth-keychain/src/lib.rs

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use geth_types::{
AgentId, AuthOpId, Capability, DeviceId, KeyId, NodeId, ResourceId, UnixMillis, UserId,
};
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
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use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet};
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pub const KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE: &str = "geth.keychain.v1@geth.local";
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pub const NODE_ENROLLMENT_REQUEST_NAMESPACE: &str = "geth.node-enrollment-request.v1@geth.local";
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pub type SignedKeychainOp = geth_codec::SignedEnvelope<KeychainOp, KeyId>;
pub fn keychain_signing_payload(op: &KeychainOp) -> Result<Vec<u8>, geth_codec::CodecError> {
geth_codec::signing_payload(KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE, op)
}
pub fn keychain_signing_payload_hash(
op: &KeychainOp,
) -> Result<geth_types::BlobHash, geth_codec::CodecError> {
geth_codec::signing_payload_hash(KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE, op)
}
#[must_use]
pub fn signed_keychain_op(op: KeychainOp, signer: KeyId, signature: Vec<u8>) -> SignedKeychainOp {
geth_codec::SignedEnvelope::new(KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE, op, signer, signature)
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}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct KeychainOp {
pub id: geth_types::AuthOpId,
pub created_at: UnixMillis,
pub kind: KeychainOpKind,
}
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct KeychainOpSignature {
pub op_id: AuthOpId,
pub signer: KeyId,
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pub signer_public_key: String,
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pub namespace: String,
pub signature: Vec<u8>,
pub created_at: UnixMillis,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct KeychainAllowedSigner {
pub key: KeyId,
pub principal: String,
pub public_key: String,
pub valid_after_ms: Option<i64>,
pub valid_before_ms: Option<i64>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct KeychainSigchainReport {
pub ops: usize,
pub signatures: usize,
pub accepted_ops: usize,
pub rejected_ops: usize,
pub active_admin_keys: usize,
pub accepted_head: Option<AuthOpId>,
pub note: String,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct KeychainSigchainEntry {
pub op: KeychainOp,
pub signatures: Vec<KeychainOpSignature>,
}
pub type KeychainSignatureVerifier<'a> = dyn Fn(&KeychainOp, &KeychainOpSignature) -> bool + 'a;
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NodeEnrollmentRequest {
pub id: AuthOpId,
pub requester_node: NodeId,
pub requester_agent: AgentId,
pub requester_agent_public_key: String,
pub requested_node_name: String,
pub requested_capabilities: Vec<NodeEnrollmentCapability>,
pub endpoint_id: Option<String>,
pub reason: Option<String>,
pub status: NodeEnrollmentStatus,
pub created_at: UnixMillis,
pub provenance: Option<NodeEnrollmentProvenance>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NodeEnrollmentCapability {
pub resource: ResourceId,
pub capability: Capability,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NodeEnrollmentProvenance {
pub namespace: String,
pub signer_node: NodeId,
pub signer_agent: AgentId,
pub signer_public_key: String,
pub signature_hex: String,
pub signed_at: UnixMillis,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum NodeEnrollmentStatus {
Pending,
Approved,
Rejected,
}
impl NodeEnrollmentStatus {
#[must_use]
pub fn as_str(&self) -> &'static str {
match self {
Self::Pending => "pending",
Self::Approved => "approved",
Self::Rejected => "rejected",
}
}
}
impl std::fmt::Display for NodeEnrollmentStatus {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.write_str(self.as_str())
}
}
impl std::str::FromStr for NodeEnrollmentStatus {
type Err = KeychainError;
fn from_str(value: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
match value {
"pending" => Ok(Self::Pending),
"approved" => Ok(Self::Approved),
"rejected" => Ok(Self::Rejected),
_ => Err(KeychainError::InvalidEnrollmentStatus(value.to_owned())),
