geth/docs/architecture.md

# Architecture

`geth` is a single-binary local-first mesh runtime. One executable provides both
daemon mode and control mode. The daemon owns local identity, metadata storage,
the shared Iroh endpoint, resource registry, module routing, and local control
socket. Control commands connect to the Unix socket and send typed JSONL
requests.

Service management is also exposed through the single binary. `geth daemon
service ...` installs and controls a user-level service definition for the local
daemon. The initial backends are systemd user units on Linux, launchd user agents
on macOS, and per-user scheduled tasks on Windows. Geth does not install itself
as a privileged system service.

## Iroh-Only Remote Communication

Remote geth node-to-node communication is Iroh-only. The daemon will own one
shared Iroh endpoint and register module protocols on ALPNs such as
`/geth/cas/1`, `/geth/kv/1`, `/geth/pipe/1`, and `/geth/ssh-proxy/1`.

The first pinned Iroh integration uses `iroh = 0.90.0`, because newer
Rust-1.85-compatible candidates in the 0.93-0.95 range failed to compile through
a transitive `ed25519-dalek` prerelease dependency. `geth-iroh` wraps
`iroh::Endpoint::builder()`, configures geth ALPNs with `Builder::alpns`, uses
`Builder::relay_mode`, persists an `iroh::SecretKey` as hex-encoded 32-byte key
material, and shuts down through `Endpoint::close().await`. The default config
uses Iroh's default relay policy; local-only/offline development can set
`[iroh].relay_mode = "disabled"`. Named custom relay maps are configured under
`[iroh.relay_maps.<name>]`, selected with `relay_mode = "custom"` plus
`relay_map = "<name>"`, validated at config load, and reported in status as
`custom:<name>` without exposing relay URLs.

Module ALPNs are registered through `geth-iroh`'s protocol router scaffold. The
router owns the default protocol descriptors, rejects duplicate ALPN
registrations, and returns explicit unknown-ALPN errors. It does not yet accept
or dispatch remote streams; peer authentication and module handlers are later
Phase 1 work.

The target product should use Iroh relay support for practical internet
connectivity and mDNS/LAN discovery for local networks. These are connectivity
and candidate-discovery mechanisms only. They do not grant trust, mutate
authorization state, or make EndpointID knowledge sufficient for access.
The current daemon can enable Iroh's local-network discovery service through
`[iroh].local_discovery = true`, which is the default. This publishes and
discovers Iroh node addressing. Signed geth peer-card payloads over LAN
discovery remain separate future work.

Peer cards are the discovery payload. A peer card carries node ID, agent ID,
endpoint candidates, timestamp, and signature metadata. The current scaffold
stores peer cards as untrusted metadata in `peer_cards`; signature verification
and trust reduction are future work. `auth explain` reports when a subject is
only a discovered peer candidate and denies access.

The daemon starts this endpoint during `geth daemon run` and keeps it alive for
the daemon lifetime. When endpoint startup succeeds, the Iroh EndpointID is
recorded as a transport binding for the stable geth node identity. If local UDP
binding is unavailable, the daemon keeps local control running and reports the
Iroh startup error through status output.

SSH keys are not transport keys. They are admin trust anchors and signing
identities for keychain and authorization operations. SSH proxying, when added,
will carry SSH bytes over an authorized Iroh stream and will not make SSH a geth
transport backend.

SSH certificate flows use the same split. Nodes can request new OpenSSH
certificates or renewals through geth metadata. A machine with the CA key or
YubiKey can approve the request and run an explicit `ssh-keygen -s ...` command,
then import the resulting certificate for distribution. Certificate and key
revocations are stored as signed-list-ready records and will be replicated over
Iroh in later phases.

## Resource Model

Everything meaningful is modeled as a resource. Resources have a kind, name,
authority reference, local role, replication policy, retention policy, and
status. Authorization is resource-scoped and capability-based.

