geth/README.md

176 lines
6.2 KiB
Markdown

# geth
`geth` is a personal, local-first mesh runtime for scripts, devices, databases,
documents, blobs, pipes, and future multi-user collaboration.
This project is not the Ethereum `geth` client. The project and executable are
still named `geth`.
## One Binary
There is one executable: `geth`.
It has daemon mode and control mode:
```sh
geth init
geth daemon run
geth daemon service install
geth status
geth node id
geth resource list
geth cas add ./file
```
The daemon owns local identity, the Iroh endpoint, trust state, resource
registry, module router, local metadata store, and synchronized data structures.
Most non-daemon commands talk to the daemon through a local Unix socket at
`$GETH_HOME/run/geth.sock`.
The daemon can also install itself as a user service:
```sh
geth daemon service install
geth daemon service status
geth daemon service uninstall
```
The bootstrap service managers are systemd user units on Linux, launchd user
agents on macOS, and per-user scheduled tasks on Windows. These are user-level
services, not system services.
## Transport And SSH
All remote node-to-node geth communication is designed to happen over Iroh only.
SSH is not a geth transport backend, and there is no SSH fallback transport.
The default node config uses Iroh's default relay policy for practical
connectivity; set `[iroh].relay_mode = "disabled"` for local-only/offline
development. Named custom relay maps can be selected with
`relay_mode = "custom"` and `relay_map = "<name>"`. Iroh local-network
discovery is enabled by default with `[iroh].local_discovery = true`.
SSH keys are used as admin trust anchors and ecosystem integration points.
OpenSSH, FIDO, and YubiKey-backed keys can sign geth trust objects through
canonical geth envelopes with explicit namespaces such as
`geth.keychain.v1@geth.local`. Future SSH proxying may carry SSH protocol bytes
over authorized Iroh streams, but the geth transport remains Iroh.
SSH certificate request and renewal flows are managed as geth metadata. A node
can create a certificate request, another machine can approve it and receive an
explicit `ssh-keygen -s ...` command suitable for a CA key or YubiKey-backed CA,
and the resulting `-cert.pub` can be imported for distribution. Certificate and
key revocation entries are tracked locally and can be exported as JSONL or as an
OpenSSH KRL specification file for later `ssh-keygen -k` use. Future Iroh
replication will distribute these records between authorized nodes.
## MVP Features
The bootstrap implementation provides:
- `geth init`
- `geth daemon run`
- `geth daemon service install|uninstall|start|stop|status|print`
- `geth status`
- `geth node id`
- `geth resource list`
- `geth resource create <kind> <name>`
- `geth keychain init [--admin-key <path>]`
- `geth keychain status`
- `geth secret status`
- `geth secret create <resource>`
- `geth secret rotate <resource>`
- `geth secret bearer create <resource> --capability <capability>`
- `geth secret bearer list`
- `geth secret bearer revoke <resource> <secret>`
- `geth auth explain <subject> <resource> <capability>`
- `geth auth grant <subject> <resource> <capability> [--grant-id <id>]`
- `geth auth revoke <resource> <grant-id>`
- local filesystem CAS commands: `add`, `get`, `hash`, `has`, `pin`, `unpin`,
`cleanup`, `list`
- local DB resource registration: `geth db add <name> <path>` and
`geth db status <name>` with schema and `crsql_changes` metadata; the DB
crate and daemon can extract typed local `crsql_changes` batches through
`geth db changes <name>` for future sync
- local SQLite-backed KV commands: `geth kv create/set/get`
- local JSON document commands: `geth document create/status/set/get`
- local daemon-lifetime pubsub snapshots: `geth pubsub pub/sub`
- SSH certificate flow metadata:
- `geth ssh cert request --public-key <path> --principal <name>`
- `geth ssh cert requests`
- `geth ssh cert approve <request-id> --ca-key <path>`
- `geth ssh cert import <request-id> --cert <path>`
- `geth ssh cert list`
- `geth ssh revocation add <kind> <target>`
- `geth ssh revocation list`
- `geth ssh revocation export --out <path> [--format jsonl|openssh-krl-spec]`
- local pipe registry commands: `geth pipe listen/connect`
Other command groups exist as explicit stubs: `ssh`.
## Resource Modules
Everything meaningful is modeled as a resource. Planned resource kinds are:
- `db`: SQLite/cr-sqlite synchronization
- `kv`: Iroh Documents backed key-value stores
- `pipe`: dumbpipe-like byte streams over Iroh; the bootstrap has a local
daemon registry only
- `document`: Automerge documents over Iroh streams
- `pubsub`: lossy notifications, not authoritative storage; the bootstrap
keeps only an in-memory daemon-lifetime ring buffer
- `cas`: content-addressed blob storage and distribution
- `ssh-proxy`: authorized SSH proxy/admin access over Iroh
Authorization is resource-scoped and capability-based. Bearer secrets may grant
specific resource capabilities but do not create trusted node identity. The auth
evaluator supports scoped KV write grants such as `kv.write_prefix:apps/foo/`
for `kv.write_key:apps/foo/config` explain checks; command-level KV enforcement
is still future work.
## Local State
If `GETH_HOME` is set, geth uses it. Otherwise it uses an OS-specific data
directory. The bootstrap layout is:
```text
$GETH_HOME/
geth.sqlite
config.toml
identity/agent.ed25519
identity/iroh.ed25519
cas/blobs/
run/geth.sock
```
## Quick Start
In one shell:
```sh
export GETH_HOME="$(mktemp -d)"
cargo run -p geth -- init
cargo run -p geth -- daemon run
```
In another shell:
```sh
export GETH_HOME="<same dir>"
cargo run -p geth -- status
cargo run -p geth -- node id
echo "hello geth" > /tmp/hello-geth.txt
cargo run -p geth -- cas add /tmp/hello-geth.txt
cargo run -p geth -- cas list
```
## Authorization Direction
The MVP defines the split between:
- keychain: SSH-rooted users, devices, nodes, agents, and endpoint bindings
- auth: resource-local signed authorization operations and capability grants
- secrets: resource master secrets, epochs, envelopes, and bearer access
The current code does not implement Keyhive, BeeKEM, strong forward secrecy, or
post-compromise security. It leaves room for future local-first, replicated auth
logs and BeeKEM/CGKA-style group key evolution.