}
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NodeEnrollmentRequestSigningPayload {
pub id: AuthOpId,
pub requester_node: NodeId,
pub requester_agent: AgentId,
pub requester_agent_public_key: String,
pub requested_node_name: String,
pub requested_capabilities: Vec<NodeEnrollmentCapability>,
pub endpoint_id: Option<String>,
pub reason: Option<String>,
pub created_at: UnixMillis,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum KeychainError {
#[error("invalid node enrollment status: {0}")]
InvalidEnrollmentStatus(String),
#[error("sigchain JSONL line {line}: {source}")]
SigchainJsonl {
line: usize,
source: serde_json::Error,
},
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}
#[must_use]
pub fn node_enrollment_request_signing_payload(
request: &NodeEnrollmentRequest,
) -> NodeEnrollmentRequestSigningPayload {
NodeEnrollmentRequestSigningPayload {
id: request.id.clone(),
requester_node: request.requester_node.clone(),
requester_agent: request.requester_agent.clone(),
requester_agent_public_key: request.requester_agent_public_key.clone(),
requested_node_name: request.requested_node_name.clone(),
requested_capabilities: request.requested_capabilities.clone(),
endpoint_id: request.endpoint_id.clone(),
reason: request.reason.clone(),
created_at: request.created_at,
}
}
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(tag = "kind", rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum KeychainOpKind {
KeychainInit,
AdminKeyAdd {
key: KeyId,
public_key: Option<String>,
principal: Option<String>,
valid_after_ms: Option<i64>,
valid_before_ms: Option<i64>,
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},
AdminKeyRevoke {
key: KeyId,
},
UserAdd {
user: UserId,
name: String,
},
UserRename {
user: UserId,
name: String,
},
UserRevoke {
user: UserId,
},
DeviceAdd {
device: DeviceId,
user: UserId,
},
DeviceRevoke {
device: DeviceId,
},
DeviceKeyAdd {
device: DeviceId,
key: KeyId,
},
DeviceKeyRevoke {
device: DeviceId,
key: KeyId,
},
NodeAdd {
node: NodeId,
device: DeviceId,
name: String,
},
NodeRename {
node: NodeId,
name: String,
},
NodeRevoke {
node: NodeId,
},
NodeEndpointAdd {
node: NodeId,
endpoint: String,
},
NodeEndpointRevoke {
node: NodeId,
endpoint: String,
},
AgentBind {
agent: AgentId,
node: NodeId,
},
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct KeychainView {
pub initialized: bool,
pub admin_keys: Vec<KeyId>,
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pub users: BTreeMap<UserId, UserRecord>,
pub devices: BTreeMap<DeviceId, DeviceRecord>,
pub nodes: BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeRecord>,
pub agents: BTreeMap<AgentId, NodeId>,
pub endpoints: BTreeMap<String, NodeId>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct UserRecord {
pub id: UserId,
pub name: String,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct DeviceRecord {
pub id: DeviceId,
pub user: UserId,
pub keys: Vec<KeyId>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NodeRecord {
pub id: NodeId,
pub device: DeviceId,
pub name: String,
pub endpoints: Vec<String>,
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}
pub fn reduce_keychain_ops(ops: &[KeychainOp]) -> KeychainView {
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let mut initialized = false;
let mut admin_keys = BTreeSet::new();
let mut users = BTreeMap::<UserId, UserRecord>::new();
let mut revoked_users = BTreeSet::new();
let mut devices = BTreeMap::<DeviceId, DeviceRecord>::new();
let mut revoked_devices = BTreeSet::new();
let mut nodes = BTreeMap::<NodeId, NodeRecord>::new();
let mut revoked_nodes = BTreeSet::new();
let mut agent_bindings = BTreeMap::<AgentId, NodeId>::new();
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for op in ops {
match &op.kind {
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KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit => initialized = true,
KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd { key, .. } => {
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admin_keys.insert(key.clone());
}
KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyRevoke { key } => {
admin_keys.remove(key);
}
KeychainOpKind::UserAdd { user, name } => {
revoked_users.remove(user);