Resource kinds:

- `db`: cr-sqlite-backed SQLite synchronization
- `kv`: Iroh Documents backed key-value data
- `pipe`: authorized byte streams and forwarding
- `document`: Automerge CRDT documents
- `pubsub`: lossy notifications and presence
- `cas`: content-addressed blobs
- `ssh-proxy`: SSH/admin proxying over Iroh

## Module Overview

`geth-cas` is implemented locally first using BLAKE3 hashes and filesystem blob
storage. Local pin/unpin metadata is tracked in SQLite and surfaced in
`cas list`. `cas cleanup` removes unpinned local blobs while retaining pinned
blobs. Iroh-blobs, providers, encrypted blobs, richer cache policies, manifests,
and file sync trees are future work.

`geth-db` currently registers local SQLite paths as DB resources and reports
local-only sync status plus a read-only SQLite schema summary/hash. cr-sqlite
loading, change extraction, and DB sync are future work.

`geth-kv` currently provides a SQLite-backed local fallback for named KV stores
through `kv create/set/get`. Iroh Documents namespaces, prefix authorization
enforcement, and replication are future work.

`geth-document`, `geth-pubsub`, `geth-pipe`, and `geth-ssh-proxy` currently
define types, command shape, and roadmap stubs.

`geth-ssh-identity` defines SSH trust namespaces plus certificate request,
approval, certificate import, and revocation-list data models. The bootstrap
persists these flows locally and exports revocations as JSONL. It does not yet
generate OpenSSH KRL binaries or replicate the lists over Iroh.

## Keychain, Auth, And Secrets

The identity plane is `geth-keychain`: admin keys, users, devices, nodes, agents,
and endpoint bindings. Endpoint rotation must not destroy higher-level node
identity. Keychain operations reduce into an active view containing current
admin keys, users, devices, node records, agent bindings, and endpoint-to-node
bindings. Revoked identity subtrees are excluded from that active view. The
daemon persists local keychain init/admin-key operations and `keychain status`
reports the reduced local view. OpenSSH signature capture and verification for
those operations is still future work.

The authorization plane is `geth-auth`: resource-local signed operation logs,
grants, revocations, groups, and `auth explain`. Auth operations reduce into a
current permission view for resources, grants, groups, and bearer access. The
library can explain direct and group grants. The daemon persists local auth
grant/revoke operations and `geth auth explain` evaluates that local operation
log. Signature validation, replication, and module enforcement are still future
work.

Both keychain and auth operations use `geth-codec` canonical envelopes for
signature payloads. The envelope includes a version, an explicit signature
namespace, and the operation payload encoded with postcard. JSON remains useful
for CLI/control output, but it is not the signed representation.

The payload access plane is `geth-secrets`: resource master secrets, epochs,
key envelopes, bearer secrets, and rotation. Revocation for private data is
modeled initially as secret epoch rotation.

## Multi-User Direction

The project is structured for future multi-user local-first authorization:

- authorization is replicated data, not one mutable ACL blob
- resources can carry or delegate to their own auth state
- users, devices, nodes, agents, and endpoints are separate principals
- capabilities are the underlying permission unit
- bearer access is resource-scoped and does not mutate the trust graph
- offline revocation is eventual
- encryption key distribution is part of authorization

## Keyhive/BeeKEM Roadmap

Resource secret epochs are the v0/v1 approximation for private payload access.
Later designs can add Keyhive-like convergent capabilities and BeeKEM/CGKA-style
group key evolution. The bootstrap does not implement BeeKEM and does not claim
strong forward secrecy or post-compromise security.

## Security Invariants

- All remote node-to-node communication is over Iroh.
- SSH is not a geth transport.
- SSH keys are admin trust anchors and signing identities.
- Agent/node keys handle routine local identity.
- Discovery is untrusted.
- Knowing an EndpointID does not grant access.
- Bearer secrets are resource-scoped capabilities.
- Bearer access does not imply trust graph mutation rights.
- Authorization is capability-based and resource-scoped.
- SSH certificate issuance must be explicitly approved by an authorized
  principal before signing.
- SSH certificate and key revocations are durable metadata that should be
  distributed over Iroh, not fetched through unauthenticated discovery.
- Network and control decoders treat input as untrusted.
- Service installation targets user service managers, not system service
  managers.