339 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
339 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
# Roadmap
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This roadmap is intended to be checkable. Each item should either be completed
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with tests/docs or split into smaller items before implementation.
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Status markers:
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- `[ ]` Not started
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- `[~]` In progress
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- `[x]` Done
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## Phase 0: Bootstrap
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Goal: establish a compiling single-binary local runtime with local state, local
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control, local CAS, service installation, and written architecture decisions.
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- `[x]` Single `geth` binary with daemon and control modes.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- `cargo run -p geth -- init` initializes a temp `GETH_HOME`.
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- `cargo run -p geth -- daemon run` starts one local daemon.
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- No `gethd` or `gethctl` binaries exist in the workspace.
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- `[x]` Local daemon control socket.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- Control request/response types roundtrip through JSONL serialization.
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- `geth status` and `geth node id` talk to a running daemon.
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- Control decoding treats input as untrusted and returns structured errors.
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- `[x]` Local metadata store and identity.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- SQLite migrations are idempotent.
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- Agent identity persists across repeated opens of the same `GETH_HOME`.
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- Store schema includes resources, auth/keychain logs, CAS, peers, modules,
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SSH cert requests, certificates, and revocations.
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- `[x]` Local filesystem CAS.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- `geth cas add/hash/has/get/list` work through the daemon.
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- Blob paths use BLAKE3 hashes under `cas/blobs/<aa>/<bb>/<hash>`.
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- Unit or integration tests verify bytes roundtrip unchanged.
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- `[x]` User service installer.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- `geth daemon service print --manager systemd|launchd|windows-task` prints
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the expected user-level service definition or command.
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- Linux install targets a systemd user unit, not a system service.
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- macOS install targets a launchd user agent.
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- Windows install targets a per-user scheduled task.
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- Tests verify generated definitions do not target privileged system services.
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- `[x]` Bootstrap docs and ADRs.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- README explains what geth is and what it is not.
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- Architecture docs state Iroh-only remote communication and SSH trust role.
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- ADRs cover single binary, Iroh-only transport, resources, auth, SSH, CAS,
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synchronized structures, service installation, and SSH certificate flows.
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## Phase 1: Iroh Foundation
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Goal: make the daemon own a real Iroh endpoint and establish authenticated
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geth-to-geth connections without granting trust from discovery alone.
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- `[x]` Pin and compile Iroh dependencies.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- `iroh` is added only after APIs are pinned and `cargo check --workspace`
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passes.
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- `geth-iroh` exposes endpoint startup/shutdown wrappers.
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- Docs note exact crate versions and any API assumptions.
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- `[x]` Daemon-owned Iroh endpoint.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- The daemon creates one shared Iroh endpoint on startup.
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- `geth status --json` reports endpoint status and EndpointID.
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- Endpoint identity is bound to agent/node identity in local metadata.
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- Restarting the daemon preserves higher-level node identity.
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- `[x]` Built-in relay policy and configuration.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- Config can select disabled, default Iroh relays, and staging relays.
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- The intended product default uses relays unless explicitly disabled.
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- `geth status --json` reports the selected relay mode.
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- Tests cover config parsing and endpoint builder relay-mode selection.
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- `[x]` Custom relay maps.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- Config can define and select named custom relay maps.
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- Invalid relay URLs fail config validation with clear errors.
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- Status output identifies the selected custom relay map without exposing
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unrelated config.
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- `[x]` Iroh LAN address discovery.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- Config can enable or disable Iroh local-network discovery.
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- The daemon registers Iroh's local mDNS-like discovery service when enabled.
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- `geth status --json` reports whether local-network discovery is enabled.
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- `[ ]` Signed peer-card LAN discovery payloads.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- The daemon can advertise and discover signed geth peer cards over LAN
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discovery.
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- LAN-discovered peer cards are stored only as untrusted peer candidates.
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- Discovered EndpointIDs do not grant module access without keychain/auth
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validation.
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- `[x]` Protocol/router scaffold.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- ALPN constants are registered through one module router.
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- Unknown ALPNs are rejected explicitly.
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- Tests cover registration collisions and unknown protocol handling.
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- `[x]` Peer cards.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- A peer card contains node ID, agent ID, endpoint candidates, timestamp, and
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signature metadata.
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- Peer cards are stored in `peer_cards`.
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- Invalid or unsigned peer cards do not update trust state.