users.entry(user.clone()).or_insert_with(|| UserRecord {
id: user.clone(),
name: name.clone(),
});
}
KeychainOpKind::UserRename { user, name } => {
if let Some(record) = users.get_mut(user) {
record.name.clone_from(name);
}
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}
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KeychainOpKind::UserRevoke { user } => {
revoked_users.insert(user.clone());
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}
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KeychainOpKind::DeviceAdd { device, user } => {
revoked_devices.remove(device);
devices
.entry(device.clone())
.or_insert_with(|| DeviceRecord {
id: device.clone(),
user: user.clone(),
keys: Vec::new(),
});
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}
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KeychainOpKind::DeviceRevoke { device } => {
revoked_devices.insert(device.clone());
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}
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KeychainOpKind::DeviceKeyAdd { device, key } => {
if let Some(record) = devices.get_mut(device) {
if !record.keys.contains(key) {
record.keys.push(key.clone());
record.keys.sort();
}
}
}
KeychainOpKind::DeviceKeyRevoke { device, key } => {
if let Some(record) = devices.get_mut(device) {
record.keys.retain(|item| item != key);
}
}
KeychainOpKind::NodeAdd { node, device, name } => {
revoked_nodes.remove(node);
nodes.entry(node.clone()).or_insert_with(|| NodeRecord {
id: node.clone(),
device: device.clone(),
name: name.clone(),
endpoints: Vec::new(),
});
}
KeychainOpKind::NodeRename { node, name } => {
if let Some(record) = nodes.get_mut(node) {
record.name.clone_from(name);
}
}
KeychainOpKind::NodeRevoke { node } => {
revoked_nodes.insert(node.clone());
}
KeychainOpKind::NodeEndpointAdd { node, endpoint } => {
if let Some(record) = nodes.get_mut(node) {
if !record.endpoints.contains(endpoint) {
record.endpoints.push(endpoint.clone());
record.endpoints.sort();
}
}
}
KeychainOpKind::NodeEndpointRevoke { node, endpoint } => {
if let Some(record) = nodes.get_mut(node) {
record.endpoints.retain(|item| item != endpoint);
}
}
KeychainOpKind::AgentBind { agent, node } => {
agent_bindings.insert(agent.clone(), node.clone());
}
}
}
users.retain(|user, _| !revoked_users.contains(user));
devices.retain(|device, record| {
!revoked_devices.contains(device) && users.contains_key(&record.user)
});
nodes.retain(|node, record| {
!revoked_nodes.contains(node) && devices.contains_key(&record.device)
});
agent_bindings.retain(|_, node| nodes.contains_key(node));
let mut endpoints = BTreeMap::new();
for (node, record) in &nodes {
for endpoint in &record.endpoints {
endpoints.insert(endpoint.clone(), node.clone());
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}
}
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KeychainView {
initialized,
admin_keys: admin_keys.into_iter().collect(),
users,
devices,
nodes,
agents: agent_bindings,
endpoints,
}
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}
pub fn sorted_keychain_ops(mut ops: Vec<KeychainOp>) -> Vec<KeychainOp> {
ops.sort_by(|left, right| {
(
left.created_at.0,
keychain_op_order(&left.kind),
left.id.to_string(),
)
.cmp(&(
right.created_at.0,
keychain_op_order(&right.kind),
right.id.to_string(),
))
});
ops
}
#[must_use]
pub fn keychain_op_order(kind: &KeychainOpKind) -> u8 {
match kind {
KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit => 0,
KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd { .. } => 1,
KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyRevoke { .. } => 2,
_ => 10,
}
}
#[must_use]
pub fn allowed_signers(
ops: &[KeychainOp],
signatures: &[KeychainOpSignature],
) -> Vec<KeychainAllowedSigner> {
let mut entries = BTreeMap::<KeyId, KeychainAllowedSigner>::new();
for op in sorted_keychain_ops(ops.to_vec()) {
match op.kind {
KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
key,
public_key,
principal,
valid_after_ms,
valid_before_ms,
} => {
let public_key = public_key
.or_else(|| {
signatures
.iter()
.find(|signature| signature.signer == key)
.map(|signature| signature.signer_public_key.trim().to_owned())
})
.unwrap_or_default();
if !public_key.is_empty() {
entries.insert(
key.clone(),
KeychainAllowedSigner {
key,
principal: principal.unwrap_or_else(|| "admin".to_owned()),
public_key,
valid_after_ms,
valid_before_ms,
},
);
}
}
KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyRevoke { key } => {
entries.remove(&key);
}
_ => {}
}
}
entries.into_values().collect()
}
#[must_use]
pub fn render_allowed_signers(entries: &[KeychainAllowedSigner]) -> String {
let mut text = String::new();
for entry in entries {
text.push_str(&format!(
"{} {}\n",
entry.principal,
entry.public_key.trim()
));
}
text
}
pub fn verify_sigchain(
ops: &[KeychainOp],
signatures: &[KeychainOpSignature],
verifier: &KeychainSignatureVerifier<'_>,
) -> KeychainSigchainReport {
let ops = sorted_keychain_ops(ops.to_vec());
let mut accepted = Vec::<KeychainOp>::new();
let mut trusted_admins = BTreeSet::<KeyId>::new();
let mut rejected_ops = 0;
for op in &ops {
let op_signatures = signatures
.iter()
.filter(|signature| signature.op_id == op.id)
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let bootstrap_init = accepted.is_empty() && matches!(op.kind, KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit);
let bootstrap_admin = accepted.len() == 1
&& matches!(accepted[0].kind, KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit)
&& matches!(&op.kind, KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd { .. });
let valid = bootstrap_init
|| bootstrap_admin
|| op_signatures.iter().any(|signature| {
let signer_is_authorized = trusted_admins.contains(&signature.signer);
signer_is_authorized
&& signature_uses_claimed_key(signature)
&& verifier(op, signature)
});
if valid {
accepted.push(op.clone());
trusted_admins = reduce_keychain_ops(&accepted)
.admin_keys
.into_iter()
.collect();
} else {
rejected_ops += 1;
}
}
let view = reduce_keychain_ops(&accepted);
KeychainSigchainReport {
ops: ops.len(),
signatures: signatures.len(),
accepted_ops: accepted.len(),
rejected_ops,
active_admin_keys: view.admin_keys.len(),
accepted_head: accepted.last().map(|op| op.id.clone()),
note: "verified by replaying keychain operations against the previously accepted admin-key view, similar to git-skm's parent allowed_signers verification".to_owned(),
}
}
#[must_use]
pub fn signature_uses_claimed_key(signature: &KeychainOpSignature) -> bool {
KeyId::new(admin_key_fingerprint(&signature.signer_public_key)) == signature.signer
}
#[must_use]
pub fn admin_key_fingerprint(public_key: &str) -> String {
format!("ssh:blake3:{}", blake3::hash(public_key.trim().as_bytes()))
}
#[must_use]
pub fn sigchain_entries(
ops: &[KeychainOp],
signatures: &[KeychainOpSignature],
) -> Vec<KeychainSigchainEntry> {
sorted_keychain_ops(ops.to_vec())
.into_iter()
.map(|op| KeychainSigchainEntry {
signatures: signatures
.iter()
.filter(|signature| signature.op_id == op.id)
.cloned()
.collect(),
op,
})
.collect()
}
pub fn encode_sigchain_jsonl(
entries: &[KeychainSigchainEntry],
) -> Result<String, serde_json::Error> {
let mut text = String::new();
for entry in entries {
text.push_str(&serde_json::to_string(entry)?);
text.push('\n');
}
Ok(text)
}
pub fn decode_sigchain_jsonl(text: &str) -> Result<Vec<KeychainSigchainEntry>, KeychainError> {
text.lines()
.enumerate()
.filter(|(_, line)| !line.trim().is_empty())
.map(|(index, line)| {
serde_json::from_str::<KeychainSigchainEntry>(line).map_err(|source| {
KeychainError::SigchainJsonl {
line: index + 1,
source,
}
})
})
.collect()
}
#[must_use]
pub fn flatten_sigchain_entries(
entries: &[KeychainSigchainEntry],
) -> (Vec<KeychainOp>, Vec<KeychainOpSignature>) {
let ops = entries.iter().map(|entry| entry.op.clone()).collect();
let signatures = entries
.iter()
.flat_map(|entry| entry.signatures.clone())
.collect();
(ops, signatures)
}
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#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn keychain_structs_roundtrip() {
let op = KeychainOp {
id: "op:1".into(),
created_at: UnixMillis(1),
kind: KeychainOpKind::UserAdd {
user: "user:eric".into(),
name: "Eric".to_owned(),
},
};
let json = serde_json::to_string(&op).expect("json");
let decoded: KeychainOp = serde_json::from_str(&json).expect("decode");
assert_eq!(decoded, op);
}
#[test]
fn keychain_signing_payload_is_canonical_and_namespaced() {
let op = KeychainOp {
id: "op:1".into(),