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- `[x]` Untrusted discovery backend trait.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- Discovery returns candidate peer cards only.
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- No discovery result grants capabilities or trust.
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- `auth explain` can distinguish "discovered" from "trusted".
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- `[ ]` Basic authenticated peer connection.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- A node can dial another node over Iroh using an EndpointID from a peer card.
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- The remote side proves an agent/node binding before module access.
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- Knowing only an EndpointID is insufficient to access a protected module.
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## Phase 2: Trust And Authorization
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Goal: replace stubs with signed, reducible keychain/auth operation logs and
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resource-scoped capability decisions.
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- `[x]` Canonical signed operation envelope.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- Keychain and auth ops use deterministic canonical encoding for signatures.
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- JSON is not used as the signed representation.
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- Tests verify equivalent operations hash/sign identically across runs.
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- `[~]` SSH-admin-rooted keychain initialization.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- `[x]` `geth keychain init` records a local `KeychainInit`.
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- `[x]` `geth keychain init --admin-key <path>` records an admin SSH public
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key fingerprint.
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- `[x]` `geth keychain status` reports the reduced local keychain view.
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- `[ ]` Future completion records signed `KeychainInit` operations.
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- `[ ]` OpenSSH signature namespaces are explicit in the signing flow.
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- `[ ]` Missing `ssh-keygen` or unavailable hardware keys produce clear
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errors during signing.
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- `[x]` Keychain operation reducer.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- Admin keys, users, devices, nodes, agents, and endpoint bindings reduce into
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a current keychain view.
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- Revoked keys/devices/nodes are excluded from active views.
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- Tests cover add, rename, revoke, and endpoint rotation.
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- `[x]` Resource auth operation reducer.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- Resource create, authority set, grants, revocations, and groups reduce into
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a current permission view.
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- Capabilities are strings, including scoped forms such as
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`kv.write_prefix:apps/foo/`.
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- Tests cover grant, revoke, group membership, and denied access.
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- `[~]` `auth explain` real decision path.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- `[x]` `geth auth grant` and `geth auth revoke` persist local auth ops.
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- `[x]` `geth auth explain <subject> <resource> <capability>` reports
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allowed/denied from the local auth-op reducer when local ops exist.
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- `[x]` Output includes the grant ID or missing grant that caused the result.
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- `[x]` JSON output is stable enough for tests and scripts.
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- `[ ]` Future completion requires signed-op validation before accepting
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replicated auth ops.
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- `[ ]` Resource secrets and bearer invites.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- Bearer secrets grant only resource-scoped capabilities.
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- Bearer principals cannot mutate trust graph state by default.
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- Secret epoch rotation is represented in durable metadata.
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- Tests verify bearer access does not imply node identity.
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- `[~]` SSH certificate and revocation lifecycle.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- `geth ssh cert request/requests/approve/import/list` persist local metadata.
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- Approval emits an explicit `ssh-keygen -s ...` command for CA/YubiKey use.
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- `geth ssh revocation add/list/export` persists and exports revocations.
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- Future completion requires auth checks for request, approve, import, publish,
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and read capabilities.
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## Phase 3: CAS, KV, And Pubsub
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Goal: turn local CAS and stubs into Iroh-backed replicated modules while keeping
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authorization and durable-state boundaries clear.
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- `[ ]` Iroh-blobs CAS integration.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- Local CAS can provide and fetch blobs over Iroh.
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- Provider tracking is recorded locally.
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- Local add/get/hash/has/list behavior remains backward compatible.
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- `[~]` CAS pin and cache policy.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- `[x]` `geth cas pin <hash>` persists local pin metadata.
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- `[x]` `geth cas unpin <hash>` removes local pin metadata.
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- `[x]` `geth cas list` reports pinned versus unpinned blobs.
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- `[ ]` Pinned blobs are retained across cache cleanup.
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- `[ ]` Unpinned cached blobs can be evicted by policy.
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- `[ ]` Tests cover attempted eviction of pinned data.
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- `[ ]` Encrypted private blobs.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- Private blob payloads are encrypted before network distribution.
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- Access is gated by resource secret epoch material.
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- Docs explicitly avoid claiming forward secrecy or PCS.
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- `[ ]` Iroh-docs KV integration.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- `geth kv create/set/get` works against a named KV resource.
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- Prefix-scoped capabilities can allow or deny writes.
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- KV metadata is durable and replicated through Iroh Documents.
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- `[ ]` Iroh-gossip pubsub integration.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- `geth pubsub pub/sub` works for local test nodes.
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- Pubsub messages are lossy notifications, not durable facts.
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- Docs and tests keep durable state in CAS/KV/document/db instead.
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## Phase 4: Pipes, SSH Proxy, And SSH Distribution
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Goal: add authorized stream-oriented management workflows over Iroh.
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- `[ ]` Dumbpipe-style Iroh streams.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- `geth pipe listen/connect` can connect two local test nodes.
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- Pipe access requires `pipe.listen` or `pipe.connect`.
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- Streams close cleanly and propagate errors.
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- `[ ]` TCP forwarding.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- A local TCP listener can forward over an authorized Iroh pipe.
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- Tests cover basic request/response forwarding.
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- Forwarding is resource-scoped and can be disabled by auth.
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- `[ ]` Unix socket forwarding where supported.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- Unix socket forwarding is available on Unix platforms.
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- Unsupported platforms return clear errors.
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- Tests skip or use cfg guards where sockets are unavailable.
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- `[ ]` SSH proxy over Iroh.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- `geth ssh proxy <node>` opens an authorized Iroh stream.
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- Remote daemon checks `ssh_proxy.connect` before connecting to local sshd or
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admin shell.
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- Knowing an EndpointID alone cannot reach sshd.
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- `[ ]` SSH certificate and revocation distribution.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- Issued cert records and revocation records replicate over Iroh.
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- Consumers can list current certs/revocations from local state while offline.
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- Conflicting or unsigned records are rejected or quarantined.
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- `[ ]` OpenSSH KRL import/export.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- Revocation records can produce an OpenSSH KRL file.
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- Existing KRL files can be imported into revocation metadata where possible.
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- Tests cover serial, key ID, public key, and certificate revocations.
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## Phase 5: DB And Documents
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Goal: add durable synchronized data structures for SQLite/cr-sqlite and
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Automerge documents.
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- `[ ]` DB resource registration.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- `geth db add <name> <path>` records DB metadata.
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- `geth db status <name>` reports local path, schema metadata, and sync state.
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- Nonexistent paths and invalid names produce clear errors.
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- `[ ]` cr-sqlite change extraction.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- The module can read changes from `crsql_changes`.
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- Schema hash/version metadata is included in sync batches.
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- Tests use a temp SQLite DB and deterministic fixture changes.
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- `[ ]` DB sync over Iroh.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- Two local test nodes can exchange and apply DB changes.
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- Schema mismatch is detected before applying changes.
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- Optional CAS-backed snapshots or batches are documented if used.
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- `[ ]` Automerge document resource.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- `geth document create/status` works for local documents.
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- Document state is stored durably.
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- Tests cover create, update, save, and reload.
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- `[ ]` Automerge sync over Iroh.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- Two local test nodes can synchronize document changes.
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- Resource authorization gates read/write sync.
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- Conflicts converge according to Automerge semantics.
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## Phase 6: File Sync And Advanced Local-First Auth
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Goal: build higher-level local-first collaboration on CAS trees, resource auth,
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and future group key evolution.
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- `[ ]` CAS tree objects.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- Tree objects describe directories, files, executable bits, and blob hashes.
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- Tree objects are content-addressed and stored in CAS.
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- Tests cover deterministic tree hashing.
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- `[ ]` File roots.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- A file root maps a local path to a CAS tree resource.
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- Scan detects create/update/delete/rename changes.
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- Sync never silently overwrites local changes without a recorded decision.
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- `[ ]` Conflict handling.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- Conflicts are represented as durable metadata.
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- CLI can list conflicts and choose a resolution.
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- Tests cover concurrent edit, delete/edit, and rename conflicts.
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- `[ ]` Keyhive-like convergent capabilities.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- Capability state is represented as local-first replicated auth data.
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- Convergent grant/revoke semantics are documented and tested.
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- Migration from current auth ops is documented.
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- `[ ]` BeeKEM/CGKA-inspired group key evolution.
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Acceptance criteria:
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- Design doc states exact security properties and non-properties.
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- Prototype is behind explicit experimental module boundaries.
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- Current resource secret epoch model remains compatible or has a migration.
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