created_at: UnixMillis(1),
kind: KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
key: "key:admin".into(),
public_key: Some("ssh-ed25519 AAAA test@example".to_owned()),
principal: Some("admin".to_owned()),
valid_after_ms: None,
valid_before_ms: None,
},
};
assert_eq!(
keychain_signing_payload(&op).expect("payload"),
keychain_signing_payload(&op).expect("payload again")
);
assert_ne!(
keychain_signing_payload_hash(&op).expect("hash"),
geth_codec::hash_canonical(&op).expect("raw op hash")
);
let signed = signed_keychain_op(op.clone(), "key:admin".into(), vec![1, 2, 3]);
assert_eq!(signed.namespace(), KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE);
assert_eq!(signed.payload(), &op);
}
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fn op(sequence: i64, kind: KeychainOpKind) -> KeychainOp {
KeychainOp {
id: format!("op:{sequence}").into(),
created_at: UnixMillis(sequence),
kind,
}
}
#[test]
fn reducer_tracks_active_keychain_view() {
let ops = vec![
op(1, KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit),
op(
2,
KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
key: "key:admin-a".into(),
public_key: Some("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a".to_owned()),
principal: Some("admin-a".to_owned()),
valid_after_ms: None,
valid_before_ms: None,
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},
),
op(
3,
KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
key: "key:admin-b".into(),
public_key: Some("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-b".to_owned()),
principal: Some("admin-b".to_owned()),
valid_after_ms: None,
valid_before_ms: None,
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},
),
op(
4,
KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyRevoke {
key: "key:admin-b".into(),
},
),
op(
5,
KeychainOpKind::UserAdd {
user: "user:eric".into(),
name: "Eric".to_owned(),
},
),
op(
6,
KeychainOpKind::UserRename {
user: "user:eric".into(),
name: "Eric Updated".to_owned(),
},
),
op(
7,
KeychainOpKind::DeviceAdd {
device: "device:laptop".into(),
user: "user:eric".into(),
},
),
op(
8,
KeychainOpKind::DeviceKeyAdd {
device: "device:laptop".into(),
key: "key:device-a".into(),
},
),
op(
9,
KeychainOpKind::DeviceKeyAdd {
device: "device:laptop".into(),
key: "key:device-b".into(),
},
),
op(
10,
KeychainOpKind::DeviceKeyRevoke {
device: "device:laptop".into(),
key: "key:device-b".into(),
},
),
op(
11,
KeychainOpKind::NodeAdd {
node: "node:laptop".into(),
device: "device:laptop".into(),
name: "laptop".to_owned(),
},
),
op(
12,
KeychainOpKind::NodeRename {
node: "node:laptop".into(),
name: "work-laptop".to_owned(),
},
),
op(
13,
KeychainOpKind::NodeEndpointAdd {
node: "node:laptop".into(),
endpoint: "endpoint:old".to_owned(),
},
),
op(
14,
KeychainOpKind::NodeEndpointAdd {
node: "node:laptop".into(),
endpoint: "endpoint:new".to_owned(),
},
),
op(
15,
KeychainOpKind::NodeEndpointRevoke {
node: "node:laptop".into(),
endpoint: "endpoint:old".to_owned(),
},
),
op(
16,
KeychainOpKind::AgentBind {
agent: "agent:daemon".into(),
node: "node:laptop".into(),
},
),
];
let view = reduce_keychain_ops(&ops);
assert!(view.initialized);
assert_eq!(view.admin_keys, vec![KeyId::from("key:admin-a")]);
assert_eq!(
view.users.get(&UserId::from("user:eric")),
Some(&UserRecord {
id: "user:eric".into(),
name: "Eric Updated".to_owned(),
})
);
assert_eq!(
view.devices.get(&DeviceId::from("device:laptop")),
Some(&DeviceRecord {
id: "device:laptop".into(),
user: "user:eric".into(),
keys: vec!["key:device-a".into()],
})
);
assert_eq!(
view.nodes.get(&NodeId::from("node:laptop")),
Some(&NodeRecord {
id: "node:laptop".into(),
device: "device:laptop".into(),
name: "work-laptop".to_owned(),
endpoints: vec!["endpoint:new".to_owned()],
})
);
assert_eq!(
view.agents.get(&AgentId::from("agent:daemon")),
Some(&NodeId::from("node:laptop"))
);
assert_eq!(
view.endpoints.get("endpoint:new"),
Some(&NodeId::from("node:laptop"))
);
assert!(!view.endpoints.contains_key("endpoint:old"));
}
#[test]
fn allowed_signers_and_sigchain_jsonl_are_portable() {
let ops = vec![
op(1, KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit),
op(
2,
KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
key: admin_key_fingerprint("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a").into(),
public_key: Some("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a".to_owned()),
principal: Some("admin-a".to_owned()),
valid_after_ms: None,
valid_before_ms: None,
},
),
];
let signatures = vec![KeychainOpSignature {
op_id: ops[1].id.clone(),
signer: admin_key_fingerprint("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a").into(),
signer_public_key: "ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a".to_owned(),
namespace: KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE.to_owned(),
signature: vec![1],
created_at: UnixMillis(2),
}];
let allowed = allowed_signers(&ops, &signatures);
assert_eq!(allowed.len(), 1);
assert!(render_allowed_signers(&allowed).contains("admin-a ssh-ed25519"));
let entries = sigchain_entries(&ops, &signatures);
let jsonl = encode_sigchain_jsonl(&entries).expect("encode jsonl");
assert_eq!(jsonl.lines().count(), 2);
let decoded = decode_sigchain_jsonl(&jsonl).expect("decode jsonl");
assert_eq!(decoded, entries);
let (decoded_ops, decoded_signatures) = flatten_sigchain_entries(&decoded);
assert_eq!(decoded_ops, sorted_keychain_ops(ops));
assert_eq!(decoded_signatures, signatures);
}
#[test]
fn sigchain_verification_replays_against_prior_admin_view() {
let admin_a: KeyId = admin_key_fingerprint("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a").into();
let admin_b: KeyId = admin_key_fingerprint("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-b").into();
let ops = vec![
op(1, KeychainOpKind::KeychainInit),
op(
2,
KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
key: admin_a.clone(),
public_key: Some("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a".to_owned()),
principal: Some("admin-a".to_owned()),
valid_after_ms: None,
valid_before_ms: None,
},
),
op(
3,
KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyAdd {
key: admin_b.clone(),
public_key: Some("ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-b".to_owned()),
principal: Some("admin-b".to_owned()),
valid_after_ms: None,
valid_before_ms: None,
},
),
op(
4,
KeychainOpKind::AdminKeyRevoke {
key: admin_a.clone(),
},
),
];
let signatures = vec![
KeychainOpSignature {
op_id: ops[1].id.clone(),
signer: admin_a.clone(),
signer_public_key: "ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a".to_owned(),
namespace: KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE.to_owned(),
signature: vec![1],
created_at: UnixMillis(2),
},
KeychainOpSignature {
op_id: ops[2].id.clone(),
signer: admin_a.clone(),
signer_public_key: "ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-a".to_owned(),
namespace: KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE.to_owned(),
signature: vec![1],
created_at: UnixMillis(3),
},
KeychainOpSignature {
op_id: ops[3].id.clone(),
signer: admin_b,
signer_public_key: "ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin-b".to_owned(),
namespace: KEYCHAIN_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE.to_owned(),
signature: vec![1],
created_at: UnixMillis(4),
},
];
let report = verify_sigchain(&ops, &signatures, &|_, signature| {
signature.signature == vec![1]
});
assert_eq!(report.accepted_ops, 4);
assert_eq!(report.rejected_ops, 0);
assert_eq!(report.active_admin_keys, 1);
}
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#[test]
fn reducer_excludes_revoked_identity_subtrees() {
let ops = vec![
op(
1,
KeychainOpKind::UserAdd {
user: "user:eric".into(),
name: "Eric".to_owned(),
},
),
op(
2,
KeychainOpKind::DeviceAdd {
device: "device:laptop".into(),
user: "user:eric".into(),
},
),
op(
3,
KeychainOpKind::NodeAdd {
node: "node:laptop".into(),
device: "device:laptop".into(),
name: "laptop".to_owned(),
},
),
op(
4,
KeychainOpKind::NodeEndpointAdd {
node: "node:laptop".into(),
endpoint: "endpoint:live".to_owned(),
},
),
op(
5,
KeychainOpKind::AgentBind {
agent: "agent:daemon".into(),
node: "node:laptop".into(),
},
),
op(
6,
KeychainOpKind::UserRevoke {
user: "user:eric".into(),
},
),
];
let view = reduce_keychain_ops(&ops);
assert!(view.users.is_empty());
assert!(view.devices.is_empty());
assert!(view.nodes.is_empty());
assert!(view.agents.is_empty());
assert!(view.endpoints.is_empty());
}
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}